United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division
MICHAEL P. MILLS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings . The Court, having
reviewed the motion, the parties' submissions, the
complaint, and applicable authority, is now prepared to rule.
William Robert Corley, was employed by FNC, Inc. on March 4,
2013 in Oxford, Mississippi. In late 2014, Plaintiff informed
his supervisors and the Human Resources Department that he
desired to move to Colorado and wished to work remotely. By
the end of 2015, Plaintiff's supervisors and other
corporate officials were aware of Plaintiff's desire to
move to Colorado.
2016, CoreLogic, Inc., Defendant, acquired FNC, Inc.. By
April 2016, Plaintiff was now employed by CoreLogic
Solutions, LLC as a technical business analyst. A few months
later in June 2016, Director of Research and Development,
Raju Alluri, discussed with Plaintiff about working as an
engineer in the Research and Development department.
Plaintiff then informed Mr. Alluri and Mr. Marsalis, his
superiors, about his desire to work remotely from Colorado.
His superiors agreed that he could work remotely.
2016, Plaintiff began his work in the Research and
Development department while at the same time continuing his
work as a technical business analyst. That same summer,
Plaintiff began making plans for his move to Colorado: he
made improvements to his home in Oxford; searched for a
property in Colorado; listed his Oxford home; and sold his
October 28, 2016, Director Raju Alluri provided Plaintiff
with a letter stating that he would be permitted to work
remotely from Colorado. Shortly thereafter Plaintiff closed
on his home in Colorado and moved in November 2016.
January 6, 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from Maria
Nalywayko, Senior Vice President for the Human Resources
& Strategic Project Administration, informing him that he
could no longer work remotely as the company was implementing
a new standard requiring that all work be office-based. The
letter required Plaintiff to either “choose to commute
to the nearest CoreLogic office no later than March 31,
2017” or “choose to take a separation package
rather than commuting to a CoreLogic location” no later
than February 3, 2017. Plaintiff chose the separation package
and returned the acknowledgement form on February 3, 2017.
separation date was March 31, 2017, and Plaintiff did not
sign a separation agreement with Defendant.
complaint, filed February 20, 2018, Plaintiff states that
CoreLogic did not apply the new policy consistently among its
employees and granted some employees extensions or
exemptions. Plaintiff argues that the new policy was
implemented to target and terminate him in order to: remove a
highly-compensated employee from payroll; remove an employee
who was due for a promotion; and remove an employee who posed
a perceived threat and competition to his supervisors.
Plaintiff alleges claims for breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, and a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
on July 21, 2018, filed this motion for judgment on the
12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
“[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not
to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). In considering Rule
12(c) motions the court relies on the same standard as that
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th
Cir. 2002). In a motion for a judgment on the pleadings
“[t]he central issue is whether, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid
claim for relief.” Hughes c. Tobacco Inst.,
Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001). Such a motion
“is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of
fact and only questions of law remain.” Id.
(citing Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of
China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, in
ruling on a motion for a ...