United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SHARION AYCOCK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Brenda
Pree originally filed this case in the Circuit Court of
Washington County, Mississippi. The Defendants removed the
case to this Court on June 15, 2016. In her Amended Complaint
[4-7], Pree alleges various claims against the Washington
County Board of Supervisors, as well as claims against County
Supervisors Jesse Amos, Paul Watson Jr., and Mike Gordon in
their official and individual capacities. Finding the
individual defendants entitled to the protection of qualified
immunity, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's equal
protection claim against them. See Order
[34].[1] At this time, the Plaintiff has three
remaining claims, all against the Board: one Title VII claim,
one Equal Protection claim, and one due process claim based
on the Mississippi Constitution. Now before the Court is the
Board's Motion for Summary Judgment [45] requesting
dismissal of all the Plaintiff's remaining claims. The
issues are fully briefed and ripe for review. See
Response [48]; Reply [51].[2]
Factual
and Procedural Background
The
Washington County Planning Director/Grant Writer resigned in
2014, and the County Administrator was hospitalized multiple
times for health issues during that same time. The County
Board of Supervisors recognized the need for additional
personnel to supplement and substitute for the current County
Administrator, and to do grant writing and administration. On
November 4, 2014, the Board of Supervisors authorized a call
for applications for the position of Assistant County
Administrator/Human Resources Director. Subsequently, the
Board approved Vicki Uppal to serve temporarily as a
volunteer grant writer/administrator for the County for a
period of three months. The Chancery Clerk issued an official
Notice of Intent and subsequently published an advertisement
for the Assistant County Administrator position. On December
1, 2014, the Board approved a salary for the position, and
reviewed and added duties, including grant writing, to the
proposed job description. At that time, the Board also
changed the job title to Assistant County
Administrator/Grants Coordinator.
By the
deadline of December 12, 2014, the Board received some
thirty-six applications. In February of 2015, four out of
five of the Supervisors submitted their top choices from the
pool of applicants.[3] From these choices, the Board selected
four top candidates for interviews. Both Uppal and the
Plaintiff were on the list of top candidates. After
completing interviews, the Board voted unanimously to appoint
Uppal as Assistant County Administrator/Grants Coordinator.
The County Administrator continued to have health issues and
eventually resigned effective June 30, 2015. On July 20,
2015, the Board appointed Uppal as County Administrator. The
Board did not advertise or consider other applicants for
County Administrator.
According
to the Plaintiff, several members of the Board conspired to
manipulate the application and appointment process for the
County Administrator position. Also according to the
Plaintiff, the Board wanted a white person in the position
instead of the Plaintiff, who is African-American, even
though the Plaintiff was more qualified. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Board appointed Uppal to the temporary grant
writing position even though she had no experience. Then, the
Plaintiff alleges, the Board members added grant-writing
qualifications to the Assistant County Administrator job
description to make Uppal appear more qualified.
As
noted above, the Plaintiff asserted three claims against the
Board, one Title VII claim, one Equal Protection claim, and
one due process claim based on the Mississippi Constitution.
The Board filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [48] requesting
dismissal of all the Plaintiff's remaining claims. The
Board argues that the Plaintiff has not brought forth any
evidence of discriminatory intent or motivation, and that it
selected Uppal for the job simply because she was more
qualified. The Plaintiff responds by arguing that she was
substantially better qualified than Uppal, and that the Board
pre-selected Uppal for the position because she is white.
Standard
of Review
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. Summary
judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine
dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
In
reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be
resolved in favor of the non-movant, “but only when . .
. both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory
facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When such contradictory facts
exist, the Court may “not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120
S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).The moving party
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The
nonmoving party must then “go beyond the
pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”
Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted).
This
Court has no duty to “sift through the record in search
of evidence to support” the nonmovant's opposition
to summary judgment. Edwards v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
841 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Forsyth v.
Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915
n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Race
Discrimination and Equal Protection
The
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall “deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. “[T]o state a claim of racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Plaintiff ‘must allege and prove that she received
treatment different from that received by similarly situated
individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a
discriminatory intent.'” Gaalla v. Brown,
460 F. App'x 469, 479 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th
Cir. 2004); Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 473
(5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). In the end, “proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”
Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528,
533 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265,
97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)).
The
Court will analyze the Plaintiff's Equal Protection and
Title VII claims together, because the “inquiry into
intentional discrimination in public employment is
essentially the same for individual actions brought under [42
U.S.C. §§] 1981 and 1983, and Title VII.”
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802,
93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Lauderdale v. Texas
Dep't of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., 512
F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2007); Wallace v. Tex. Tech
Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996). To succeed on
a claim for intentional discrimination under these statutory
schemes, the Plaintiff must first prove a prima
facie case of discrimination either through direct
evidence of discriminatory ...