OF JUDGMENT: 10/19/2016
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. JEFF WEILL, SR., JUDGE
COURT ATTORNEYS: CHRISTOPHER SCOTT ROUTH JAMIE KELLY McBRIDE
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY:
BILLY L. GORE
This appeal arises from the Hinds County Circuit Court's
order granting in part Richard Chapman's motion for
post-conviction relief (PCR), following this Court's
mandate in Chapman v. State, 167 So.3d 1170 (Miss.
2015) (Chapman IV). There, in a five-to-four
decision, a majority of this Court found that no direct
appeal was taken from Chapman's 1982 conviction for rape
and life sentence, and ordered the trial court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine if the record and transcript
from the jury trial still existed, and if not, whether
something equivalent could be reconstructed. Id. at
1175. After parties reconstructed much of the record on
remand, the trial court granted Chapman leave to file an
out-of-time appeal from his 1982 rape conviction and life
Chapman appeals from that ruling, claiming the record is less
than adequate to allow an acceptable appeal to be prepared.
Chapman maintains his trial counsel was constitutionally
deficient for failing to file an appeal, or even a notice of
appeal, even though Chapman claims he paid counsel to do so.
Chapman also claims a life sentence imposed on a
sixteen-year-old for a crime that was not a homicide
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Chapman submits his
1982 rape conviction should be reversed and this cause
dismissed or, in the alternative, remanded for a new trial.
The State contends Chapman's out-of-time appeal is devoid
of reversible error and argues Chapman's rape conviction
and life sentence imposed by the jury should be affirmed.
Having reviewed the reconstructed record, we find that
Chapman is not entitled to an out-of-time appeal. As will be
explained, we confirm what Justice Coleman surmised in his
dissent in Chapman IV was likely the case: (1)
Chapman's trial record was not destroyed, as Chapman has
claimed throughout his multiple PCR petitions; and (2)
Chapman had three years from April 17, 1984, when
Mississippi's Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief
Act (UPCCRA) went into effect, to petition for an out-of-time
appeal but failed to do so. See Chapman IV, 167
So.3d at 1177-80 (Coleman, J., dissenting); see also
former Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(1)(h), providing
grounds for relief to "[a]ny prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court of record of the state of Mississippi who
claims: . . . he is entitled to an out of time
The reconstructed record plainly shows that Chapman was aware
as late as August 1983 that a direct appeal had not been
filed after his 1982 rape conviction. And even though the
UPCCRA had not yet been enacted, Chapman had a judicial
remedy available to him, as set forth by this Court in 1977,
upon which Chapman also failed to act. See Jones v.
State, 346 So.2d 376 (Miss. 1977) (Jones I) and
Jones v. State, 355 So.2d 89 (Miss. 1978) (Jones
Chapman was indicted by a Hinds County grand jury on August
10, 1981, for rape and armed robbery. The rape charge was
tried before a Hinds County jury in January 1982. Chapman was
represented at trial by Hermel Johnson. Former Mississippi
Supreme Court Justice Reuben Anderson, then serving as a
Hinds County circuit judge, presided over Chapman's
trial. No direct appeal was taken afterward.
In September 1982, Chapman pleaded guilty to robbery (without
a firearm), after having been charged with robbing the rape
victim with a firearm. Chapman was sentenced to ten years in
the custody of Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC),
with six years suspended, four years to serve, and five years
on supervised probation.
The reconstructed record shows that, in August 1983, former
Hinds County Circuit Judge William Coleman sent Chapman the
Dear Mr. Chapman:
The index card in the Court Administrator's office shows
that you were convicted of rape and received a life sentence
on January 27, 1982 and that you entered a plea of guilty on
September 22, 1982 to robbery without a firearm and received
a ten year sentence, six years suspended on five year
supervised probation and four years to serve.
After your letter was received by Judge [Reuben] Anderson,
the Court Administrator checked with Mr. Johnson, your
attorney, and he advised that it was part of the plea
bargaining agreement on the robbery charge that you would not
appeal the rape charge. I have no way of knowing if this is
correct or not.
This Court has lost jurisdiction and, if it is your intention
to appeal, you must file the proper papers with the
Mississippi Supreme Court.
William F. Coleman Circuit Judge
In April 1985, Judge Coleman entered an order allowing the
following evidence used in Chapman's 1982 rape trial to
be turned over or destroyed: saliva sample, blood sample,
rape pack, two pairs of underwear, one blue shirt, one pair
of grey pants, and one "checked sheet."
In 2005, the Innocence Project filed a motion in Hinds County
Circuit Court on Chapman's behalf for "Preservation
and Production of Evidence." Former Hinds County Circuit
Judge Swan Yerger ordered the University of Mississippi
Medical Center (UMMC), the Mississippi State Crime
Laboratory, the Jackson Police Department (JPD), the Hinds
County Sheriff's Office, the Hinds County District
Attorney's Office, the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, and
the Hinds County Circuit Clerk's Office to search for
biological evidence relating to Chapman's 1982 rape
prosecution. The trial court also directed each entity to
provide the status and disposition of any biological evidence
and to preserve such evidence until further notice.
The Hinds County District Attorney's Office responded to
the circuit court's order that all evidence from
Chapman's rape case had been destroyed pursuant to an
April 1985 court order. Chapman v. State, 47 So.3d
203, 205 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (Chapman I).
In 2006, Chapman filed a pro se PCR motion alleging: (1)
innocence regarding the rape conviction; (2) the trial
court's failure to abide by Uniform Rule of Circuit and
County Court Practice 8.04 in accepting Chapman's guilty
plea for robbery; (3) the State's failure to preserve
exculpatory evidence and the trial transcript; and (4)
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Chapman filed
an amended motion, alleging also: (1) his indictments in both
the rape and robbery cases were defective; (2) the jury in
his rape trial was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community; and (3) he is serving an illegal sentence.
Id. at 205-06. The trial court dismissed
Chapman's PCR motion, finding the motion was time-barred
under the three-year statute of limitation provided by
Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(2), and that Chapman was not
entitled to relief. Id. at 206.
Chapman I affirmed the trial court's dismissal,
finding Chapman had failed to comply with Mississippi Code
Section 99-39-9(1)(d), which requires a sworn statement of
specific facts within the prisoner's personal knowledge,
and a sworn statement of specific facts not within the
prisoner's knowledge stating how or by whom said facts
will be proven. Id. Chapman also failed to comply
with Mississippi Code Section 99-39-9(1)(e), which requires
witness affidavits from all who will testify and copies of
documents or records that will be offered. Chapman I
noted, however, this requirement may be excused upon a
showing of good cause. Id.
Addressing the trial court's finding that Chapman's
PCR action was time-barred, Chapman I pointed out
that the Legislature recently had enacted Mississippi Code
Section 99-39-5(2)(a)(ii), which lifts the time bar if
biological evidence exists that would demonstrate, through
additional DNA testing, a reasonable probability the
petitioner would not have been convicted or would have
received a lesser sentence if favorable results had been
obtained through such DNA testing at the time of prosecution.
Id. at 208-09 (citing Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-39-5 (2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2015)). But Chapman failed to
show that previously tested or untested biological evidence
exists, and Chapman failed to meet his burden of proving
newly discovered evidence. Id. at 209.
Lastly, Chapman I explained that the Legislature
recently had enacted a procedure for preserving and
destroying DNA evidence, and requiring the State to retain
enough biological evidence to develop a DNA profile, and
detailing under what circumstances biological evidence may be
destroyed. Id. at 209 (citing Miss. Code Ann. §
99-49-1(3)(d), (f)-(h) (Rev. 2015)). The law, however, was
not in effect when the evidence used in Chapman's
prosecution was ordered destroyed by the circuit court in
Further, Chapman I found that Chapman failed to make
an adequate showing or assertion that the State had acted in
bad faith in destroying the evidence. Id. (citing
Cox v. State, 849 So.2d 1257, 1266 (Miss. 2003)
(setting forth a three-part test to prove a spoliation claim,
including consideration whether the government acted in bad
faith in failing to preserve potentially exculpatory
In 2011, Chapman filed another PCR motion in the trial court
asserting the same claims presented in his 2006 PCR motion.
The trial court found the motion time-barred and dismissed
it. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
dismissal, finding it "time barred and successive-writ
barred." Chapman v. State, 135 So.3d 184 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2013), reh'g denied (Apr. 1, 2014),
cert. dismissed, 145 So.3d 674 (Miss. 2014)
In 2012, while Chapman II was pending in the Court
of Appeals, Chapman filed a third PCR motion in the trial
court, asserting: (1) destruction of evidence violated his
due-process rights, (2) trial court erred in finding his
motion was time-barred, (3) the indictment was defective, (4)
the jury was not properly sworn, (5) the State failed to
comply with discovery, (6) he had ineffective assistance of
counsel, and (7) the State's closing argument was
improper. The trial court denied relief, finding the PCR
motion was time-barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
It is clear that Chapman's motion was time-barred. Under
the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA),
where "no appeal is taken," a petitioner must move
for relief "within three (3) years after the time for
taking an appeal from the judgment of conviction or sentence
has expired, or in case of a guilty plea, within three (3)
years after entry of the judgment of conviction." Miss.
Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2013). Chapman was
convicted in 1982, which was before the UPCCRA was enacted on
April 17, 1984. Odom v. State, 483 So.2d 343, 344
(Miss. 1986). "Individuals convicted prior to April 17,
1984, ha[d] three (3) years from April 17, 1984, to file
their [motion] for post[-]conviction relief."
Id. Therefore, Chapman had until April 17, 1987, to
file his PCR motion. Chapman did not file his motion until
well after the statute of limitations had run. Thus,
Chapman's motion is time-barred, and we find no exception
to this bar applies. See Miss. Code Ann. §
Chapman v. State, 167 So.3d 1205, 1206-07 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2014) (Chapman III).
Chapman thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was granted. In a five-four decision, this
Court reversed Chapman III. Chapman IV, 167
So.3d at 1175.
The majority found that Chapman had alleged two potential
violations of his constitutional rights: (1) his trial record
and transcript were improperly destroyed, and (2) his trial
counsel was ineffective for not filing a direct appeal, which
caused the recordings of Chapman's trial not to be
transcribed. Id. at 1172.
The majority found that the first potential constitutional
violation implicated due-process rights because if
Chapman's trial record was destroyed, this violated a
statutory duty under Mississippi Code Section 9-7-128 to
preserve the record. Id. The majority found that the
only things contained in the record before it were
Chapman's order of conviction and what Chapman claimed
was his indictment for rape. Id.
Speaking to the second potential constitutional violation,
the majority said Chapman had claimed his attorney agreed at
trial to file an appeal but failed to do so even though
Chapman allegedly had paid his attorney for that service.
Id. And according to Chapman, he (Chapman) did not
learn of his attorney's failure until roughly two years
later when Chapman was informed by the court clerk that no
direct appeal had ever been filed. Id.
The majority said that Chapman also had alleged his attorney
was ineffective for not calling an alibi witness.
Id. Chapman also had claimed his indictment failed
to cite the relevant statute under which he was charged; the
State improperly destroyed all physical evidence after his
conviction; his sentence was illegal; the jury's verdict
was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence; and
at trial, the victim pointed to Chapman's trial counsel
from the witness stand when identifying who had raped her.
Id. at 1172-73.
The majority held that Chapman was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing so the trial court could determine "what, if
anything, of the trial record exists, and to provide Chapman
and the State an opportunity to locate or reconstruct the
trial record and transcript, or to produce an equivalent
picture." Id. at 1174.
On remand, the trial court issued an order granting in part
Chapman's PCR motion, related here in pertinent part, as
Shortly after remand, the [c]ourt and the parties began the
long and tedious task of researching and investigating to
determine whether or not the trial record or transcript
existed. In light of the fact this matter proceeded to trial
. . . over 34 years ago, determining the existence of the
trial record and transcript was exceptionally challenging as
all of the individuals originally involved with the case no
longer work for Hinds County. Additionally, reviewing the
court reporter records was painstakingly difficult, as the
records are maintained in a highly unorganized fashion in a
room within the Hinds County Courthouse. The reviewing of
these records was further complicated by the fact that
neither the [c]ourt nor the parties were aware of the true
identity of the court reporter in the above-styled cause of
action until May, 2016.
After nearly one (1) year of investigation into this matter
by both the Court and the parties, Assistant District
Attorney Jamie McBride located the original reel to reel
tapes which contain the audio recordings of the
Defendant's 1982 trial. Due to the dated nature of the
tapes, the [c]ourt was forced to have the audio files
transferred to a digital format and the sound quality
enhanced. The audio recordings were subsequently transcribed
by a freelance court reporter as the original court reporter,
Nelda Woods, was unavailable to complete this project.
Within the Mississippi Supreme Court's July 2, 2015 Order
in this case, the trial court was instructed to
"consider the merits of Chapman's claims raised in
the current motion for PCR based on that record" in the
event that such was located. [Citation omitted]. Within the
instant PCR motion and the amended motion, Chapman makes
multiple claims which would have been most appropriately
raised on direct appeal, such as a Batson violation,
faulty indictment and ineffective assistance of counsel,
among others. Chapman also makes an implicit request for an
out of time appeal, citing within his amended motion that his
trial counsel stated in open court at the sentencing hearing
that he intended to appeal this conviction, but failed to do
Chapman claims that his trial counsel stated on the record
following the sentencing hearing that he intended to appeal
the conviction, however the sentencing hearing is not
contained in the record. Additionally, the only document the
undersigned could located in the court file that contains any
reference to an appeal is an unsigned copy of a letter to
Chapman from the Honorable William F. Coleman, which states
that "the Court administrator checked with Mr. Johnson,
your attorney, and he advised that it was part of the plea
bargaining agreement on the robbery charge that you would not
appeal the rape charge. I have no way of knowing if this is
correct or not." See Exhibit B, attached.
Therefore in the case sub judice, the record does not contain
adequate evidence to contradict Chapman's claims,
however, the undersigned finds that an evidentiary hearing
would be useless as Chapman's trial counsel is deceased.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds it appropriate to grant
Chapman's request for an out of time appeal, made within
his original and supplemental [PCR motion] so that he may
file a direct appeal of his underlying conviction and
sentence in Hinds Co. cause number T-94. By granting Chapman
leave to file an out of time appeal, the undersigned
dismisses the remaining claims made within the instant
motions as moot, however, nothing about the entry of this
order should preclude Chapman from making these claims within
the appeal of his criminal convictions.
At the outset, we take this moment to restate the rule in
Mississippi with regard to out-of-time appeals, as reiterated
in Diggs v. State, 784 So.2d 955 (Miss. 2001):
To prove [the] right to an out-of-time appeal, the movant
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he asked
his attorney to appeal within the time allowed for giving
notice of an appeal. Moreover, the movant must show that the
attorney failed to perfect the appeal and that such
failure was through no fault of the movant.
Id. at 956 (quoting Dickey v. State, 662
So.2d 1106, 1108 (Miss. 1995) (emphasis added)).
Here, in finding that "the record does not contain
adequate evidence to contradict Chapman's claims,"
the trial court found that Chapman sufficiently had
established he was denied his right to an appeal by
counsel's actions or inactions through no fault of
Chapman's. Given the circumstances in this case, such as
the fact that Chapman's trial attorney is deceased, the
trial court found an evidentiary hearing would be useless to
determine otherwise. The trial court proceeded no further in
Having thoroughly reviewed the reconstructed record, we agree
there is nothing that contravenes the trial court's
finding that Chapman's attorney failed to perfect an
appeal through no fault of Chapman's. But, despite this
finding by the trial court, we find that Chapman is not
entitled to an out-of-time appeal.
As will be explained, the reconstructed record conclusively
establishes that Chapman was aware, as late as August 1983,
that no direct appeal or notice of appeal pertaining to his
1982 rape conviction had been filed. Yet, Chapman failed to
act pursuant to either the judicial remedy created by this
Court in 1977 for such situations, or the UPCCRA, which went
into effect in April 1984 and granted specific grounds for
relief to "[a]ny prisoner" such as Chapman claiming
"he is entitled to an out of time appeal."
Coleman's 1983 Letter to Chapman
Judge Coleman's 1983 letter to Chapman confirms what
Chapman himself admits was the case: that Chapman learned of
trial counsel's alleged failure to file an appeal
"roughly two years" after his rape conviction. What
Judge Coleman told Chapman in the letter about needing to
"file the proper papers with the Mississippi Supreme
Court" because the circuit court had "lost
jurisdiction[, ]" needs clarification.
The letter was written prior to the UPCCRA, which was enacted
on April 17, 1984. The act repealed the statutory writ of
error coram nobis and abolished the common-law writs
relating to post-conviction collateral relief, error
coram nobis, error coram vobis, and post-
conviction habeas corpus. See Miss. Code
Ann. §§ 99-39-3(1), 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015).
Though the act applied prospectively from its date of
enactment, individuals convicted prior to April 17, 1984,
were given three years from April 17, 1984, to file a PCR
petition. Odom v. State, 483 So.2d at 344-45.
Thus, all inmates-such as Chapman-had until April 17, 1987,
to file a PCR petition to request an out-of-time appeal under
former Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(1)(h)-again,
providing grounds for relief to "[a]ny prisoner in
custody under sentence of a court of record of the state of
Mississippi who claim: . . . he is entitled to an out of time
But when Judge Coleman's 1983 letter was written, the
remedy announced in Jones I applied. Prior
to Jones I, "out-of-time appeals were unknown
in our practice." Coleman v. State,
804 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2002).
Jones I recognized that "[d]ue process requires
adequate post conviction remedies." Jones I,
346 So.2d at 377. Jones I also recognized that in
most cases, the trial court would be without jurisdiction to
grant an out-of-time appeal in instances where a petitioner
may have been denied the right to appeal his or her criminal
conviction. Id. Thus, Jones I held that the
proper remedy would be to allow the complainant to petition
the Mississippi Supreme Court for an appeal so "this
Court may decide for itself what relief may be due."
The next year, this Court expounded upon Jones I in
Jones v. State, 355 So.2d 89 (Miss. 1978) (Jones
II). Jones II held that a petition for an
out-of-time appeal should be filed with this Court, with
proper affidavits. Id. at 90. The case then would be
remanded for an evidentiary hearing, allowing the trial court
to grant an out-of-time appeal if the evidence demonstrated
that, through no fault of the petitioner, the right to
perfect an appeal with the time prescribed by law was denied
"by the acts [or omissions] of his attorney or the trial
court." Id. at 90.
the UPCCRA was enacted, the judicial remedy provided in Jones
I and II was no longer necessary See Coleman, 804
So.2d at 1041 (Carlson, J., concurring).
Here, the reconstructed record conclusively shows that
Chapman was aware as late as August 1983 that his attorney
had not filed an appeal. At that point, Chapman had a
judicial remedy he could have pursued. Then, eight months
later in April 1984, Chapman had a statutory remedy that
became and remained available to him until April 1987. But
Chapman failed to act on either remedy.
The majority in Chapman IV did not address this
failure due to the scant record then before the Court. The
majority also was concerned about Chapman's claims that
the trial record and trial transcript were improperly
destroyed by the State, along with biological evidence used
in Chapman's trial. Id. at 1172-74. But as
Justice Coleman in his dissent in Chapman IV
correctly surmised, and as the reconstructed record now
confirms, neither was the case. Chapman IV, 167
So.3d at 1177-80 (Coleman, J., dissenting). The transcript
for Chapman's trial proceedings was not destroyed;
rather, one was not transcribed because an appeal had not
been filed. Id. at 1178. Further, it was common
practice in Mississippi jurisprudence at the time to allow
physical evidence to be destroyed. Id.
For these reasons, we find that Chapman is not entitled to an
out-of-time appeal. And we reverse the trial court's
ruling granting Chapman's request to file an out-of-time
Even were we to lift the procedural bars and permit Chapman
an out-of-time appeal, we find no merit in Chapman's
present claim in this matter that the reconstructed record is
inadequate to allow an acceptable appeal to be prepared. The
reconstructed record is more than adequate to address the
claims Chapman asserts in his PCR petition(s) in Chapman
v. State, 167 So.3d 1205, 1206-07 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)
(Chapman III): (1) destruction of evidence violated
his due-process rights, (2) the indictment was defective, (3)
the jury was not properly sworn, (4) the State failed to
comply with discovery, (5) his counsel was ineffective; and
(6) the State's closing argument was improper.
As will be discussed, the reconstructed record shows each of
these claims to be without merit. And we begin our discussion
with what the reconstructed record shows the facts of this
case to be, in the light most favorable to the jury's
1982 guilty verdict.
On June 1, 1981, at approximately 12:15 p.m., the
victim was sitting in her car during her lunch
break at her place of employment-Oliver Van Horn's
warehouse, located on North Gallatin Street in Jackson,
Mississippi. A young African-American male, whom the victim
had never seen before (and later identified as Chapman),
approached her vehicle and asked if he could get some
cardboard boxes out of the back of the warehouse. The victim
told Chapman to go around front and ask someone inside.
Chapman walked away from the vehicle toward the direction of
the warehouse. The victim watched him for a moment then
turned back around in her vehicle. About five minutes later,
Chapman returned to the victim's vehicle. The victim
"didn't hear him walk up. He just snuck up on
Chapman said: "Hey, I want your car." The victim
turned around and looked out of her car window, which was
rolled down, and Chapman had a gun pointed at her head. The
victim described the gun as "a small handgun, revolver,
black in color."
Chapman forced his way into the victim's vehicle. The
victim told the jury: "He didn't wait for me to move
over. He sat on top of me." Chapman then cranked the
vehicle and drove off toward the back of the warehouse and on
to "a little dirt road and he went for little ways . . .
Chapman told the victim if she screamed, he would kill her.
She said Chapman was driving "real, real slow, and he
had the gun in his hand sitting on his lap," and she
"kept asking him, 'Please don't kill me.'
And he said, 'Just shut up and don't scream or
don't do anything funny.'"
Moments later, Chapman stopped the vehicle. He asked the
victim how much money she had. The victim told Chapman she
had $219 in her purse. Chapman took the money and asked if
she had any more. The victim said no. Chapman then looked
through the victim's purse.
Chapman asked the victim if she had any kids. She said she
had two small children. Chapman told her, "You don't
want anything to happen to your kids." The victim said,
"No." And Chapman said, "Well, I'm going
to f*** you up." Chapman then made the victim "get
out of the car and go into the bushes."
The victim told the jury: "We came to a little clear
spot and he made me lay down, and he said, 'Pull down
your pantyhose and underwear.'" Chapman told her,
"Don't scream or do anything because I'll kill
you." The victim said there was a "big ant
bed" at the spot where she lay down, "and they were
crawling all over me and biting me and he wouldn't let me
get up. And that's when he started raping me."
Chapman then told her "to get up because they started
Chapman moved the victim to "another little clearing
place," about "eight feet" away and told her,
"Don't do anything because I'll blow your head
off." The victim told the jury: "And he raped me
Chapman told the victim: "You're supposed to enjoy
it. Look like you're enjoying it." At that point, a
white pickup truck drove by, and Chapman said,
"Don't say anything because I'll kill you."
The area where the rape occurred was behind the Jackson Paper
Company near railroad tracks. The victim believed the white
truck belong to the railroad.
The victim said when the white truck drove by, Chapman
"just laid there and waited for the truck to go by and
looking at me, just waiting for me to do something." She
said, "while I was there, I noticed that he had a big
scar on his right shoulder[, ] . . . and I kept looking at it
. . . ."
Chapman "finally got up and he told me to put my clothes
on and go back to the car." There, Chapman told her,
"Now, if you call the police or tell anybody, I'm
going to come back and blow your head off." Chapman took
the victim's money and walked away toward the Jackson
When asked by the State at trial whether she consented to
having sexual intercourse with Chapman, the victim said,
"No, I didn't. He forced me to[;] he had a gun and
he kept threatening that he would kill me if I didn't do
what he wanted me to." She told the jury specifically
that Chapman's "penis penetrat[ed her] genital
areas." And the crime occurred "here in the City of
After Chapman walked away from the vehicle, the victim drove
back to Van Horn's and told a co-worker what had
happened. The co-worker informed the manager, who called the
police. Police officers from the Jackson Police Department
(JPD) arrived within five or ten minutes, and the victim told
them what had happened.
She described the individual as being in his late teens or
early twenties, "6'1" [tall], weighed about 165
pounds, and he had a short afro and a beige v-neck sweater
with no sleeves . . . and a gold chain around his neck."
He also had "peach fuzz" on his face. He was
wearing blue jeans and tennis shoes. She also told the police
the individual had a scar on his right shoulder, which she
described as about three inches long.
When asked by the State at trial whether she could identify
the person who raped her if she saw that person again, the
victim said, "Yes, I would." She then pointed to
Chapman, saying the "defendant sitting right
there." The State asked, "Is that the person
without the suit on that you're referring to?" The
victim stated: "Right. Short
The victim told the jury that after talking with the police
at Van Horn's for approximately "thirty to
fourty-five minutes[, ]" the police drove her to UMMC.
There, she was examined by a doctor, and a rape kit was
performed. She said they also gave her some medicine to help
prevent "venereal disease." The police called the
victim's husband while she was at the hospital.
The next evening, on June 2, the police called the victim at
home around 9:00 p.m., told her they had picked up a suspect,
and asked her to come to the police station in the morning
for an identification lineup. The victim and her husband went
to the station the next morning.
On June 3, while the victim stood in a viewing room, the
police brought five individuals out into an adjacent room,
separated by a one-way mirror. The victim identified Chapman
out of the lineup. She did so without seeing Chapman's
scar, as all of the lineup participants "had on short
sleeves." She said they all appeared to be the same age.
They were different sizes, but all wore the same type of jail
JPD officers had arrested Chapman on June 2 at around 7:00
p.m. JPD officers were told at "roll call" about
the rape and armed robbery that had occurred the day before,
and they were given the suspect's description as provided
by the victim.
Officer P.C. Burnham testified that he and Officer John
Bowman were patrolling downtown Jackson around 7:00 p.m. on
June 2, when they observed a vehicle traveling west on Amite
Street, driving erratically. They pulled the vehicle over and
saw it was occupied by Chapman, Officer Burnham told the
jury, while pointing at Chapman in the courtroom. Both
officers knew Chapman from the area.
They asked Chapman for his driver's license, and Chapman
said he did not have one. Officer Burnham said the
description they had received about the rape suspect, prior
to their encounter with Chapman, was that of a "black
male, 6 feet, 6 feet 1, . . . 160 pounds." Officer
Burnham said at the time of crime, the individual was said to
be "wearing blue jeans, some type of pullover-type cream
or beige colored shirt with some button in the front."
When they stopped Chapman on Amite Street, Chapman "was
wearing exactly the same thing that had been dispatched over
the radio . . . ."
The officers were told the suspect had a bad scar on his
right shoulder. Officer Burnham said Officer Bowman asked
Chapman if he had any scars on him. Chapman said no. Officer
Bowman asked if he could look, and Chapman purportedly said
he did not mind. Officer Bowman pulled Chapman's
"right collar over." And "[t]here was a scar
on his right shoulder as described to us ...