United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
CHAKAKHAN R. DAVIS PLAINTIFF
HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI and TYRONE LEWIS DEFENDANTS
KEITH BALL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the court are two motions filed by Plaintiff Chakakhan Davis:
(1) motion  for recusal of the district and magistrate
judges assigned to this case; and (2) a “Motion for
Prospective Relief of the Undersigned Decree” ,
requesting the magistrate judge's recusal and vacation of
Order . Chief District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III has
already denied the portion of motion  seeking his
recusal. . For the reasons stated below, the remainder
of motion  is denied, and motion  is also denied.
contends that the undersigned magistrate judge should recuse
himself from this case. As grounds for recusal, Davis cites
the following: the undersigned's ruling on her motion to
quash ; the undersigned's instruction to her
that if she was disruptive during the deposition of her
mother or brother, she may be excluded from the
deposition(s); and her speculation that the undersigned
somehow “participated” in an email advertisement
entitled, “Slow Thyroid? Follow these 3 all-natural
steps, ” being sent to her.  at 6;
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge or
magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” Section (b) of the statute
lists additional grounds for disqualification, including
where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, ” “personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, ”
where “in private practice he served as lawyer in the
matter in controversy, ” or “has been a material
witness concerning it.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
standard for judicial disqualification under 28 U.S.C. §
455 is whether a reasonable person, with full knowledge of
all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the
judge's impartiality.” Matassarin v.
Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 571 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted). The standard for bias is an objective one.
Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir.
well-established that “judicial rulings alone almost
never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Andrade, 338 F.3d at 455 (citation
We note that remarks during the course of a trial that are
critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or
partiality challenge. Not establishing bias or
partiality are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, and even anger that are within the bounds of what
imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as
federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary
efforts at courtroom administration - even a stern and
short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom
administration - remain immune.
Matassarin, 174 F.3d at 571 (citations and ellipses
considered all of Davis's allegations in her motions, the
undersigned finds no basis under 28 U.S.C. § 455 or
otherwise to recuse himself. The undersigned's ruling and
instruction at issue simply applied the court rules and
governing law in an attempt to effectuate just, efficient,
and orderly discovery in this case. And the undersigned did
not participate in the subject email advertisement being sent
to Davis. Davis's motions identify no bias or partiality.
THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Davis's motion 
for recusal of the undersigned and motion  are denied.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
 In her motion to quash, Davis
requested that the undersigned quash the defendants'
notices for the depositions of her mother and brother. Davis
claimed in the motion that her mother suffers from
“paranoid schizophrenia” and that her brother is
a “hostile, prejudice[d], and/or biased witness.”
 at 2. However, in her amended complaint, Davis included
both her mother and brother in the events giving rise to her
claims, and in an interrogatory response, Davis specifically
identified her mother and brother as having
“discoverable knowledge of the facts and circumstances
of this case.”  at 3-4;  at 1-2. Davis failed
to show that her mother was incompetent to testify, and the
defendants were certainly entitled to depose those ...