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Davis v. Hinds County

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division

August 20, 2018

CHAKAKHAN R. DAVIS PLAINTIFF
v.
HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, AND TYRONE LEWIS DEFENDANTS

          ORDER

          DANIEL P. JORDAN III CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Plaintiff Chakakhan R. Davis seeks reconsideration of this Court's April 30, 2018 Order [119] granting Defendant Hinds County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [75]. Because Davis still fails to demonstrate that the claims she wishes to pursue are plausible under the facts submitted, the Court denies her Motion for Reconsideration [135].

         I. Background

         On April 30, 2018, the Court entered an order granting Hinds County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. See Apr. 30, 2018 Order [119]. In relevant part that Order: (1) dismissed Davis's Fourth Amendment claims for false-arrest and excessive-force related to her arrest because Davis failed to allege any Hinds County policy or instances of inadequate training to support her claims; (2) dismissed Davis's unlawful-search claim only as to the strip-search incident; (3) dismissed Davis's Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim regarding only Officer Brenda Jones's conduct in digging her nails into Davis's arm while allegedly dragging Davis to her cell; (4) reaffirmed the earlier dismissal with prejudice of Davis's state-law false-imprisonment claim related to the detention center; and (5) dismissed Davis's Eighth Amendment claims because Davis at all times was a pretrial detainee. See generally Id. Davis asks the Court to reconsider its dismissal of her “false arrest, illegal search/seizures, excessive force, false imprisonment and Eighth Amendment Cruel and unusual punishment Claims.” Pl.'s Mot. [135] at 5. The Court now turns to Davis's arguments.

         II. Standards

         Davis seeks reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). But because the Order granted only partial dismissal, it was interlocutory, and the Court must consider Davis's request for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2017). That rule states that interlocutory orders “may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). “‘Interlocutory orders,' such as grants of partial [dismissal] . . . ‘are left within the plenary power of the court that rendered them to afford such relief from them as justice requires.'” McKay v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Zimzores v. Veterans Admin., 778 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1985)). Whether to grant such relief is a matter left to the trial court's discretion. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment (stating that “interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of [Rule 60], but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice requires”).

         III. Analysis

         A. Arrest-Related Claims

         Davis says the Court erred in dismissing her Fourth Amendment arrest-related claims on the basis that she failed to plead facts suggesting deliberate indifference. Specifically, she argues that the Court should have applied the single-incident theory espoused in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). See Pl.'s Mot. [135] at 7. Accordingly, she asks the Court to reconsider dismissal of her false-arrest and excessive-force claims.

         Regarding the single-incident exception, the Fifth Circuit has stated that:

a showing of deliberate indifference is difficult, although not impossible, to base on a single incident. . . . The “single incident exception” is narrow and to rely on the exception “a plaintiff must prove that the highly predictable consequence of a failure to train would result in the specific injury suffered, and that the failure to train represented the moving force behind the constitutional violation.”

Sanders-Burns v. City Of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 386 (5th Cir. 2005)). In application, the Fifth Circuit has further noted:

Deliberate indifference flows from knowledge of the effects of decisions or conditions and taking no steps to correct the shortcomings, which is why the single-incident exception rarely can succeed. Instead of showing a prior incident that would have created the knowledge, the [plaintiffs] have done nothing more than show deficient training on the use of force. In the absence of a prior incident, the training deficiencies must have been so obvious that the shooting here would have appeared to [defendant] as a “highly predictable consequence.” Valle [v. City of Hous.], 613 F.3d [536, ] 549 [(5th Cir. 2010)]. The ...

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