United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PERCY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court are Plaintiff Tyrowone Kimble's motions
for summary judgment. Docs. #59 & #81. For the reasons
set forth below, summary judgment will be denied.
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is proper only when the pleadings and evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
illustrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is deemed material its
resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of
the lawsuit under governing law. Sossamon v. Lone Star
State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial,
that party must support its motion with credible evidence
that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not
controverted at trial.” McKee v. CBF Corp.,
299 Fed.Appx. 426, 428 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 331). If the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party, then there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact,
and summary judgment must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quotation marks
Kimble has been allowed to proceed in this pro se
prisoner civil rights action on a claim that his
constitutional rights were violated by an incident of
excessive force that was at least partially caused by the
Chief of Police's failure to train and/or supervise his
officers. See, e.g., Docs. #30 & #29.
incident giving rise to this lawsuit occurred when police
officers initiated a traffic stop against Kimble in August
2016, in order to serve a warrant that was pending against
him at the time. See Doc. #30. Kimble claims that
while he was attempting to comply with police orders,
Defendant Officer Gammill shot him twice with a taser.
Id. Kimble also maintains that the Chief of Police,
Mark Martin, failed to supervise and train his officers,
which contributed to the injury against him. Id.
Defendant Gammill filed his answer to the allegations on
November 21, 2017. Doc. #24. Defendant Martin filed his
answer to the complaint on November 29, 2017. Doc. #36. Both
Defendants deny Kimble's allegations.
January 18, 2018, Kimble moved for summary judgment. Doc.
#59. In this motion, Kimble argues that the dash camera video
evidence that was introduced at his
Spears hearing (1) causes undue prejudice to his
claims, and (2) contains Defendant Gammill's admission
that he shot Kimble twice with his taser. Doc. #59. He also
argues that the documents in this case demonstrate that he
was transported by ambulance for medical care, that he was
diagnosed with facial trauma, and that his booking photograph
shows injury to his face. Id. Defendants responded
to the motion on February 2, 2018, maintaining, in part, that
Kimble was resisting arrest. See Doc. #66.
February 26, 2018, Kimble filed a second dispositive motion,
this time for partial summary judgment. Doc. #81. In this
motion, Kimble claims that Defendants' discovery failed
to address his failure to train and supervise claim against
Defendants. Id. Defendants responded to the second
motion on March 8, 2018, claiming that Kimble admits that the
facts are in dispute and asserting that Kimble has failed to
demonstrate a constitutionally actionable injury. Doc. #
establish a claim of excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an injury, (2)
resulting directly and only from a use of force that was
clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was
clearly unreasonable. Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d
332, 340 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). In
analyzing a use of force under the Fourth Amendment, the
particular circumstances of the case - including whether
suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest -
are relevant to whether a particular use of force was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
the elements of a failure to train or supervise claim under
§ 1983 are: (1) that “the supervisor either failed
to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal
link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the
violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure
to train or supervise amounts to deliberate
indifference.” See, e.g., Estate of Davis ex rel.
McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 379
(5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, absent an
established violation of a plaintiff's rights, there can
be no liability to a supervisory official for his or her
failure to train a subordinate.
clearly in dispute whether Kimble was resisting arrest and
whether Kimble suffered an injury because of an excessive use
of force. The Court finds that these are genuine issues of
material fact that cannot be resolved on the evidence
currently before the Court, and that Kimble has not,
therefore, discharged his burden under Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of ...