GEORGE J. STRICKLAND A/K/A GEORGE STRICKLAND A/K/A GEORGE JACKSON STRICKLAND Petitioner
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Respondent
EN BANC ORDER
D. MAXWELL II, JUSTICE
the Court is the Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief
filed pro se by George J. Strickland. Strickland's
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and
the mandate issued on August 30, 2016. Strickland v.
State, 192 So.3d 1105 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). This is
Strickland's second application for leave, and it is
barred as a successive application. Miss. Code Ann. §
99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2015). The Court finds that Strickland has
presented no arguable basis for his claims, that no exception
to the procedural bar exists, and that the petition should be
denied. See Means v. State, 43 So.3d 438, 442 (Miss.
2010). Notwithstanding the procedural bar, the Court finds
that Strickland's claims are without merit.
Court also finds that the successive application for leave is
frivolous. Strickland is warned that future filings deemed
frivolous may result not only in monetary sanctions, but also
in restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction
collateral relief (or pleadings in that nature) in forma
pauperis. Order, Dunn v. State, 2016-M-01514
(Miss. Nov. 15, 2018).
THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Post-Conviction
Collateral Relief filed pro se by George J. Strickland is
DENY AND ISSUE SANCTIONS WARNING: RANDOLPH, C.J., MAXWELL,
BEAM, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
DENY: COLEMAN, J.
DISMISS: KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ.
P.J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
STATEMENT JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J.; COLEMAN, J., JOINS IN
PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT:
Although George J. Strickland's application for
post-conviction relief does not merit relief, I disagree with
the Court's finding that the application is frivolous and
with the warning that future filings deemed frivolous may
result in monetary sanctions or restrictions on filing
applications for post-conviction collateral relief in
This Court previously has defined a frivolous motion to mean
one filed in which the movant has "no hope of
success." Roland v. State, 666 So.2d 747, 751
(Miss. 1995). However, "though a case may be weak or
'light-headed,' that is not sufficient to label it
frivolous." Calhoun v. State, 849 So.2d 892,
897 (Miss. 2003). In his application for post-conviction
relief, Strickland made reasonable arguments that the
evidence presented was insufficient to support a guilty
verdict, that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight
of the evidence, that his sentence was disproportionate to
the crime charged, and that violations of his constitutional
rights required reversal. As such, I disagree with the
Court's determination that Strickland's application
Additionally, I disagree with this Court's warning that
future filings may result in monetary sanctions or
restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction
collateral relief in forma pauperis. The imposition
of monetary sanctions upon a criminal defendant proceeding
in forma pauperis only serves to punish or preclude
that defendant from his lawful right to appeal. Black's
Law Dictionary defines sanction as "[a] provision that
gives force to a legal imperative by either rewarding
obedience or punishing disobedience."
Sanction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
(emphasis added). Instead of punishing the defendant for
filing a motion, I believe that this Court should simply deny
or dismiss motions that lack merit. As Justice Brennan wisely
The Court's order purports to be motivated by this
litigant's disproportionate consumption of the
Court's time and resources. Yet if his filings are truly
as repetitious as it appears, it hardly takes much time to
identify them as such. I find it difficult to see how the
amount of time and resources required to deal properly with
McDonald's petitions could be so great as to justify the
step we now take. Indeed, the time that has been consumed in
the preparation of the present order barring the door to Mr.
McDonald far exceeds that which would have been necessary to
process his petitions for the next several years at least. I
continue to ...