United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MICHAEL T. PARKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment . Having considered the parties'
submissions and the applicable law, the undersigned
recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment  be
granted and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
August 2, 2017, Plaintiff Jermaine Kenyatta Coleman,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
filed his Complaint  pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff asserts a claim against Deputy Sheriff Josh
Strickland concerning the excessive use of force.
Plaintiff's claim arose while he was housed as a pretrial
detainee at the Forrest County Jail in Hattiesburg,
to Plaintiff, on May 26, 2017, Defendant placed restraints on
Plaintiff in order to transport him to his preliminary
hearing. After Plaintiff was restrained, Defendant allegedly
pushed Plaintiff's face into the wall, slammed him onto
the floor, and choked him. Plaintiff alleges that, as a
result of the altercation, his knee was hurt and his lip was
relief, Plaintiff seeks to have the Court “look
into” his allegations and have Defendant fired as a
sheriff's deputy. Plaintiff also wishes to be released
from prison. According to Plaintiff, he is not seeking
monetary damages. See Omnibus Order .
April 16, 2018, Defendant filed his Motion for Summary
Judgment , arguing that the relief requested by Plaintiff
may not be granted by this Court.
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
motion for summary judgment will be granted only when
“the record indicates that there is ‘no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'”
Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d
285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
The Court must view “the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. The
nonmoving party, however, “cannot defeat summary
judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of
evidence.'” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med.
Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994)). In the absence of proof, the Court does not
“assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove
the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
his Spears hearing, Plaintiff testified that he is
not seeking monetary damages but instead requests that the
Court (1) “look into” his allegations; (2) have
Defendant fired as a sheriff's deputy; and (3) have
Plaintiff released from prison. See Omnibus Order
. In his Motion for Summary Judgment , Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's claims for relief are moot
because Plaintiff is no longer housed at the Forrest County
Jail or otherwise unavailable in this action.
transfer of an inmate from an allegedly offending institution
generally renders his claims for injunctive relief moot.
See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir.
2002). In order for Plaintiff's claims for injunctive
relief to remain viable, he must establish a
“demonstrated probability” or a “reasonable
expectation” that he will be transferred back to the
Forrest County Jail. Id.; see also Herman v.
Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
“any suggestion of relief based on the possibility of
transfer back . . . is too speculative to warrant
relief”). Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff
may be transferred back to the Forrest County Jail. Thus,
Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief should be
dismissed as moot.
Plaintiff's specific requests for relief are unavailable
in this action. First, Plaintiff's request that the Court
“look into” his allegations cannot be granted.
See Williams v. Natchitoches Police Dep't., 2014
WL 462904, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 15, 2014) (“the Courts
are not investigatory agencies.”); Green v.
Revel, 2010 WL 597827, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2010)
(noting that a court “is not an investigative
body”); McBride v. Ausbie, 2014 WL 5032720, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2014) (“To the extent Plaintiff
seeks to have this Court investigate his claims or institute
criminal charges against Defendant, he has failed to state a
claim for relief.”). Second, Plaintiff's request
that the Court have Defendant fired is
“unattainable” in a § 1983 action. See
Hurrey v. Unknown TDCJ Corr. Officer, 2009 WL 3645638,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2009) (“the federal courts are
not personnel directors of state prison systems, and such
relief is unattainable in this action”); Hood v.
Angelle, 2010 WL 2571348, at *3 (M.D. La Apr. 21, 2010)
(“this court will not insinuate itself into the hiring
and firing decisions of state employees”).
Plaintiff's request that he be released from prison
“is not available by way of a civil rights
action.” Kelley v. Lemoines, 2010 WL 785880,
at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 2, 2010) (citing Carson v.
Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997); Cook v.
Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice Planning, 37 F.3d 166, 168
(5th Cir. 1994)). “This court cannot grant . . .
release from confinement on a § 1983 action, as this
relief can only be granted in a habeas action.”
Watts v. Doggett, 2006 WL 240578, at *1 (S.D.Miss.
Jan. 31, 2006); see also Huntsberry v. Renteria,
2011 WL 2135676, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2011). Because
Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he has requested,
this action should be dismissed.