United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
TIRALE O. REED PETITIONER
SHERIFF BILLY SOLLIE DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
R. ANDERSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
detainee Tirale Reed filed the instant petition for writ of
habeas corpus relief on July 19, 2017. Respondent moves to
dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or in the alternative, for failure to
exhaust state court remedies. Upon review of the pleadings
and applicable case law, the undersigned recommends that the
petition be dismissed.
order for a court to review the claims of a state pre-trial
detainee under § 2241, two prerequisites must be met.
The petitioner must first be “in custody”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), and second, he must
have exhausted his available state remedies. Dickerson v.
State of Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987).
pre-trial detainee has the right to seek federal habeas
relief, the availability of such relief is not without
limits. Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973). The right to seek federal habeas
corpus relief under ' 2241 “does not lie, absent
‘special circumstances, ' to adjudicate the merits
of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to
a judgment of conviction by a state court.”
Id. at 489. To the contrary, a pre-trial detainee is
not permitted to derail “a pending state court
proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses
prematurely in federal court.” Id. at 493. The
United States Supreme Court has thus drawn “an
important distinction between a petitioner who seeks to
‘abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly
functioning of state judicial processes' by litigating a
speedy trial defense to a prosecution prior to trial, and one
who seeks only to enforce the state's obligation to bring
him promptly to trial.” Brown v. Estelle, 530
F.2d at 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting
Braden, 410 U.S. at 490). The Fifth Circuit has held
that this distinction rests upon the type of relief requested
by the petitioner: If the petitioner is attempting to dismiss
the indictment or prevent the prosecution of his case, then
he is seeking to abort the state proceedings. Id. at
1282. If he is attempting to “force the state to go to
trial, ” then he is merely seeking to force the state
to fulfill its obligation to provide him with a prompt trial.
Id. “While the former objective is normally
not attainable through federal habeas corpus, the latter is,
although the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies
still must be met.” Id. at 1283.
time of his federal filing, Reed was awaiting trial in the
custody of the Lauderdale County Detention Facility for
murder, shooting into a dwelling, and felon in possession of
a firearm. Reed asserts that he was held in “pretrial
detention for a year without judicial actions” in
violation of his right to a speedy trial. The record now
reflects that Petitioner is no longer in the physical custody
of the Lauderdale County Detention Facility. Respondent
advises that he posted bond on August 15, 2017, and this
Court's docket reflects that Reed filed a change of
address on August 18, 2017, indicating that he now resides at
3400 69th Avenue, Meridian, MS 39037. Courts
generally consider a prisoner's habeas challenge to be
mooted by the release from custody, unless “some
concrete and continuing injury” or “collateral
consequence” of the conviction exists. Spencer v.
Lemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7(1998); Bailey v.
Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1987). But
when a prisoner merely contests the imposition or duration of
his confinement, and not the conviction itself, the case
becomes moot when he is no longer confined. Lane v.
Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
instant petition, Reed requests that he be released from
custody and compensated for the time spent in pre-trial
detention in violation of his right to a speedy trial. In
this regard, the record shows as follows: An initial
appearance was set on the pending charges, and a preliminary
hearing was scheduled for July 21, 2016. Reed waived his
right to a preliminary hearing and a bond was set on the
pending charges on that date. A grand jury convened in August
2017, but it was continued to October 2017, after requests
for further investigation were made. In response to the
Court's order requesting an update on the status of the
state court charges, Respondent reports that the Reed is
still on bond, and this matter is currently scheduled to be
presented to the grand jury during the March 2018
event, Reed attaches a “Motion to Demand a Fast and
Speedy Trial, ” and a “Motion to Dismiss for the
State's Violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment
Right to Speedy Trial” to his petition for habeas
relief, both of which he asserts were “notarized and
[h]and delivered on July 18, 2017.” However, nothing
of record indicates that these motions were filed in the
Lauderdale County Circuit Court, and Petitioner does not
assert, nor does the record reflect, “special
circumstances” which would allow this Court to consider
the merits of Petitioner's claims before he has been
tried. The constitutional right to a speedy trial does not
qualify as “a per se ‘special circumstance'
that obviates the exhaustion requirement.”
Dickerson., 816 F.2d at 227. Thus, to the extent
Reed seeks to raise a claim challenging the delay in
indictment and trial, he must still overcome the hurdles of
exhaustion before requesting federal relief. Brown,
530 F.2d at 1283.
these reasons, the undersigned recommends that his petition
be dismissed for failure to exhaust available state remedies.
OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
to Rule 72(a)(3) of the Local Uniform Civil Rules of the
United States District Courts for the Northern District of
Mississippi and the Southern District of Mississippi,
any party within 14 days after being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation, may serve and file written
objections to the Report and Recommendation. The objections
must be filed with the Clerk of Court, and the objecting
party must specifically identify the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations to which he objects.
parties are hereby notified that failure to file written
objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation contained within this report and
recommendation, within 14 days after being served with a copy
shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error,
from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district
court. 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) (as amended,
effective December 1, 2009); Douglas v. United Services
Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir.
 ECF No. 7-1 - 7-2.