United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
SHARION AYCOCK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and receiving a “right-to-sue” letter,
Andrew Bankhead filed his Complaint  in this Court against
the City of Cleveland, Mississippi and Cleveland Police Chief
Charles Bingham. Now before the Court is the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment  requesting summary judgment
in their favor on all of Plaintiff Bankhead's claims. The
Plaintiff failed to respond and the allotted time for doing
so is expired. See L. U. Civ. R. 7(b)(4).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the Court will
construe his pleadings liberally. See McCreary v.
Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 657 (5th Cir. 2013). After
examining the Plaintiff's Complaint and the attached
Charge of Discrimination, it appears to the Court that the
Plaintiff has brought a claim for race discrimination, and a
claim for retaliatory termination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. The Plaintiff alleges that the City and Bingham
failed to promote him to the position of inspector because he
is African American, and instead promoted two white
candidates. The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants
later fired him in retaliation for filing a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission related to his failed promotion.
Plaintiff failed to respond to the Defendants' requests
for admission served under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
The Defendants now argue that the Plaintiff's failure to
respond to their requests for admission deems the matters
contained within the requests admitted and conclusively
established. The Court agrees. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(3), (b). Although the Court is fully aware of its
obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, a
pro se Plaintiff is not excused from the procedures
and obligations mandated by the Federal Rules. See
Coleman v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No.
A-12-CV-032 LY, 2012 WL 12886432, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 27,
2012) (citing Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 65 F.3d 452, 455 n.4 (5th Cir. 1995));
see also Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th
Cir. 1995). By operation of Rule 36, the matters contained in
the Defendants' requests for admission, and not answered
or objected to by the Plaintiff, are deemed admitted and
conclusively established. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
these preliminary matters addressed, the Court will now take
up the substance of the Defendants' request for summary
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. Summary
judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine
dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be
resolved in favor of the non-movant, “but only when . .
. both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory
facts.” procedural Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When such contradictory
facts exist, the Court may “not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120
S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
moving party “bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct.
2548. The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the
pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”
Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). This
Court has no duty to “sift through the record in search
of evidence to support” the nonmovant's opposition
to summary judgment. Edwards v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
841 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Forsyth v.
Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915
n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Court notes that the Plaintiff failed to respond to the
pending motion for summary judgment and wholly failed to
“designate ‘specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.'” Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). Although the
Plaintiff clearly failed to meet his responsibility in the
summary judgment context, out of an abundance of caution, the
Court conducted an independent review of the entire record in
this case and will analyze the relevant issues based on this
noted above, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants
refused to promote him because of his race, and that the
Defendants then fired him in retaliation for filing a Charge
of Discrimination. The Defendants respond by arguing that the
Plaintiff, by way of his failure to respond to discovery, has
admitted that his failed promotion and termination had
nothing to do with his either his race or his filing with the
Commission. The Defendants argue in the alternative, that