United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WILLIAM H. BARBOUR, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of
dismissal. Petitioner Marvin Deuane Naylor is presently
incarcerated at the Lauderdale County Detention Facility,
Meridian, Mississippi. Pet.  at 1. The Court, having
considered his pro se habeas petition, amended petition ,
and the relevant authorities, finds that it should be
dismissed for the reasons that follow.
is challenging his current incarceration based on five
criminal charges, case numbers: 204-16, 264-16, 261-16,
262-16, and 263-16, that are pending against him in
Lauderdale County, Mississippi. See Pet.  at 2.
As ground for habeas relief, Petitioner claims that the
confidential informant is unreliable. Id. at 6-7.
Petitioner further states that his constitutional rights have
been violated because Petitioner has been subjected to an
illegal search and search. Id. at 6. Additionally,
Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights of due
process and the right to a speedy trial have been violated.
Id. As relief, Petitioner requests that the Court
[i]nvestigate said charges[, ] challenge search &
seizure, due to the fact that property was not and is not
Def.[‘s][.] Also[, ] challenge credibility of
confidential informant due to the fact he has caught other
felon[ies] including[, ] introduction of contraband in Kemper
County Detention Facility where he no[w] resides. Also[, ]
sup[p]ress evidence obtained by him [the confidential
Id. at 8.
pre-trial detainee like Petitioner has the right to seek
federal habeas relief, the availability of such relief is not
without limits. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973). “[F]ederal
habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special
circumstances, ' to adjudicate the merits of an
affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a
judgment of conviction by a state court.” Id.
at 489 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253
(1886)). Furthermore, a petitioner is not permitted to derail
“a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate
constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.”
Id. at 493.
United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between a
pre-trial petitioner seeking to “abort a state
proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state
judicial processes” and a petitioner seeking only to
enforce the state's obligation to bring him promptly to
trial. Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th
Cir. 1976) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-90;
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969)). The Fifth
Circuit has held that the distinction is based on the type of
relief requested by the petitioner. Id. If the
petitioner is seeking to prevent prosecution of the cases,
then he is seeking to “abort a state proceeding or to
disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial
processes.” Id. However, if the petitioner is
attempting to “force the state to go to trial, ”
then he is merely seeking to force the state to fulfill its
obligation to provide petitioner with a prompt trial.
Id. The former objective is generally not attainable
through federal habeas corpus; the latter is. Id.
in liberally construing Petitioner's request for relief,
the Court finds that Petitioner seeks the dismissal of his
state criminal charges, and is therefore, attempting
“to abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly
functioning of state judicial processes” which is not
available through federal habeas corpus. See Dickerson v.
State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting
Brown, 530 F.2d at 1283). Thus, Petitioner cannot
maintain these claims in a request for federal habeas relief.
to the extent Petitioner's claims can be construed as a
request to force the State of Mississippi to bring him to
trial, he is required to exhaust his claims in state court
prior to pursuing a federal habeas corpus petition. See
Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 228. The exhaustion requirement
gives “the State the ‘opportunity to pass upon
and correct' alleged violations of its prisoner's
federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.
364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v.
Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). In order to satisfy
the exhaustion requirement, Petitioner must present his
claims to the state's highest court in a procedurally
proper manner. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 839-840 (1999).
State of Mississippi provides available remedies for a
criminal defendant to assert that his constitutional right to
a speedy trial has been violated. See e.g., Reed v.
State, 31 So.3d 48, 56-57 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding
criminal defendant may assert a demand for a speedy trial in
the trial court and then he is required to obtain a pretrial
ruling on that motion). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate
that he has exhausted his state-court remedies for the claims
presented in this Petition. See Dickerson, 816 F.2d
at 228 (finding inmate's numerous preindictment motions
in the state court requesting that he be tried as soon as
possible did not satisfy exhaustion of speedy trial issue for
federal habeas petition). Furthermore, Petitioner does not
identify any special circumstances necessitating federal
court intervene or disruption of the state's judicial
process. Petitioner's claims can be resolved by a trial
on the merits in state court or by other procedures of the
state court system. To allow Petitioner to “assert an
affirmative defense” to his pending charges prior to a
judgment of conviction by the state court “would short
circuit the judicial machinery of the state courts.”
Brown, 530 F.2d at 1283 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 490). The Court
concludes that pre-trial habeas corpus relief is unwarranted.
See id.; Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 227.
Petitioner's request for habeas relief pursuant to §
2241 is denied.
Court has considered the pleadings and applicable law. For
the reasons stated, this pro se Petition for habeas corpus
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is denied. A final
Judgment in accordance with ...