MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE FOR THE COURT
matter is before the Court on the Application for Leave to
Proceed in the Trial Court filed pro se by Gregory Hollins.
The mandate in Hollins's direct appeal issued in 2012.
The present petition is subject to the time bar. Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-39-5 (Rev. 2015). Further, Hollins's
previous petition for post-conviction relief was denied by
order of the Court entered on December 29, 2015. The present
filing is successive. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27 (Rev.
2015). After due consideration, the panel finds that Hollins
has presented no arguable basis for his claims, that no
exception to the procedural bars exists, and that the
petition should be denied. See Means v. State, 43
So.3d 438, 442 (Miss. 2010). Notwithstanding the procedural
bars, the Court finds that the claims raised in the petition
are without merit.
Court further finds that the present petition is frivolous.
Hollins is hereby warned that future filings deemed frivolous
could result in monetary sanctions or in restrictions on the
petitioner's ability to file petitions for
post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that
nature) in forma pauperis. See Order, Dunn v.
State, 2016-M-01514 (Miss. Nov. 15, 2018).
THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application for Leave to Proceed
in the Trial Court filed pro se by Gregory Hollins is denied.
DENY AND ISSUE SANCTIONS WARNING: RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN,
AND ISHEE, JJ.
DISMISS AND ISSUE SANCTIONS WARNING: MAXWELL, BEAM, AND
DENY: KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT:
Although Gregory Hollins's application for
post-conviction relief does not merit relief, I disagree with
the Court's finding that the application is frivolous and
with the warning that future filings deemed frivolous may
result in monetary sanctions or restrictions on filing
applications for post-conviction collateral relief in
This Court previously has defined a frivolous motion to mean
one filed in which the movant has "no hope of
success." Roland v. State, 666 So.2d 747, 751
(Miss. 1995). However, "though a case may be weak or
'light-headed,' that is not sufficient to label it
frivolous." Calhoun v. State, 849 So.2d 892,
897 (Miss. 2003). In his application for post-conviction
relief, Hollins made reasonable arguments challenging the
subsequent drug-offender enhancement and claiming that
certified copies of his prior convictions do not appear in
the record, that he is actually innocent, and that his
sentence is disproportionate. As such, I disagree with the
Court's determination that Hollins's application is
Additionally, I disagree with this Court's warning that
future filings may result in monetary sanctions or
restrictions on filling applications for post-conviction
collateral relief in forma pauperis. The imposition
of monetary sanctions upon a criminal defendant proceeding
in forma pauperis only serves to punish or preclude
that defendant from his lawful right to appeal. Black's
Law Dictionary defines sanction as "[a] provision that
gives force to a legal imperative by either rewarding
obedience or punishing disobedience."
Sanction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
(emphasis added). Instead of punishing the defendant for
filing a motion, I believe that this Court should simply deny
or dismiss motions that lack merit. As Justice Brennan wisely
The Court's order purports to be motivated by this
litigant's disproportionate consumption of the
Court's time and resources. Yet if his filings are truly
as repetitious as it appears, it hardly takes much time to
identify them as such. I find it difficult to see how the
amount of time and resources required to deal properly with
McDonald's petitions could be so great as to justify the
step we now take. Indeed, the time that has been consumed in
the preparation of the present order barring the door to Mr.
McDonald far exceeds that which would have been necessary to
process his petitions for the next several years at least. I
continue to ...