United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
B. BIGGERS, JR. SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Marvin Pearson, an inmate housed at the Marshall County
Correctional Facility, has filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging
his pleas and sentences for three counts of armed robbery and
his parole ineligibility attendant to those convictions.
2011, Pearson pleaded guilty to three counts of armed robbery
in the Circuit Court of Tunica County and was sentenced to a
term of fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections without the possibility of parole.
Docs. #8-1 and #8-2. After filing unsuccessful
post-conviction actions in the circuit court, Pearson filed
the instant petition for federal habeas relief. See
Doc. #1. After being directed to respond to the petition,
Respondents subsequently moved to for dismissal. See
Doc. #8. Pearson has failed to timely respond to
Respondents' motion, and this matter is now ripe for
instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is subject to the
statute of limitations of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Egerton
v. Cockrell, 334 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2003). The
issue of whether Respondents' motion should be granted
turns on the statute's limitation period, which provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of -
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
the laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant
was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The federal limitations period is
tolled while a “properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In “rare and
exceptional circumstances, ” the limitations period may
be equitably tolled. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d
168, 170-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
statute, there is no direct appeal from a guilty plea.
See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-101. Therefore,
Pearson's convictions became final on July 5, 2011, the
date on which he was sentenced on his guilty plea.
See Doc. #8-2; Roberts v. Cockrell, 319
F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a judgment becomes
final “by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review”).
Therefore, unless Pearson properly filed a post-conviction
application as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) on
or before July 5, 2012, his federal habeas petition is
records submitted by Respondents demonstrate that Pearson has
filed two motions for post-conviction relief in the Circuit
Court of Tunica County, Mississippi, but that neither were
filed prior to July 7, 2012. The first motion for
post-conviction relief was signed by Pearson on March 5, 2014
and stamped as “filed” by the circuit court on
March 12, 2014. See Doc. #8-3 (Cause No. 2014-0046).
That motion was ultimately dismissed for lack of merit by
Order filed September 15, 2014. See Doc. #8-4.
Thereafter, Pearson signed a second motion for
post-conviction relief on July 8, 2015, which was stamped
“filed” by the circuit court on November 13,
2015. See Doc. #8-6 (Cause No. 2015-0138). The
post-conviction motion was denied as untimely, successive,
and for lack of merit. See Doc. #8-7. Pearson
appealed this decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court,
which dismissed the appeal as untimely on March 29, 2018.
See Doc. #8-8. Pearson sought both rehearing and
certiorari review of that decision, but those motions were
likewise either denied or dismissed. See Doc. #8-9.
Therefore, because ...