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Jamison v. Hood

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division

November 27, 2018

ANDREW JAMISON PETITIONER
v.
JIM HOOD RESPONDENT

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          MICHAEL P. MILLS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This matter comes before the court on the pro se petition of Andrew Jamison for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The State has not responded to the petition because the deadline to do so has not expired. For the reasons set forth below, the petitioner's first ground for relief will be dismissed as successive, and the remaining ground will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

         Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

          The writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal authority under which a person may be detained, is ancient. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St. John's L.Rev. 55 (1934). It is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, ” Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, A.C. 603, 609 (1923), and it is equally significant in the United States. Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the right of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or invasion, public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Deskbook § 56. Its use by the federal courts was authorized in Section14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Habeas corpus principles developed over time in both English and American common law have since been codified:

The statutory provisions on habeas corpus appear as sections 2241 to 2255 of the 1948 Judicial Code. The recodification of that year set out important procedural limitations and additional procedural changes were added in 1966. The scope of the writ, insofar as the statutory language is concerned, remained essentially the same, however, until 1996, when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, placing severe restrictions on the issuance of the writ for state prisoners and setting out special, new habeas corpus procedures for capital cases. The changes made by the 1996 legislation are the end product of decades of debate about habeas corpus.

Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal court may issue the writ when the petitioner is in state custody pursuant to something other than a state judgment (such as pretrial detention, pretrial bond order, etc.), permitting a federal court to order the discharge of any person held by a state in violation of the supreme law of the land. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311, 35 S.Ct. 582, 588, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915).

         Nature of Proceedings: § 2254 v. § 2241

          Mr. Jamison filed the instant petition on the form for seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (which is a challenge to the validity of an inmate's conviction or sentence); however, Ground Two of the petition (the only one for which the court can exercise jurisdiction), falls under the category of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In Ground Two, the petitioner challenges the validity of a state detainer against him, which would affect the duration of his custody, rather than the validity of his conviction or the sentence imposed in the trial court. When a state prisoner challenges unconstitutional parole procedures or rules which affect his release, and resolution would entitle him to accelerated release, the challenge is properly brought as a habeas corpus proceeding, rather than one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir.1998).

         However, a challenge to the execution of a sentence, as opposed to its duration, is appropriately brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as opposed to § 2254. Id., at 490; see also, Batiste v. State Bd. of Pardon and Parole, 1999 WL 102027 at *1 (E.D.La.1999) (quoting King v. Lynaugh, 729 F.Supp. 57, 58 (W.D.Tx.1990)); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir.1997) (petitions under § 2241 are used to attack execution of a sentence); Hall v. Saffle, 10 Fed.Appx. 768, 2001 WL 589514 at *2 (10th Cir. May 31, 2001) (unpub.) (due process challenge to the execution of a sentence is properly considered under § 2241). Section 2241 is an appropriate vehicle to challenge government action that affects the actual duration of the petitioner's custody (rather than the length of the sentence imposed), “such as challenges to administrative orders revoking good-time credits, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, a right to release on parole, or other equivalent sentence-shortening devices.” § 5:7. Federal prisoners-Section 2241 habeas corpus petitions, Postconviction Remedies § 5:7. The petitioner in this case challenges merely the length of his incarceration under the sentences imposed, rather than the sentences, themselves. Thus, he seeks federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

         Facts and Procedural Posture

         Mr. Jamison was convicted in the Circuit Court DeSoto County, Mississippi, for attempted armed robbery and possession of a stolen firearm. He was sentenced on January 18, 2006, to serve terms of 10 years on the attempted armed robbery charge (3 to serve and 7 on post-release supervision) and 5 years on the possession of a stolen firearm charge - to be served consecutively (a total of 8 years). Jamison v. Byrd, 2:07CV8-MPM-SAA (N. D. Miss.) Doc. 19-2 at 14.[1] It appears that Mr. Jamison was released on parole from his state sentence prior to his arrest on federal charges. Doc. 2 at 1 (“[Jamison] was on probation March 5, 2011.”)

         Then, on June 23, 2012 he committed the federal offenses and was arrested on those charges. United States v. Jamison, 2015 WL 1606766 (6th Cir. 2015) (Brief of Andrew Jamison, Defendant/Appellant) at *3, *12. He was indicted on the federal charge of felon in possession of a firearm on November 29, 2012, and the Magistrate Judge ordered that he be detained until trial. United States v. Jamison, 2:12CV20323-STA (W.D. Tenn.), Doc. 73 at 1 (Jamison charged and detained until trial). On May 23, 2013, the Federal Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment charging him with a second offense - armed robbery. Id. at 2-3.

         On August 9, 2013, during his federal pretrial detention, Mr. Jamison received a state warrant for his arrest for violating the terms of parole on his state sentence. Doc. 2 at 1. According to Mr. Jamison, his maximum discharge date on his state convictions was May 23, 2013, the same date the federal Grand Jury returned the superseding indictment. Id. He believes that his sentence had fully expired on that date - prior to the issuance of the August 9, 2013, arrest warrant on the state parole violation. Id. In other words, Mr. Jamison alleges that his state sentence fully expired before his parole could be revoked based upon his arrest on federal charges. A jury convicted him on both federal charges (robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) on April 8, 2014. Id. He is currently serving ...


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