United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION  TO WITHDRAW
CONSENT TO MAGISTRATE JURISDICTION
PERCY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
matter comes before the court on the motion  by the
plaintiff, Timothy Nelson Evans, to withdraw his consent to
Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
“Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United
States magistrate judge ... may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the
entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to
exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he
serves.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); Mendes Junior
Int'l Co. v. M/V SOKAI MARU, 978 F.2d 920, 922
(5thCir.1992). “[C]onsent to trial before a
magistrate [judge] waives the right to trial before an
article III judge.” Carter v. Sea Land Servs.,
Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir.1987). At
the Spears hearing in this case, the court informed
Mr. Evans that he could choose to proceed before a Magistrate
Judge, and Evans stated on the record that he wished to do
so. Then, Mr. Evans completed and returned the standard form
consenting to magistrate jurisdiction. That form also
explained the process and consequences of this decision.
is no absolute right to withdraw a validly given consent to
trial before a magistrate. Carter v. Sea Land Servs.,
Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987). As
with the standard for granting motions to withdraw waivers of
other rights, motions to withdraw consent to trial before a
magistrate judge may be granted only for good cause, a
decision left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Kirshberger v. United States, 392 F.2d 782
(5th Cir.1968) (withdrawal of guilty plea);
Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138
(5th Cir.1979) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b) motion to
withdraw waiver of jury trial); United States v.
Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.1985) (motion
for continuance to allow representation of specific counsel).
Once accepted, a referral to a Magistrate Judge may only be
vacated upon a showing of “extraordinary
circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4); see
also Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283
F.3d 282, 292 (5thCir. 2002).
Evans' Previous Lack of Candor to the Court
Evans argues that the court has taken too long to rule on the
many motions he has filed in this case, including several
motions for injunctive relief. Given Mr. Evans'
dishonesty in another, substantially identical, case filed in
this court, the court has, for some time, mulled over how to
proceed in the instant case. As discussed in the court's
memorandum opinion in the present case, Mr. Evans fabricated
nearly all of the claims in his previous case (Evans v.
Santos, 4:15CV72-DMB-JMV (N.D. Miss.)) - namely, that he
received absolutely no medical treatment for over a year
after filing a grievance regarding water in his cell - and
that the withholding of treatment was in retaliation for
having filed a federal lawsuit regarding his alleged lack of
medical care. Evans simply cut this claim out of whole cloth,
as his medical records reflect that he was treated over
90 times during the relevant period, receiving treatment
at least weekly for a variety of ailments. In addition, Mr.
Evans files motions at a relentless pace, as his previous
case contains some 264 docket entries (an extraordinarily
large number for a pro se prisoner case.) These
facts give the court pause when considering Mr. Evans'
current federal civil rights claims.
in the Present Case
present case, Mr. Evans has re-alleged the same claims
covering the same time periods as those in his previous case,
but has added nearly identical claims allegedly occurring
during the period immediately afterward. Indeed, even in the
present motion, Mr. Evans alleges “ALL
medical care has been completely cut off by [Mississippi
State Penitentiary Superintendent] Marshal Turner and all
security.” ECF Doc. 54 at 1. He further alleges that
the defendants have stopped providing medical care because
of: racial bias, bias against homosexuals, and because he
made allegations in the present suit that the defendants have
engaged in hate crimes against him and others. Id.
court at first considered dismissing this entire case as
vexatious because, in the previous case, the court had
already decided most of the claims against Evans, and the new
allegations appear to be more of the same, but from a later
time. However, as Mr. Evans is being treated for mental
health problems, the court did not wish to dismiss the case
without reviewing documentary evidence of his treatment
(mainly medical records) - and giving the parties an
opportunity to present arguments on the requests for
injunctive relief. Thus, the court will issue an order moving
Mr. Evans' later claims forward - and a separate order
setting a briefing schedule for the parties to present their
arguments regarding injunctive relief.
court notes that Mr. Evans' lengthy, rambling, and
repetitive pleadings, coupled with the sheer number of
documents he submits to the court, create an unnecessary
drain on judicial resources. This problem is magnified when,
as in the previous case, the overwhelming majority of Mr.
Evans' allegations are demonstrably false - and the rest
fail to state a valid claim for relief. The court cautions
Mr. Evans that, should the allegations in the present case
prove equally false, then the court will issue an order to
show cause why he should not be sanctioned as a deterrent to
filing false allegations in the future.
foregoing reasons, the instant motion  to withdraw
consent to magistrate jurisdiction is