United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
CMH HOMES, INC. PLAINTIFF
JENNIFER DENISE WILSON and WANDA J. RIDGWAY DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
STARRETT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration
 filed by Defendants Jennifer Denise Wilson and Wanda J.
Ridgway. After reviewing the submissions of the parties, the
record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that this
motion is not well taken and should be denied.
Jennifer Denise Wilson and Wanda J. Ridgway (collectively
“Defendants”) purchased a manufactured home from
Plaintiff CMH Homes, Inc. (“CMH”), on June 3,
2017. As part of the purchase process, Defendants entered
into a Binding Dispute Resolution Agreement
(“BDRA”), by which parties agreed to submit to
mediation, and if mediation failed, mandatory, binding
arbitration, any dispute
arising out of or related to (i) the modular or manufactured
home(s) purchased, sold, owned, occupied and/or delivered in
any transaction with Buyer or Beneficiaries (the
“Home”), (ii) the documents related to the
purchase and sale of the Home (including, but not limited to,
the Retailer Closing Agreement, any Purchase or Sales
Agreement, buyer's order, supplemental invoice, and other
instruments and agreements whereby the Seller purports to
convey or receive any goods or services or from Buyer or
Beneficiaries (collectively, the “Contract”)),
(iii) any products, goods, services, insurance, supplemental
warranty, service contract, and real property (including
improvements to the real property) sold under or referred to
in the Contract, (iv) any events leading up to the Contract,
(v) the collection and servicing of the Contract, (vi) the
design and construction of the Home, and (vii) the
interpretation, scope, validity, and enforceability of the
Contract . . . .
(BDRA [1-5][11-2] at p. 1.)
August 3, 2017, Defendants' attorney sent a letter
alleging “major damage” to the purchased home,
stating that the home was in a “heavily damaged
condition” that was caused by CMH. (Letter [1-6].) In
an e-mail dated October 26, 2017, Defendants rejected a
settlement offer made by CMH and said that a formal demand
would be forthcoming. No such demand was made and no further
communication was received from Defendants.
filed its Petition  on February 28, 2018, asking that the
Court enter an order compelling Defendants to comply with the
terms of the BDRA. The Court granted this Petition  in its
Order  on May 16, 2018. Defendants filed their Motion for
Reconsideration  on June 13, 2018.
Standard of Review
motion asking the court to reconsider a prior ruling is
evaluated . . . as a motion . . . under Rule 59(e) . . .
[when] filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of
judgment . . . .” Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma,
Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012).
Rule 59(e) motion calls into question the correctness of a
judgment.” Templet v. Hydrochem Inc., 367 F.3d
473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004). There are three grounds for
altering or amending a judgment under Rule 59(e): “(1)
an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the
availability of new evidence not previously available, or (3)
the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” Williamson Pounders Architects, P.C. v.
Tunica Cnty., Miss., 681 F.Supp.2d 766, 767 (N.D. Miss.
2008). Rule 59(e) motions are “not the proper vehicle
for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that
could have been offered or raised before the entry of
judgment, ” Templet, 367 F.3d at 478, and they
“should not be used to . . . re-urge matters that have
already been advanced by a party.” Nationalist
Movement v. Town of Jena, 321 Fed.Appx. 359, 364 (5th
Cir. 2009). Reconsideration of a previous order is “an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.”
Id. Before filing a Rule 59(e) motion, parties
“should evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear
error of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement”
with the Court. Atkins v. Marathon LeTourneau Co.,
130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D.Miss. 1990).
argue that the Court's Order  should be reconsidered
because it did not consider claims, such as those dealing
with the credit transaction, usury violations, and fraud,
which were not raised in the initial pre-litigation letter
and were mentioned for the first time in Defendants'
response to the Petition . These claims, they argue, are
now before the Circuit Court of Lamar County, Mississippi.
arguments are merely a rehashing of arguments already
presented and rejected by this Court. The Petition  dealt
specifically with the claims addressed by Defendants in their
pre-litigation letter, and the Court's Order 
granting the Petition  deals only with whether those
claims are within the scope of the BDRA. The Court declined
to rule on whether any other claims fell within the scope of
the BDRA because those claims were not before it. Rather than
offer any new arguments as to why the Court should reconsider
and decide this issue, Defendants have given the Court
further cause to refrain from addressing it. Because these