United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi.
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Bayview Loan Servicing LLC filed a motion to
dismiss (Rec. Doc. 14), the Court ordered the parties to file
supplemental memoranda “about the propriety of
transferring the above-captioned matter to the Southern
District of Mississippi.” Rec. Doc. 21. Plaintiff
Rekena Collins and Defendant Bayview Loan Servicing LLC
timely filed the supplemental memoranda. Rec. Docs. 22, 23.
For the reasons discussed below, IT IS
ORDERED that the above-captioned matter is
TRANSFERRED to the Southern District of
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2015, Plaintiff filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Southern
District of Mississippi. See Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 7.
One of her assets was a piece of property located in
Waveland, Mississippi. See Rec. Doc. 1-3. One of her
liabilities was the mortgage on that property; the mortgage
was held by Bank of America. See Rec. Doc. 1
¶¶ 6, 9. In September 2015, the Waveland property
was abandoned from the bankruptcy estate and Bank of America
was allowed to proceed with foreclosure. See Rec.
Doc. 1-2. Later that same month, the bankruptcy court issued
an order discharging Plaintiff's liability for the debts
she owed when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
See Rec. Doc. 14-4 at 2-3.
to the Complaint, Bank of America sold the mortgage on the
Waveland property to Bayview Loan Servicing LLC in January
2016. See Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 9. Bayview corresponded
with Plaintiff about the mortgage in 2016. See Id.
¶ 10. In January 2017, Bayview sent a Form 1099-A to
Plaintiff at an address in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.
See Rec. Docs. 1 ¶ 11; 1-3. Plaintiff alleges
that, by sending her the Form 1099-A, Bayview “ma[de]
her responsible for” “an outstanding principal
balance of $120, 919.47” “on her personal income
taxes.” Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 11.
January 18, 2018, Petitioner filed the instant complaint
against Bayview, Bank of America, and Bank of New York
Mellon.Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Bank of New York Mellon and Bank of America were
negligent and grossly negligent when they sold the mortgage
on the Waveland property to Bayview, that Bayview was
negligent when it charged off the mortgage on the Waveland
property, and that all Defendants violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act “FDCPA” by causing
Plaintiff to incur a personal tax liability from the sale of
the mortgage on the Waveland property. See id.
“the venue of all civil actions brought in district
courts of the United States” is determined by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b). Under § 1391(b),
a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in
which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of property that is the subject of the action is
situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any
judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the
court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If the case falls within one of the
categories in § 1391(b), “venue is proper; if it
does not, venue is improper.” Atl. Marine Constr.
Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 56 (2013).
venue is improper, a district court “shall dismiss, or
if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Even when venue is
proper, “a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been
brought” “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404. A district court may raise the issue of venue
sua sponte. See Mills v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989);
Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Exxon Corp., 845
F.2d 523, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1988); Caldwell v. Palmetto
State Sav. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1998).
is not proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendants are not
domiciled in Louisiana and their principal places of business
are not located here. See Rec. Doc. 1 ¶¶
2-3. Moreover, Plaintiff's lawsuit does not arise out of
Defendants' contacts with the state of Louisiana; in
fact, all of the alleged activities occurred in Mississippi.
See Id. ¶¶ 7, 11; Rec. Doc. 1-3.
Therefore, Defendants are not residents of Louisiana for
purposes of this case. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(1), (c)(2). None of the events, omissions, or
property involved in this case occurred or are located in the
Eastern District of Louisiana. See Id. ¶¶
7, 11; Rec. Doc. 1-3. Therefore, § 1391(b)(2) does not
make the Eastern District of Louisiana a proper venue.
Because venue is improper, this Court “shall dismiss,
or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer [the] case
to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
is in the interest of justice because Plaintiff indicates
that she wishes to pursue her case in the Southern District
of Mississippi. See Rec. Doc. 22. The Southern
District of Mississippi retains jurisdiction over the
bankruptcy discharge order, which it may enforce via its
contempt power. See Rec. Docs. 14-1 at 6; 22 at 3-4;
In re Cano, 410 B.R. 506, 545-48 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.
2009). Furthermore, because the Eastern District of Louisiana
and the Southern District of Mississippi are adjacent
judicial districts, there will be little practical impact on
the parties going forward.
to the Southern District of Mississippi is appropriate
because venue is proper and that court will have personal
jurisdiction over Bayview. Venue is proper in the Southern
District of Mississippi because the events at the center of
this case occurred there. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(2). Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding was
conducted in the Southern District of Mississippi.
See Rec. Doc. 1 ¶ 7. The Waveland property is
located in the Southern District of Mississippi. See