United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S RECOMMENDATION
AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE, ETC.
STARRETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
 of Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker and the Objection
 filed by Madjied Ali Samsoedien
(“Petitioner”) as to the Report and
Recommendation. The above captioned case was referred to
Judge Parker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). After a thorough
review of both the record and the objection filed in this
case, the Court finds as follows:
facts of this case are set out in detail in the Report and
Recommendation  of Magistrate Judge Parker. For the
purposes of this Court's review, the relevant facts are
1, 2006, a jury in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida convicted Petitioner of two
counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h): conspiracy to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) and conspiracy to violate
18 U.S.C. § 1957. United States v. Samsoedien,
No. 1:05-cr-20652-CMA-1, ECF No. 201 (S.D. Fla. June 1,
2006). On September 15 of that same year, Petitioner was
sentenced to 210 months imprisonment, two years of supervised
release, and a $100 special assessment. Id., ECF No.
300. Petitioner filed this Petition  for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on December 22, 2015.
Judge Parker entered his Report and Recommendation  on
June 11, 2018. In his Report and Recommendation , Judge
Parker construed Petitioner's § 2241 motion as a
§ 2255 motion through the “savings clause, ”
since Petitioner claimed that a retroactive Supreme Court
decision rendered his conviction void. Judge Parker
recommended that the petition should be denied, as the
petition did not meet the requirements of the savings clause.
Petitioner timely filed his Objection  on July 24, 2018.
Objection , Petitioner raises five main issues: (a) that
Judge Parker incorrectly reviewed his petition in light of
the savings clause; (b) that he is actually innocent; (c)
that newly discovered evidence exists; (d) that cumulative
errors, bias, and prejudice occurred in the trial
proceedings; and (e) that the sentencing was fundamentally
Standard of Review
Court has concluded its review of the Report and
Recommendation  and Petitioner's Objection .
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court is
required to make a de novo review of the portions of
the report and recommendation to which the objection is made.
Since he timely objected, Petitioner is entitled to a review
of his objection by an Article III judge. Longmire v.
Gust, 921 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 1991).
Court's review comes with several qualifications. First,
the Court is not required to merely rehash the findings of
the Magistrate Judge. Koetting v. Thompson, 995 F.2d
37, 40 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court will not consider
objections that are frivolous, conclusive, or general.
Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421
(5th Cir. 1997). Finally, since a regurgitation of arguments
from the original petition is not an objection in fact, the
Court will not consider such arguments. Edmond v.
Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1993).
stated above, Petitioner advances multiple claims in his
Objection . The Court will address these claims in turn.
Savings Clause Claim
claims that the Supreme Court's decision in Regalado
Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 128 S.Ct. 1994,
170 L.Ed.2d 942 (2008), narrows the scope of his offense so
that he was convicted of a non-existent crime, and that the
decision applies retroactively to his case. Thus, Petitioner
brings this claim through 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), also
known as the “savings clause.” Samsoedien v.
Berkebile, No. 5:15-cv-124-KS-MTP, ECF No. 1, at 3-4. In
order to successfully bring a petition under the savings
clause, the petitioner must show that his claim is
“(i)…based on a retroactively applicable Supreme
Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have
been convicted of a nonexistent offense and
(ii)…was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when
the claim should have been raised in the petitioner's
trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.”
Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904
(5th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner is correct in that Regalado Cuellar
applies retroactively to his case: it interpreted a federal
statute (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)) that
substantively defines a criminal offense (money laundering).
Regalado Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 554, 128 S.Ct. 1994;
Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2010).
However, Regalado Cuellar does not
establish that Petitioner may have been convicted of a
nonexistent offense. Petitioner was convicted of two counts
of violating 18 U.S.C. 1956(h): conspiracy to violate 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) and conspiracy to ...