Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Samsoedien v. Berkebile

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division

August 2, 2018

MADJIED ALI SAMSOEDIEN PETITIONER
v.
DAVID BERKEBILE, CI Adams County Warden RESPONDENT

          ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE, ETC.

          KEITH STARRETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation [13] of Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker and the Objection [16] filed by Madjied Ali Samsoedien (“Petitioner”) as to the Report and Recommendation. The above captioned case was referred to Judge Parker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). After a thorough review of both the record and the objection filed in this case, the Court finds as follows:

         I. Background

         The facts of this case are set out in detail in the Report and Recommendation [13] of Magistrate Judge Parker. For the purposes of this Court's review, the relevant facts are thus:

         On June 1, 2006, a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida convicted Petitioner of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h): conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) and conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1957. United States v. Samsoedien, No. 1:05-cr-20652-CMA-1, ECF No. 201 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2006). On September 15 of that same year, Petitioner was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment, two years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Id., ECF No. 300. Petitioner filed this Petition [1] for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on December 22, 2015. Judge Parker entered his Report and Recommendation [13] on June 11, 2018. In his Report and Recommendation [13], Judge Parker construed Petitioner's § 2241 motion as a § 2255 motion through the “savings clause, ” since Petitioner claimed that a retroactive Supreme Court decision rendered his conviction void. Judge Parker recommended that the petition should be denied, as the petition did not meet the requirements of the savings clause. Petitioner timely filed his Objection [16] on July 24, 2018.

         In his Objection [16], Petitioner raises five main issues: (a) that Judge Parker incorrectly reviewed his petition in light of the savings clause; (b) that he is actually innocent; (c) that newly discovered evidence exists; (d) that cumulative errors, bias, and prejudice occurred in the trial proceedings; and (e) that the sentencing was fundamentally defective.

         II. Standard of Review

         The Court has concluded its review of the Report and Recommendation [13] and Petitioner's Objection [16]. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court is required to make a de novo review of the portions of the report and recommendation to which the objection is made. Since he timely objected, Petitioner is entitled to a review of his objection by an Article III judge. Longmire v. Gust, 921 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 1991).

         This Court's review comes with several qualifications. First, the Court is not required to merely rehash the findings of the Magistrate Judge. Koetting v. Thompson, 995 F.2d 37, 40 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court will not consider objections that are frivolous, conclusive, or general. Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1997). Finally, since a regurgitation of arguments from the original petition is not an objection in fact, the Court will not consider such arguments. Edmond v. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1993).

         III. Analysis

         As stated above, Petitioner advances multiple claims in his Objection [16]. The Court will address these claims in turn.

         A. Savings Clause Claim

         Petitioner claims that the Supreme Court's decision in Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 128 S.Ct. 1994, 170 L.Ed.2d 942 (2008), narrows the scope of his offense so that he was convicted of a non-existent crime, and that the decision applies retroactively to his case. Thus, Petitioner brings this claim through 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), also known as the “savings clause.” Samsoedien v. Berkebile, No. 5:15-cv-124-KS-MTP, ECF No. 1, at 3-4. In order to successfully bring a petition under the savings clause, the petitioner must show that his claim is “(i)…based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and (ii)…was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner's trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.” Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001).

         First, Petitioner is correct in that Regalado Cuellar applies retroactively to his case: it interpreted a federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)) that substantively defines a criminal offense (money laundering). Regalado Cuellar, 553 U.S. at 554, 128 S.Ct. 1994; Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2010). However, Regalado Cuellar does not establish that Petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense. Petitioner was convicted of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 1956(h): conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. ยง 1956(a)(1) and conspiracy to ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.