PATSY B. WHITE APPELLANT
WILLIAM T. WHITE D/B/A ROYERS ESTATES INC. APPELLEE
OF JUDGMENT: 03/23/2018
COUNTY CHANCERY COURT HON. SUSAN RHEA SHELDON TRIAL JUDGE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: PAUL E. ROGERS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WILLIAM T. WHITE (PRO SE)
This appeal arises from William T. White's failure to
transfer title to real property to his mother, Patsy B.
White, after she completed payments on the deed of trust. The
Pike County Chancery Court dismissed Patsy's second
amended complaint and found that her breach-of-contract claim
was barred by the statute of frauds and the statute of
limitations. She appeals from that order. We find no error
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2007, Royers Estates Inc. received approximately
22.5 acres of property in Pike County (the "subject
property") in exchange for a deed of trust valued at
$56, 375. The deed of trust was between William, the owner of
Royers Estates, and Pauline Edwards, the previous owner of
the property. The deed of trust indicated that it was a
security for a promissory note where William was to pay
Pauline the sum of $882 per month until it was paid in full.
William became unable to make the monthly payments. Patsy,
William's mother, agreed to take over the payments on the
subject property in order to avoid foreclosure. Patsy claimed
that in exchange for making the payments, William verbally
agreed to transfer his interest in the subject property to
Along with the deed of trust on the subject property, Patsy
also took over payments for other properties under the same
condition: that William transfer title to Patsy in return for
payment. According to Patsy, "[t]itle to the subject
property was supposed to have been transferred at the same
time as the other titles to the other properties were
transferred . . . ." The deeds evidencing the conveyance
of the other properties were attached to the first amended
complaint and dated December 16, 2008 and June 16 and 17,
In November 2013, Patsy completed payments on the subject
property. When Patsy attempted to sell the subject property
in March 2014, she discovered that title to the subject
property had never been transferred to her but instead
remained in William's name.
In July 2014, Patsy filed a complaint for quiet title,
injunction, and damages. In essence, Patsy sought specific
performance of the verbal agreement. Additionally, Patsy
asked for damages if the title defect could not be cured and
that William be prevented from transferring his interests in
the property to any other party.
Patsy amended her complaint one month later to include the
other properties she agreed to pay for in return for title.
William, acting pro se, filed an answer along with a motion
to dismiss. Following a hearing in April 2016, the chancery
court allowed Patsy to amend her complaint. On April 22,
2016, Patsy filed a second amended complaint and asserted a
claim for breach of contract. Patsy further sought mandatory
injunctive relief and requested the imposition of a
constructive trust and damages. Patsy also requested
"that she be granted a lien against the subject property
to secure said lien."
William moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. He
asserted that the statute of frauds and the statute of
limitations barred Patsy's breach-of-contract claim. The
chancery court granted William's motion to dismiss on
July 7, 2017. The next day, Patsy moved for reconsideration
seeking clarification because the order gave no reason for
On March 23, 2018, the chancery court issued an order with
findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Patsy's
motion for reconsideration. In that order, the court found
that Patsy's breach-of-contract claim was barred by the
statute of frauds and the statute of limitations.
Additionally, the court determined that Patsy failed to meet
the requirements for injunctive relief and "fail[ed] to
plead any of the requisite elements for the imposition of a
constructive trust." The chancery court concluded that
the second amended complaint was properly dismissed for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is from this order that Patsy now appeals. She alleges
that (1) her claim does not violate the statute of frauds;
(2) her claim does not violate the statute of limitations;
(3) the chancery court wrongly dismissed her request for
mandatory injunctive relief; (4) the chancery court wrongly
denied the imposition of a constructive trust; and (5) the
chancery court wrongly denied her the granting of a lien
against the subject property. Finding no error, we affirm.
"Chancellors are vested with broad discretion, and this
Court will not disturb the chancellor's findings unless
the court's actions were manifestly wrong, the court
abused its discretion, or the court applied an erroneous
legal standard." Johnston v. Parham, 758 So.2d
443, 445 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
"When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court's
standard of review is de novo." Scaggs v. GPCH-GP
Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (¶6) (Miss. 2006).
"[T]he allegations in the complaint must be taken as
true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears
beyond doubt that the ...