PATRICK DANTRE FLUKER A/K/A PATRICK D. FLUKER A/K/A PATRICK FLUKER APPELLANT
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
OF JUDGMENT: 06/12/2017
FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH J.
PATRICK DANTRE FLUKER PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS ATTORNEY FOR
IRVING, P.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, JJ.
In 2007, Patrick Fluker pled guilty to armed robbery. The
circuit court sentenced him to twenty years in the custody of
the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with five years
suspended and fifteen years to serve, and ordered the
sentence to run consecutively to a sentence that Fluker was
serving on a 2003 armed robbery conviction. Fluker has since
filed at least four motions for post-conviction relief (PCR)
related to his 2007 conviction. All of his motions have been
denied, and the denials have been affirmed when appealed.
See Fluker v. State, 17 So.3d 181 (Miss. Ct. App.
2009); Fluker v. State, 191 So.3d 127 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2016), cert. denied, 203 So.3d 600 (Miss.
2016); see also Fluker v. State, 200 So.3d 1148
(Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming the dismissal of
Fluker's complaint seeking parole eligibility on his 2007
conviction), cert. denied, 214 So.3d 1058 (Miss.
2017); Fluker v. State, 2 So.3d 717 (Miss. Ct. App.
2008) (affirming the denial of PCR on Fluker's 2003
conviction); Fluker v. State, 170 So.3d 517 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2014) (same), aff'd, 170 So.3d 471
(Miss. 2015) (same); Fluker v. State, 210 So.3d 1062
(Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (same), cert. denied, 202
So.3d 209 (Miss. 2016). In the PCR motion that is the subject
of this appeal, Fluker alleges that (1) he was denied a
speedy trial; (2) his plea was involuntary; (3) he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel; and (4) the circuit
court lacked "subject matter jurisdiction" because
"the State repealed its boundaries." He also alleges
that his motion is not subject to the procedural bars of the
Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA)
because his claims involve "fundamental constitutional
rights." The circuit court denied Fluker's motion as
procedurally barred. Fluker then appealed.
We affirm. This is at least the fourth PCR motion that Fluker
has filed related to his 2007 conviction. The UPCCRA bars
such successive motions. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6)
(Rev. 2015) (providing that an order denying a PCR motion
"shall be conclusive until reversed" and
"shall be a bar to a second or successive [PCR]
motion"). In addition, Fluker filed the motion ten years
after he pled guilty. Therefore, the motion is also untimely.
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) (providing that
a PCR motion must be filed within three years after a
judgment of conviction entered on a guilty plea). None of the
issues raised in Fluker's motion involve
"fundamental rights" that are excepted from the
UPCCRA's procedural bars. See Green v. State,
235 So.3d 1438, 1440 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (listing
"fundamental rights" that are excepted from the
Act's procedural bars). A petitioner cannot avoid the
Act's procedural bars simply by asserting that
"fundamental rights" are at stake when, as in this
case, there is no evidence to support such a claim. We made
the same point when we affirmed the denial of one of
Fluker's prior PCR motions two years ago.
Fluker, 191 So.3d at 129 (¶6). For these
reasons, we affirm the circuit court's order denying
Fluker's PCR motion.
We also conclude that Fluker's motion and appeal are
frivolous because his claims had no hope of success and no
basis in fact or law. See Dock v. State, 802 So.2d
1051, 1056 (¶11) (Miss. 2001). Clearly, Fluker's
motion is procedurally barred, and he fails to identify any
arguable exception to the procedural bars. Moreover, Fluker
unsuccessfully litigated claims alleging an involuntary plea
and ineffective assistance in at least one prior PCR motion.
See Fluker, 17 So.3d at 182 (¶2). Finally, our
Supreme Court has long held that a defendant waives his right
to a speedy trial by pleading guilty. Anderson v.
State, 577 So.2d 390, 391-92 (Miss. 1991). Because his
motion and appeal are frivolous, Fluker shall forfeit earned
time pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section
47-5-138(3) (Rev. 2015). See Dock, 802 So.2d at 1056
(¶11) ("Sections 47-5-138(3)(a) and (b) are fully
applicable against pro se litigants who seek post-conviction
relief."); McLamb v. State, 974 So.2d 935, 939
(¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) ("The circuit court did
not sanction [the petitioner] pursuant to section
47-5-138(3), but the statute does not limit such a finding to
the trial court."). This opinion shall be sent to the
Department of Corrections, and the Department shall forfeit
earned time as provided in section 47-5-138(b).
C. J, IRVING AND GRIFFIS, PJJ, BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR,
GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ, CONCUR
 This Court has held "that
Mississippi still possesse[d] sovereign state power" and
that our courts still had jurisdiction notwithstanding the
boundary repeal that Fluker alleges. Carlock v.
Carlock, 743 So.2d 424, 425 (¶¶3-5) (Miss. Ct.
App. 1999). Congress has the unquestioned power to set state
boundaries, which remained in effect at all ...