United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division
MICHAEL P. MILLS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before this Court for consideration of
Defendants City of Cleveland (“Cleveland”) and
Charles Bingham's Motion for Summary Judgment
, Plaintiff Emily McCain's response, and
Defendants' reply. After considering each in light of
relevant statutory and case law, the court is now prepared to
about November 5, 2013, Plaintiff was hired as a patrolman
third class by Defendant Cleveland based on Defendant Charles
Bingham's recommendation, who was employed as the
Cleveland Police Chief. Immediately following her hiring,
Plaintiff's employment was rescinded by Cleveland after
several complaints were made against her to members of the
Cleveland Board of Aldermen. Plaintiff's father, Police
Captain Mike McCain, informed the Chief Administrative
Officer for Cleveland, Farae Wolfe, that he planned to pursue
the matter further with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and, on or about February 4,
2014, McCain began her employment with Cleveland as a
her time as an employee of Cleveland, Plaintiff alleges that
she was subjected to unfair treatment based on her gender.
Her allegations include limitations in her duties as a
patrolman, disparaging comments by shift supervisors, the
department's refusal to purchase female-cut uniforms, and
Defendant Bingham's refusal to give Plaintiff
commendation after she saved the life of a crime victim.
employment was terminated on or about November 4, 2015 after
she arrested an intoxicated individual, who proceeded to
escape from the back window of her patrol car. She alleges
that her termination was unfair because previous arrestee
escapes had not resulted in the termination of similarly
situated male officers. Plaintiff commenced this action by
filing her Complaint against Defendants City of
Cleveland and Charles Bingham, based upon allegations of
gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, made actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
judgment is appropriately granted when the evidence shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists
where a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986). A court considering a motion for summary judgment
must construe the facts and evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Ford, Bacon &
Davis, LLC v. Travelers Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 734, 736 (5th
Cir. 2011). If the party seeking summary judgment meets its
initial burden, the nonmoving party must then counter
“with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue
for trial.” Harris ex rel. Harris v. Pontotoc Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 685, 690 (5th Cir. 2011). The
nonmoving party cannot rely on metaphysical doubt, conclusive
allegations, or unsubstantiated assertions but instead must
show that there is an actual controversy warranting trial.
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994). “The moving party is ‘entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law' [where] the nonmoving party
has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of its case with respect to which it has the burden
of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 317 (1986).
summary judgment is granted when there is no dispute to any
material fact, the Defendants, in this case, must demonstrate
that there are no factual disputes in order to succeed on
their motion for summary judgment. However, it is the opinion
of the court that the Defendants have failed to demonstrate
that there is no genuine factual issue for trial. In fact, it
is the opinion of this court that the facts are such that a
reasonable jury could potentially find for either party in a
trial-further evidence that a trial is warranted given the
circumstances. The factual issues that remain unresolved at
the present time include the reasons why the Plaintiff was
terminated and if her termination departs from the standard
termination procedure for male officers in the same or
substantially similar disciplinary situations.
has presented evidence that her termination was performed on
terms upon which male officers were not similarly terminated.
Although the Defendants attempted to explain the differences
between the specific incidences in their briefs, and why the
officers may have been disciplined differently, the court
believes these differences are such that a reasonable jury
should decide whether the Plaintiff's gender played a
factor in her termination. Furthermore, the mere fact that
there is such a dispute as to these specific incidents
between other officers alludes to the fact that underlying
issues remain unresolved at the present juncture.
foregoing reasons, the court does not believe that summary
judgment is proper at the present stage, as it is possible
that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff given the
facts present currently before the court. ...