EN BANC ORDER
MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH CHIEF JUSTICE
before the en banc Court is Tommie Lee Page's Application
for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court.
was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced as a
habitual offender to life in prison. Page v. State,
843 So.2d 96, 97 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). The Court of Appeals
affirmed, and the mandate issued on May 6, 2003. Id.
then, Page has filed multiple applications for leave to seek
post-conviction relief in the trial court. The order denying
his last application said that application was his third.
Order, Page v. State, 2013-M-01645 (Miss. Aug. 15,
2018). Upon further review, however, he has filed a total of
seven: Order, Page v. State, 2013-M-01645 (Miss.
Aug. 15, 2018); Order, Page v. State, 2013-M-01645
(Miss. Dec. 17, 2015); Order, Page v. State,
2013-M-01645 (Miss. Nov. 13, 2013); Order, Page v.
State, 2012-M-00840 (Miss. July 5, 2012); Order,
Page v. State, 2007-M-00432 (Miss. Feb. 18, 2009);
Order, Page v. State, 2007-M-00432 (Miss. Apr. 18,
2007); Order, Page v. State, 2004-M-00448 (Miss.
July 19, 2004).
application, Page raises the following claims:
(1) His sentence is illegal because (a) he was erroneously
sentenced for a crime that was neither tried nor proved; (b)
the indictment was fatally defective for erroneously charging
the crime of aggravated assault; and (c) the indictment was
defective, and his due-process rights were violated, because
the word "did" was omitted.
(2) The trial court erred by allowing the multi-count
indictment to proceed when it was not permitted under
Mississippi Code Section 99-7-2 (Rev. 2015).
(3) The habitual-offender portion of his sentence is illegal.
(4) His conviction and sentence are illegal because the State
failed to prove aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
due consideration, we find the following.
although Page alleges illegal sentence in his first claim,
his arguments are that the indictment and the jury
instructions were defective. Such claims do not meet any
recognized exception to the time, waiver, and successive-writ
bars. Chapman v. State, 167 So.3d 1170, 1174-75
(Miss. 2015); Smith v. State, 149 So.3d 1027,
1031-32 (Miss. 2014), overruled on other grounds by
Pitchford v. State, 240 So.3d 1061 (Miss. 2017);
Bell v. State, 123 So.3d 924, 925 (Miss. 2013);
Rowland v. State, 98 So.3d 1032, 1035-36 (Miss.
2012), overruled on other grounds by Carson v.
State, 212 So.3d 22 (Miss. 2016); see also Bevill v.
State, 669 So.2d 14, 17 (Miss. 1996); Brown v.
State, 187 So.3d 667, 671 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). And
even if they did meet a recognized exception, Page's
claims lack any arguable basis to warrant relief from the
bars. Means v. State, 43 So.3d 438, 442 (Miss.
Page's claim challenging the multi-count indictment also
does not meet any recognized exception to the procedural
bars. Chapman, 167 So.3d at 1174-75; Smith,
149 So.3d at 1031-32; Bell, 123 So.3d at 925;
Rowland, 98 So.3d at 1035-36; see also
Bevill, 669 So.2d at 17; Brown, 187 So.3d at
671. And even if such claim did meet a recognized exception,
his claim lacks any arguable basis to warrant relief from the
bars. Means, 43 So.3d at 442.
Page's challenge to the legality of the habitual-offender
portion of his sentence constitutes a recognized exception to
the procedural bars. Rowland, 98 So.3d at 1035-36.
To warrant waiving the bars, however, the claim must have
some arguable basis. Means, 43 So.3d at 442. We find
that Page's claim does not.
Page's claim that the State failed to prove aggravated
assault beyond a reasonable doubt is barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-39-21(2) (Rev.
2015). That issue was raised and decided on direct appeal.
Page, 843 So.2d at 98 ("[Page] contends that
the State ...