United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division
WILLIE J. HARRIS PLAINTIFF
JACQUELINE CANNON DEFENDANT
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MICHAEL P. MILLS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Defendant Jacqueline Cannon's motion for
summary judgment and Plaintiff Willie J. Harris' response
thereto. See Docs. #80 & #87. For the reasons
set forth below, Defendant's motion will be granted and
summary judgment entered in favor of Defendant Cannon.
February 1, 2017, Harris, an inmate housed in Unit 30 at the
Mississippi State Penitentiary, filed a grievance against
Deputy Warden Lee Simon. According to Harris,
Simon, assisted by Defendant Jacqueline Cannon,
began retaliating against him.
contends that Cannon's involvement in the retaliation
concerns two false RVRs against him that were written at
Simon's instruction: RVR #01725266 and RVR #01732159.
Both RVRs were for the possession of contraband (tobacco).
Harris claims that the first RVR was destroyed and replaced
with the second RVR in order to omit any reference to the RVR
being written upon Simon's orders. Harris was found
guilty of RVR #01732159.
subsequently initiated this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He requests that the Court remove RVR #01732159 from
his record, and that he be awarded with court costs and
monetary damages for mental anguish and suffering.
judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
illustrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is deemed “material
if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the
outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.”
Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316,
326 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation mark
omitted). “The moving party must show that if the
evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible
evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the
nonmoving party to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th
Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
the motion is properly supported with competent evidence, the
nonmovant must show that summary judgment is inappropriate.
Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d
377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 323. That is, the non-movant must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986);
Beck, 204 F.3d at 633. The nonmovant cannot rely
upon “conclusory allegations, speculation, and
unsubstantiated assertions” to satisfy his burden, but
rather, must set forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue as to every essential element of his
claim. Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); Morris, 144 F.3d at
380. If the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, ” then
there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). If no proof is presented, however, the Court does not
assume that the nonmovant “could or would prove the
necessary facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
plaintiff cannot meet this burden with “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), “conclusory
allegations, ” Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 871-73 (1990),
“unsubstantiated assertions, ” Hopper v.
Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994), or by a mere
“scintilla” of evidence, Davis v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1994). Therefore,
in considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must
determine whether the non-moving party's allegations are
plausible. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
(emphasis added). “[D]etermining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief. . . [is]
context-specific[, ] . . . requir[ing] the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)
(discussing plausibility of claim as a requirement to survive
a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).