United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
CHAKAKHAN R. DAVIS PLAINTIFF
HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, AND TYRONE LEWIS DEFENDANTS
P. JORDAN III CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Chakakhan R. Davis seeks relief from this Court's
November 29, 2017 Order  granting in part and denying in
part her Motion to Amend Complaint . Because Davis still
fails to demonstrate that the claims she wishes to pursue are
plausible, the Court denies her Motion for Prospective Relief
and Reconsideration .
says Defendants mistreated her during an arrest and
subsequent incarceration because she had previously filed a
grievance with the Hinds County Sherriff's Department.
For purposes of this motion, the relevant history relates to
Davis's proposed false-arrest and First Amendment
retaliation claims against Defendants Hinds County,
Mississippi; former Sherriff Tyrone Lewis; and Officer Brenda
Jones (the “Moving Defendants”).
initiated this case by filing a pro se complaint in state
court asserting various state and federal claims, including a
claim for false arrest. She did not, however, mention First
Amendment retaliation as the basis for any claim. After
removal from state court, the Moving Defendants filed motions
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
See Defs.' Mots. [7, 9]. Lewis and Jones sought
dismissal of all state- and federal-law claims against them,
while Hinds County sought dismissal of the state-law claims
against it. Davis responded , asserting a new claim
against the Moving Defendants based on First Amendment
23, 2017, the Court ruled on Moving Defendants' motions,
finding first that Davis never served Lewis or Jones.
See May 23, 2017 Order . Because of that, the
Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of their Rule
12(c) motions. The Court did, however, consider the merits to
determine whether allowing Davis an opportunity to cure
defective service would be futile. Id. at 5-7
(citing Gregory v. United States, 942 F.2d 1498,
1500-01 (10th Cir. 1991)). The Court stated that any futile
claims would be dismissed without prejudice under Rule
12(b)(5) for lack of proper service.
considering the parties' arguments, the Court held that
the federal claims, and most of the state-law claims, Davis
pleaded against Lewis and Jones were futile and
should be dismissed without prejudice-including the
false-arrest claims. May 23, 2017 Order  at 18. But based
on Davis's pro se status, the Court allowed her to seek
leave to amend her Complaint in two relevant ways: (1) to
better articulate the newly proposed First Amendment
retaliation claims against the Moving Defendants; and (2) to
re-plead her false-arrest claim against Hinds County.
Id. at 22.
accepted the Court's invitation to seek leave to amend,
but she submitted a proposed Amended Complaint [30-1] that
was almost identical to her original Complaint. So on
November 29, 2017, the Court denied leave to amend except as
to one unrelated claim against Lewis. Nov. 29, 2017 Order
 at 9.
now seeks an order vacating the Court's November 29, 2017
Order to the extent the Court prevented her from amending her
complaint as to First Amendment retaliation and false arrest.
See Pl.'s Mot.  at 25. For the following
reasons, the Court denies her motion.
seeks reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(4). But because the Order granted only partial
dismissal, it was interlocutory, and the Court must consider
Davis's request for reconsideration under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d
763, 766 (5th Cir. 2017). That rule states that interlocutory
orders “may be revised at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties' rights and liabilities.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b). “‘Interlocutory orders, ' such as
grants of partial [dismissal] . . . are left within the
plenary power of the court that rendered them to afford such
relief from them as justice requires.'” McKay
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 751 F.3d 694, 701 (5th Cir.
2014) (quoting Zimzores v. Veterans Admin., 778 F.2d
264, 266 (5th Cir. 1985)). Whether to grant such relief is a
matter left to the trial court's discretion.
Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory
committee's note to 1946 amendment (stating that
“interlocutory judgments are not brought within the
restrictions of [Rule 60], but rather they are left subject
to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford
such relief from them as justice requires”).
presents a 32-page memorandum explaining why she should be
allowed to pursue the First Amendment and false-arrest
claims. The First Amendment claim obviously falls under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, but the false-arrest claim is less clear.
When discussing her false-arrest claim, Davis at times
references theories that would apply in the § 1983
context, see Pl.'s Mot.  at 16-17, but her
most direct statement asserts that the Court should not have
dismissed her “State Law false arrest claim, ”
see Id. at 17. Either way, reconsideration is
Davis's brief offers lengthy and often redundant
discussions regarding the law, it fails to demonstrate that
she can factually plead plausible claims-something her first
and second complaints and previous memoranda also failed to
do. The Court has already considered all relevant evidence
that Davis mentions in her most recent motion, and its last
two orders addressed those issues in full. See May
23, 2017 Order ; Nov. 29, 2017 Order . There is no
need to go ...