United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division
M. VIRDEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court is Jason Alston's motion for recusal. Doc. #7.
Alston brought his first suit, in this court, against Prairie
Farms on December 13, 2016, alleging violations of Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Alston v. Prairie Farms Dairy,
Inc., No. 4:16-CV-245-DMB-JMV, 2018 WL 1800867, at *1
(N.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2018). On April 16, 2018, the Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Prairie Farms Dairy,
Inc., and entered a final judgment dismissing the case with
post-judgment motion filed May 31, 2018, Alston sought to
“[r]ecuse or [d]isqualify” District Judge Debra
Brown and the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
144 and 455. Alston v. Prairie Farms at Doc. # 120.
The motions were denied as wholly without merit. Id.
at Doc. #147 and 148. The alleged impropriety Mr. Alston
complained of in his former motion is the basis of his
instant motion. This motion will also be denied as wholly
motion, Alston contends that recusal is warranted because of
alleged events that occurred during the March 21, 2018, final
pretrial/settlement conference in the previous case. In
short, Alston claims that during the conference, the
undersigned escorted Prairie Farms' attorney to District
Judge Debra Brown's chambers where the attorney discussed
with the District Judge then pending motions for summary
judgment in the case. Alston also suggests the defense
attorney was carrying a “large purse” that was
“heavy” with what Alston implies was bounty of
455(a) provides that “[a]ny … judge … of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” A recusal motion brought under § 455
is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
Chitimacha Tribe, 690 F.2d at 1166. “A judge
abuses his discretion in denying recusal where a reasonable
man, cognizant of the relevant circumstances surrounding the
judge's failure to recuse, would harbor legitimate doubts
about that judge's impartiality.” Garcia v.
City of Laredo, Tex., 702 F.3d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quotation marks and alterations omitted). In this context, a
court should ask “how things appear to the
well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than
the hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.”
United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir.
455 “is not intended to give litigants a veto power
over sitting judges.” F.T.C. v. Namer, No.
06-30528, 2007 WL 2974059, at *6 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir.
1993). Furthermore, “rumor, speculation, beliefs,
conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar
non-factual matters do not form the basis of a successful
recusal motion.” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d
898, 926 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and alterations
as in his previous motion, Alston's allegations speak for
themselves and do not warrant any meaningful explanation or
discussion, as they are clearly premised on his suspicion,
speculation, and belief. See DiGiustino v. SmarteCarte
Co., Inc., No. 16-00192, 2018 WL 1440214, at *6-7 (D.
Haw. Mar. 22, 2018).
the Court is confident that a reasonable person, cognizant of
all the relevant circumstances, would not question the
undersigned's impartiality based on Alston's vague,
utterly unsubstantiated, wildly speculative, and entirely
false perceptions and beliefs.
the undersigned declines to recuse herself from this matter,
as “erroneous perceptions of reality and loosely based
charges of partiality based on personal perceptions…
do not warrant or justify recusal or disqualification.”
In re AVN Corp., No. 98-20098, 1998 WL 35324198, at
*3 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 1998).
Mr. Alston's  motion for recusal, insofar as it