D. MAXWELL II, JUSTICE
before the en banc Court is Gregory Linson's motion
titled "Post-Conviction Relief Miss. Code Ann.
99-39-25(1) Rule 2(c) and 4(g)."
filed this, his sixth application for leave to seek
postconviction collateral relief outside the three-year
limitations period. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). We
discern three claims: (1) Linson was unfairly surprised when
the State amended his indictment to charge him as a repeat
drug offender and a habitual offender; (2) the cocaine's
weight did not mandate a thirty-year sentence; and (3)
"[w]hen the facts which constitute a criminal offense
may fall under either of two statutes, or when there is a
substantial doubt as to which of the two is to be applied,
the case will be referred to the statute which imposes the
lesser punishment." Alexander v. State, 749
So.2d 1031, 1039 (Miss. 1999) (quoting White v.
State, 374 So.2d 225, 227 (Miss. 1979)).
due consideration, we find the following. First, claim (1)
does not meet any recognized exception to the time, waiver,
and successive-writ bars. Rowland v. State, 98 So.3d
1032, 1035-36 (Miss. 2012), overruled on other grounds by
Carson v. State, 212 So.3d 22 (Miss. 2016); Bell v.
State, 123 So.3d 924, 925 (Miss. 2013); Chapman v.
State, 167 So.3d 1170, 1174-75 (Miss. 2015); see
also Bevill v. State, 669 So.2d 14, 17 (Miss. 1996);
Brown v. State, 187 So.3d 667, 671 (Miss. Ct. App.
2016). And even if it did, it lacks any arguable basis to
surmount the bars. Means v. State, 43 So.3d 438, 442
(Miss. 2010). Second, in claims (2) and (3), Linson
effectively challenges the legality of his sentence. While
illegal-sentence claims can be excepted from the time,
waiver, and successive-writ bars, Rowland, 98 So.3d
at 1036, Linson's claims lack any arguable basis to
warrant waiving the bars. Means, 43 So.3d at 442.
has been warned that frivolous filings may subject him to
sanctions. Order, Linson v. State, 2011-M-00377
(Miss. Oct. 26, 2011). He is hereby warned again that future
filings deemed frivolous may result not only in monetary
sanctions, but also restrictions on filing applications for
post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that
nature) in forma pauperis. En Banc Order, Dunn v.
State, 2016-M-1514 (Miss. Nov. 15, 2018); En Banc Order,
Fairley v. State, 2014-M-01185 (Miss. May 3, 2018)
(citing Order, Bownes v. State, 2014-M-00478 (Miss.
Sept. 20, 2017)).
THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion is dismissed.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND
COLEMAN, J., AGREES IN PART AND IN RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE
J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
STATEMENT JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J.
JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
Although Gregory Linson's application for post-conviction
relief does not merit relief, I disagree with the warning
contained in this Court's order that future filings
deemed frivolous may result in monetary sanctions or
restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction
collateral relief in forma pauperis.
The imposition of monetary sanctions upon a criminal
defendant proceeding in forma pauperis only
serves to punish or preclude that defendant from his lawful
right to appeal. Black's Law Dictionary defines sanction
as "[a] provision that gives force to a legal imperative
by either rewarding obedience or punishing
disobedience." Sanction, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). Instead of
punishing the defendant for filing a motion, I believe that
this Court should simply deny or dismiss motions which lack
merit. As Justice Brennan wisely stated,
The Court's order purports to be motivated by this
litigant's disproportionate consumption of the
Court's time and resources. Yet if his filings are truly
as repetitious as it appears, it hardly takes much time to
identify them as such. I find it difficult to see how the
amount of time and resources required to deal properly with
McDonald's petitions could be so great as to justify the
step we now take. Indeed, the time that has been consumed in
the preparation of the present order barring the door to Mr.
McDonald far exceeds that which would have been necessary to
process his petitions for the next several years at least. I
continue to find puzzling the Court's fervor in ensuring
that rights granted to the poor are not abused, even when so
doing actually increases the drain on our limited resources.
In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186-87, 109 S.Ct. 993,
997, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989) (per ...