United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division
JESSE M. SKINNER PETITIONER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESPONDENT
BRAMLETTE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
cause is before the Court on the petitioner Jesse M. Skinner
(“Skinner”)'s Motion to Vacate or Set Aside
the Petitioner's Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (docket entry 269). The Government has
responded to the motion. Also before the Court is
Skinner's Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss his Motion to
Vacate without Prejudice (docket entry 278).
Skinner's third named habeas corpus petition, in
addition to a myriad of other motions collaterally attacking
the judgment against him. Since Skinner was convicted in
2003, he has exhausted his appellate rights, filed a habeas
petition in 2006 which was denied and then appealed, filed a
motion to quash the indictment in 2008, filed a Rule 60(b)
motion in 2011, a notice of felony in 2011, another habeas
petition in 2014, a Rule 12(b)(2) motion and this, his third
habeas petition, in 2017.
successive motion has not been certified by the Fifth Circuit
as required by 28 U.S.C. §2255(h). Nor would it be, as
it brings forth no new evidence nor is it based on a new rule
of constitutional law. For that reason alone, it must be
dismissed. Nevertheless, the Court will address the merits of
Skinner alleges throughout the petition that his case was
“removed” from state court. This is incorrect.
The criminal case was initiated by a criminal complaint in
the federal courts, as Skinner acknowledges in his attack on
DEA Task Force Agent Metcalf's authority to bring the
federal charges. In addition, his collateral attack on the
authority of the state court judge to sign the original
search warrant confuses the jurisdiction she has to hear
certain types of cases with the ability to perform certain
tasks within the geographical area of her jurisdiction.
Furthermore, there is nothing new about the factual
information Skinner relies upon.
also attacks the authority of DEA Task Force Agent John
Metcalf to sign the criminal complaint. But as Skinner
acknowledges, Agent Metcalf's deputization is during the
period of assignment (doc. 269 at pp. 8-9). That begins when
he is deputized and ends when he leaves the task force. It is
not a minute by minute evaluation of what task he is
performing while a task force agent. Skinner also repeats the
incorrect jurisdictional argument that the federal government
does not have jurisdiction to prosecute federal narcotics
laws in Harrison County; and repeats his assertion that his
case was “removed” from state court, despite the
fact that his case was brought in federal court. Skinner is
wrong on both counts.
also claims that neither 3, 4 methylenedioxy-methamphetamine
(ecstacy) nor pseudoephedrine were federal controlled
substances. He is correct about pseudoephedrine. That
substance is a listed chemical under 21 U.S.C.
§802(34)(K) and Skinner was charged and convicted under
§841(c)(2) (which makes it a crime to possess a listed
chemical knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it
would be used to manufacture a controlled substance). Ecstacy
has been a controlled substance under 21 C.F.R. §
1308.11(d)(11) since 1985.
Court finds that Skinner's successive § 2255 motion
must be dismissed since (1) it has not been certified by the
Fifth Circuit as required by 28 U.S.C. §2255(h), and (2)
it lacks merit.
the Government responded to Skinner's successive §
2255 motion, Skinner moved to voluntarily dismiss his §
2255 motion without prejudice. Inasmuch as the Court is
already dismissing Skinner's motion for lack of merit and
lack of certification by the Fifth Circuit, the Court will
deny as moot Skinner's motion to voluntarily dismiss his
§ 2255 motion without prejudice. Skinner is advised that
he must obtain permission from the Fifth Circuit to file a
second or successive petition. A second or successive
petition must be certified as provided in § 2244 by a
panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain:
newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense;
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitioner Jesse M.
Skinner's Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the
Petitioner's Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(docket entry 269) is DENIED, and this
action is dismissed with prejudice. A separate Final Judgment
in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 shall issue;
ORDERED that petitioner Skinner's Motion to Voluntarily
Dismiss his Motion to Vacate without Prejudice
(docket entry 278) is DENIED AS MOOT;
FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability (COA) and
leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED. A
prisoner seeking relief under § 2255 has no absolute
entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his
petition. An applicant seeking a certificate of appealability
in a § 2255 proceeding must make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
§ 2253(c)(2). That standard is met when
“reasonable jurists could debate whether ... the
petition should have been resolved in a different
manner.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484,
120 S.Ct. ...