OF JUDGMENT: 06/22/2016
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT TRIAL JUDGE: HON. THOMAS J. GARDNER III
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JASON HOLLOWAY (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BILLY
J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.
Jason Rickey Holloway, appearing pro se, appeals the Alcorn
County Circuit Court's denial of his motion for
postconviction relief (PCR). After review of the record, we
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 20, 2015, Holloway pleaded guilty to strong armed
robbery under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-73
(Rev. 2006) and was sentenced as a non-violent offender under
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2007) to
fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections in cause number CR2012-251.
On or about September 13, 2015, Holloway filed his first PCR
motion in cause number CR2012-251, alleging he was denied his
right to a speedy trial, his indictment was improper, his
lawyer was ineffective, and his plea was involuntary.
Holloway also filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
enter a plea of not guilty. On June 15, 2016, the circuit
court summarily denied Holloway's PCR
motion. That same day, the circuit court entered
an order denying Holloway's pro se motion to withdraw the
guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty. On July 11, 2016,
Holloway filed an out-of-time appeal, which he called a
"motion to proceed to the appeal court." But, that
motion was never addressed or forwarded to the Mississippi
Clerk of Appellate Courts.
On or about September 13, 2016, Holloway filed his second PCR
motion in the same cause number. In an order entered on or
about January 3, 2017, the circuit court denied
Holloway's second PCR motion finding it barred as a
successive writ. On July 25, 2017, Holloway filed a letter
deemed as a notice of appeal related to the circuit
court's denial of one of the motions filed in June 2016.
This Mississippi Clerk of Appellate Courts directed Holloway
to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as
untimely. On December 14, 2017, this Court's clerk
received Holloway's motion for an out-of-time appeal
stating that he was unaware of the thirty-day deadline to
On or about March 13, 2018, this Court granted Holloway's
out-of-time appeal from the denial of his first PCR motion,
finding that Holloway had clearly taken the steps to file the
equivalent of a timely notice of appeal. Therefore, this
Court will review Holloway's first PCR motion, because it
does not appear that Holloway appeals the denial of his
second PCR motion.
"When reviewing a trial court's denial or dismissal
of a motion for PCR, we will only disturb the trial
court's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous;
however, we review . . . legal conclusions under a de novo
standard of review." Chapman v. State, 167
So.3d 1170, 1172 (¶3) (Miss. 2015).
Holloway was allowed to appeal the denial of his first PCR
motion filed in September, 2015. As a result, we will only
address the claims Holloway asserts in his first PCR motion,
as those claims are properly before this Court.
Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial
Holloway asserts that he was denied the right to a speedy
trial. It is well established that where a defendant
voluntarily pleads guilty to an offense he waives
nonjurisdictional rights incident to trial, including the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. See Anderson v.
State, 577 So.2d 390, 392 (Miss. 1991); Kyles v.
State, 185 So.3d 408, 411 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016). Therefore, we find that this issue is without merit.
Holloway argues that his indictment was improperly amended.
"A circuit court's decision to permit the State to
amend an indictment to reflect a defendant's
habitual-offender status is an issue of law and enjoys a
relatively broad standard of review." Curry v.
State, 131 So.3d 1232, 1234 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App.
2013) (quoting Jackson v. State, 943 So.2d 746, 749
(¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). Holloway maintains that he
would have not pleaded guilty if he would have known that the
State would move to indict him as a nonviolent habitual
offender. But Holloway did not object at his plea hearing,
and the trial court found that Holloway's claim targeting
the amendment of his indictment to reflect his status as a
habitual offender was in direct contradiction to
Holloway's statements under oath. The following is an
excerpt of Holloway's statement to the trial court during
his plea hearing:
THE COURT: Do I understand correctly that this recommendation
is that he be sentenced as an habitual offender in this
cause? Is that what I understand?
THE STATE: Yes, Your Honor, it is.
DEFENSE: That's the nonviolent habitual ...