United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Hattiesburg Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Keith Ball UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is the Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Defendants in this action brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, Daniel Louis Williams, has not
responded to the motion. For the reasons explained in this
opinion, the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment
should be granted.
is currently a post-conviction inmate housed at the South
Mississippi Correctional Institution (“SMCI”). He
alleges that his constitutional rights were violated while he
was a pre-trial detainee at the Forrest County Detention
Center (“FCDC”) during 2014 and 2015. Defendants
are Sheriff Billy McGee and officers at FCDC, as follows:
Captain Donell Brannon, Sergeant Jason Milsap, Sergeant
Andrea Estrada, Phillip Jackson, Brandon Freeman, Charles
Sanders, Shane Giacone, Richard Laubesher, Adrian Jones, and
Greg Anderson. Defendant Derek Bourne remains unserved.
previous opinion , the Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Defendants as to all of Williams's claims, with
the exception of his claim for denial of dental care. The
Court denied summary judgment without prejudice as to that
claim on the basis that the Defendants failed to provide
sufficient evidentiary support for the motion. Subsequently,
Defendants filed the present motion on Williams's claims
of denial of dental care, supported by additional medical
explained in the Court's prior opinion, Williams alleges
that Defendants denied him adequate dental care when he broke
or chipped two wisdom teeth in March 2014 and June 2014, and
for the following months until he saw a dentist in May 2015.
 at 12-16. He alleges that one tooth broke in half in
March 2014, and that he suffered a chip to the other one in
June 2014. Id. at 12-13. He admits that the nurses
gave him ibuprofen for his pain, but he argues that he was
informed by FCDC officers and medical personnel that his
family would have to pay for any non-emergency dental work.
Id.; [38-2] at 5, 9, 14, 15, 21. At the omnibus
hearing, Williams admitted that he was sent to a dentist in
May 2015, at which time the dentist pulled one of his teeth.
 at 15-16. Williams alleges that the dentist arranged a
follow-up appointment to extract the second tooth, but that
Defendants refused to transport him to the second
appointment. Id. As of July 27, 2015, Williams was
no longer in the custody of FCDC. See  at
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in relevant
part, that A[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.@ Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of fact is
genuine if the "'evidence is sufficient to permit a
reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.'" Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch and
Center, 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1999)(quoting
Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 618 (1998)). Issues of fact
are material if Aresolution of the issues might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law."
Lemoine, 174 F.3d at 633. The Court does not,
"however, in the absence of any proof, assume the
nonmoving [or opposing] party could or would prove the
necessary facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc)(emphasis
omitted). Moreover, the non-moving party's burden to come
forward with "specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial, " Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), is not satisfied by
"conclusory allegations" or by
"unsubstantiated assertions, " or by only a
"scintilla" of evidence. Little, 37 F.3d
alleges that Defendants denied him dental care related to his
wisdom teeth in 2014 and 2015. ; ; ;  at 12-16.
At the omnibus hearing, Plaintiff testified that each of the
Defendants, with the exception of Defendant Sheriff Billy
McGee, relayed to him that FCDC's policy required his
family to pay for dental treatment.  at 26-32. As to
Defendant McGee, Williams testified that McGee did not do
anything to him personally or fail to do anything that
violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 26-28.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the denial of
dental treatment claims in both their official and individual
of dental treatment may constitute deliberate
indifference.” Green v. Hendrick Medical
Center, 2001 WL 300844, *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 7,
2001)(unpublished)(citing Harris v. Hegmann, 198
F.3d 153, 159-160 (5th Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, “delay
in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment
violation if there has been deliberate indifference, which
results in substantial harm.” Mendoza v.
Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
“Neither an incorrect diagnosis nor the failure to
alleviate a significant risk that an official should have
perceived but did not is sufficient to establish deliberate
indifference.” Jackson v. Dunn, 610 F.
App'x 397 (5th Cir. 2015)(affirming grant of summary
judgment on Mississippi prisoner's claim for deliberate
indifference to dental needs). Likewise, “unsuccessful
treatment, medical malpractice, and acts of negligence do not
constitute deliberate indifference; nor does a prisoner's
disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional
circumstances.” Id. Moreover, the issue of
whether “additional diagnostic techniques or forms of
treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for
medical judgment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 107 (1976).
state claims against the Defendants in their individual
capacities, "the plaintiff must allege facts reflecting
the defendants' participation in the alleged wrong,
specifying the personal involvement of each defendant."
Jolly v. Klein, 923 F.Supp. 931, 943 (S.D. Tex.
1996). Supervisory officials, moreover, "cannot be held
liable for the actions of subordinates under any theory of
vicarious liability." Id. "Supervisory
officials may be held liable only if: (i) they affirmatively
participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivation; or
(ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally result
in plaintiff's injury." Mouille v. City of Live
Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). In other words,
in a § 1983 case, liability for an employee's
actions may not be imputed to employers under a theory of
to Williams's claims against Defendant Sheriff McGee,
Plaintiff testified at the omnibus hearing that he had sued
McGee because he was the sheriff, not because McGee had done
anything personally or failed to do anything personally to
him that violated his constitutional rights.  at 27.
There is no respondeat superior liability under
§ 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Williams has failed to come forward
with any evidence, or even allege, that Defendant McGee was
aware of his dental condition. Accordingly, McGee is entitled
to summary judgment on Williams's claims against him in
his personal capacity.
claims of denial of dental care against the remaining
defendants in their personal capacities also fail. At the
omnibus hearing, Plaintiff clarified that he had sued the
remaining defendants, all officers at FCDC, not because they
ever refused to take him to sick call, but because they
relayed to him that FCDC's policy requires inmates to pay
for non-emergent dental care.  at 27-32. Although
Williams testified at the hearing that he believed that
Defendants Brannon and Milsap played a role in determining
whether he could obtain off-site dental care, he has failed
to come forward with any evidence, other than his unsupported
suppositions, that these or any other defendant officer could
make decisions regarding his dental care. ...