United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division
MICHAEL P. MILLS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the court on the pro se petition
of Andrew Jamison for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. The State has not responded to the
petition because the deadline to do so has not expired. For
the reasons set forth below, the petitioner's first
ground for relief will be dismissed as successive, and the
remaining ground will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal
authority under which a person may be detained, is ancient.
Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass,
Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St. John's L.Rev.
55 (1934). It is “perhaps the most important writ known
to the constitutional law of England, ” Secretary
of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, A.C. 603, 609
(1923), and it is equally significant in the United States.
Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the
right of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or invasion,
public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed.
Prac. & Proc. Deskbook § 56. Its use by the federal
courts was authorized in Section14 of the Judiciary Act of
1789. Habeas corpus principles developed over time
in both English and American common law have since been
The statutory provisions on habeas corpus appear as
sections 2241 to 2255 of the 1948 Judicial Code. The
recodification of that year set out important procedural
limitations and additional procedural changes were added in
1966. The scope of the writ, insofar as the statutory
language is concerned, remained essentially the same,
however, until 1996, when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, placing severe restrictions
on the issuance of the writ for state prisoners and setting
out special, new habeas corpus procedures for
capital cases. The changes made by the 1996 legislation are
the end product of decades of debate about habeas
Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal court may
issue the writ when the petitioner is in state custody
pursuant to something other than a state judgment (such as
pretrial detention, pretrial bond order, etc.), permitting a
federal court to order the discharge of any person held by a
state in violation of the supreme law of the land. Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311, 35 S.Ct. 582, 588, 59
L.Ed. 969 (1915).
of Proceedings: § 2254 v. § 2241
Jamison filed the instant petition on the form for seeking
habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(which is a challenge to the validity of an inmate's
conviction or sentence); however, Ground Two of the petition
(the only one for which the court can exercise jurisdiction),
falls under the category of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In Ground
Two, the petitioner challenges the validity of a state
detainer against him, which would affect the duration of his
custody, rather than the validity of his conviction or the
sentence imposed in the trial court. When a state prisoner
challenges unconstitutional parole procedures or rules which
affect his release, and resolution would entitle him to
accelerated release, the challenge is properly brought as a
habeas corpus proceeding, rather than one under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486,
490 (5th Cir.1998).
a challenge to the execution of a sentence, as
opposed to its duration, is appropriately brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as opposed to § 2254.
Id., at 490; see also, Batiste v. State Bd. of
Pardon and Parole, 1999 WL 102027 at *1 (E.D.La.1999)
(quoting King v. Lynaugh, 729 F.Supp. 57, 58
(W.D.Tx.1990)); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n,
115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir.1997) (petitions under
§ 2241 are used to attack execution of a sentence);
Hall v. Saffle, 10 Fed.Appx. 768, 2001 WL 589514 at
*2 (10th Cir. May 31, 2001) (unpub.) (due process
challenge to the execution of a sentence is properly
considered under § 2241). Section 2241 is an appropriate
vehicle to challenge government action that affects the
actual duration of the petitioner's custody (rather than
the length of the sentence imposed), “such as
challenges to administrative orders revoking good-time
credits, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison
officials, a right to release on parole, or other equivalent
sentence-shortening devices.” § 5:7. Federal
prisoners-Section 2241 habeas corpus petitions,
Postconviction Remedies § 5:7. The petitioner in this
case challenges merely the length of his incarceration under
the sentences imposed, rather than the sentences, themselves.
Thus, he seeks federal habeas corpus relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
and Procedural Posture
Jamison was convicted in the Circuit Court DeSoto County,
Mississippi, for attempted armed robbery and possession of a
stolen firearm. He was sentenced on January 18, 2006, to
serve terms of 10 years on the attempted armed robbery charge
(3 to serve and 7 on post-release supervision) and 5 years on
the possession of a stolen firearm charge - to be served
consecutively (a total of 8 years). Jamison v. Byrd,
2:07CV8-MPM-SAA (N. D. Miss.) Doc. 19-2 at 14. It appears that
Mr. Jamison was released on parole from his state sentence
prior to his arrest on federal charges. Doc. 2 at 1
(“[Jamison] was on probation March 5, 2011.”)
on June 23, 2012 he committed the federal offenses and was
arrested on those charges. United States v. Jamison,
2015 WL 1606766 (6th Cir. 2015) (Brief of Andrew
Jamison, Defendant/Appellant) at *3, *12. He was indicted on
the federal charge of felon in possession of a firearm on
November 29, 2012, and the Magistrate Judge ordered that he
be detained until trial. United States v. Jamison,
2:12CV20323-STA (W.D. Tenn.), Doc. 73 at 1 (Jamison charged
and detained until trial). On May 23, 2013, the Federal Grand
Jury returned a superseding indictment charging him with a
second offense - armed robbery. Id. at 2-3.
August 9, 2013, during his federal pretrial detention, Mr.
Jamison received a state warrant for his arrest for violating
the terms of parole on his state sentence. Doc. 2 at 1.
According to Mr. Jamison, his maximum discharge date on his
state convictions was May 23, 2013, the same date the federal
Grand Jury returned the superseding indictment. Id.
He believes that his sentence had fully expired on that date
- prior to the issuance of the August 9, 2013,
arrest warrant on the state parole violation. Id. In
other words, Mr. Jamison alleges that his state sentence
fully expired before his parole could be revoked based upon
his arrest on federal charges. A jury convicted him on both
federal charges (robbery and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon) on April 8, 2014. Id. He is
currently serving ...