United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
matter comes before the Court on the pro se petition
of Mississippi inmate, Daniel Paul Copple, on a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Respondents have moved to dismiss the petition as time-barred
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, and Copple has filed a
response to the motion. This matter is now ripe for
resolution. Having fully considered the record, arguments of
the parties, and the applicable law, Respondents' motion
will be granted and the instant petition dismissed with
prejudice, for the reasons set forth below.
and Procedural History
December 8, 2011, Copple was convicted of two counts of
murder and one count of aggravated assault in the Circuit
Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, and was sentenced to
life imprisonment on each murder conviction and fifteen
years' imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction.
Doc. #11-1. On July 16, 2013, the Mississippi Court of
Appeals affirmed Copple's convictions and sentences.
Copple v. State, 117 So.3d 651 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)
(2012-KA-00237-COA). Copple failed to seek rehearing in the
Mississippi Court of Appeals.
filing numerous pleadings in State courts, Copple filed a
federal habeas petition on or about May 16, 2018, challenging
his State-court convictions and sentences. Doc. #1 & Doc.
instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is subject to the
statute of limitations of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Egerton v.
Cockrell, 334 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2003). The issue
of whether Respondents' motion should be granted turns on
the statute's limitation period, which provides:
(d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
the laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant
was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The federal limitations period
is tolled while a "properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review" is pending.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In "rare and
exceptional circumstances," the limitations period may
be equitably tolled. Felder v. Johnson, ...