D. MAXWELL II, JUSTICE
before the en banc Court is Joe Nathan Harris's
Application for Leave to Proceed in the Trial Court.
filed this fourth application outside the three-year
limitations period. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev.
2015). He raises two claims: (1) newly discovered evidence
and (2) illegal sentence.
claim (1), the procedural bars do not apply if a petitioner
can show he or she has "evidence, not reasonably
discoverable at the time of trial, that is of such nature
that it would be practically conclusive that, if it had been
introduced at trial, it would have caused a different result
in the conviction or sentence." Underwood v.
State, 37 So.3d 10, 12 (Miss. 2010) (quoting Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Supp. 2009)). After due
consideration, we find the evidence Harris offers fails to
meet that standard.
claim (2), illegal-sentence claims can be excepted from the
procedural bars. Rowland v. State, 98 So.3d 1032,
1035-36 (Miss. 2012), overruled on other grounds by
Carson v. State, 212 So.3d 22 (Miss. 2016). To warrant
waiving those bars, however, the claim must have some
arguable basis. Means v. State, 43 So.3d 438, 442
(Miss. 2010). After due consideration, we find that
Harris's claim does not.
above reasons, we find the application should be dismissed.
In addition, Harris is hereby warned that future filings
deemed frivolous may result not only in monetary sanctions,
but also in restrictions on his filing applications for
post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that
nature) in forma pauperis. Order, Dunn v.
State, 2016-M-01514 (Miss. Nov. 15, 2018).
THEREFORE ORDERED that the application is dismissed.
DISMISS: WALLER, C.J., KITCHENS, P.J., KING, COLEMAN,
MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ.
DENY: RANDOLPH, P.J.
J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
STATEMENT JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J.
JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
Although Joe Nathan Harris's application for
post-conviction relief does not merit relief, I disagree with
this Court's warning that future filings which this Court
deems frivolous may result in monetary sanctions or
restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction
collateral relief in forma pauperis.
This Court seems to tire of reading motions that it deems
"frivolous" and imposes monetary sanctions on
indigent defendants. The Court then bars those defendants,
who in all likelihood are unable to pay the imposed
sanctions, from future filings. In choosing to prioritize
efficiency over justice, this Court forgets the oath that
each justice took before assuming office. That oath stated in
relevant part, "I . . . solemnly swear (or affirm) that