United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
T. WINGATE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for
consideration of dismissal. Petitioner Allied Rush is
presently incarcerated at the Lauderdale County Detention
Center, Meridian, Mississippi. Pet.  at 1. He filed the
instant petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Pet.  at 1. As directed by the Court's
Order  entered December 3, 2018, Petitioner filed a
Response  on December 14, 2018. The Court, having
considered Petitioner's pro se habeas Petition ,
Response , and the relevant authorities, finds that it
should be dismissed for the reasons that follow.
states that he was falsely charged on or about April 22,
2018, with the criminal charges of aggravated assault,
shooting into a dwelling, and shooting into a vehicle by the
Circuit Court of Lauderdale County, Mississippi. Pet.  at
7; Pet'r's Resp.  at 1. Petitioner's ground
for habeas relief is that his pretrial bond should be
reduced. Pet.  at 7-8. Petitioner argues that his
co-defendants have had their bonds reduced and Petitioner is
entitled to having his bond reduced after 90-days.
Id. at 8. Petitioner states that he has been
incarcerated for sevens months without being indicted.
Id.; Pet'r's Resp.  at 1. Petitioner
states that he has filed a motion for bond reduction.
Pet'r's Resp.  at 1. Petitioner further states
that he has been appointed an attorney by the Circuit Court
of Lauderdale County. Id. As relief, Petitioner
requests the following: (1) that the Court
“re-investigate this crime;” (2) that the Court
“exonerate [him] from all charges;” and (3) that
he be given a “fair chance to a lower bond.” Pet.
 at 9.
pre-trial detainee like Petitioner has the right to seek
federal habeas relief, the availability of such relief is not
without limits. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973). “[F]ederal
habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special
circumstances,' to adjudicate the merits of an
affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a
judgment of conviction by a state court.” Id.
at 489 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253
(1886)). Furthermore, a petitioner is not permitted to derail
“a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate
constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.”
Id. at 493.
Exhaustion required concerning pre-trial bond
claims that his pre-trial bond was not reduced even though he
argues he is entitled to a bond reduction after 90-days. Pet.
 at 8. Petitioner states that he has been incarcerated for
seven months. Id.; Pet'r's Resp.  at 1.
Petitioner is required to exhaust his claims in state court
prior to pursuing a federal habeas corpus petition. See
Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 228 (5th
Cir.1987). The exhaustion requirement gives “the State
the ‘opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged
violations of its prisoner's federal rights.”
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per
curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971)). In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement,
Petitioner must present his claims to the state's highest
court in a procedurally proper manner. See O'Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-840 (1999).
State of Mississippi provides available remedies for a
criminal defendant to assert the denial of reduction of
pre-trial bond. See Strickland v. Darby, 135 So.3d
234, 235 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). As reflected by his Response
, Petitioner has pending a motion for bond reduction in
the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County. See
Pet'r's Resp.  at 1. In the event Petitioner
disagrees with the decision of the Circuit Court of
Lauderdale County, he may appeal the state trial court's
decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court. See
Strickland, 135 S. 3d at 235.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he has exhausted
his state-court remedies for the claims presented in this
Petition. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228 (finding
inmate's numerous preindictment motions in the state
court requesting that he be tried as soon as possible did not
satisfy exhaustion of speedy trial issue for federal habeas
petition). Petitioner does not claim, nor does the Court
find, the presence of exceptional circumstances to excuse the
exhaustion requirement. See Deters v. Collins, 985
F.2d 789, 795-96 (5th Cir.1993) (holding exhaustion
requirement may only be excused in “rare cases where
exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency mandate federal
court interference”). Moreover, the Court notes that
Petitioner states he is being represented by a court
appointed attorney concerning his pending criminal charges.
See Pet'r's Resp.  at 1. Therefore,
Petitioner's claims relating to his pretrial bond are
dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted.
clear, the Court is not passing on the validity of
Petitioner's claims related to the issue of his bond, but
before he can bring the matters to this Court, he must first
pursue them in state court.
Requests to have pending state criminal charges dismissed
United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a
pre-trial petitioner seeking to “abort a state
proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state
judicial processes” and a petitioner seeking only to
enforce the state's obligation to bring him promptly to
trial. Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th
Cir. 1976) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-90;
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969)). The Fifth
Circuit has held that the distinction is based on the type of
relief requested by the petitioner. Id. If the
petitioner is seeking to dismiss an indictment or otherwise
prevent prosecution of the cases, then he is seeking to
“abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly
functioning of state judicial processes.” Id.
But if the petitioner is attempting to “force the state
to go to trial, ” then he is merely seeking to force
the state to fulfill its obligation to provide petitioner
with a prompt trial. Id. The former objective is
generally not attainable through federal habeas corpus; the
latter is. Id.
Petitioner seeks the dismissal of his state criminal charges,
see Pet.  at 9, and is therefore, attempting
“to abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly
functioning of state judicial processes” which is not
available through federal habeas corpus. See
Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226 (quoting Brown, 530