ANTHONY GREEN A/K/A ANTHONY EARL GREEN A/K/A ANTHONY E. GREEN APPELLANT
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
OF JUDGMENT: 01/09/2017
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH TRIAL JUDGE.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ANTHONY GREEN (PRO SE).
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY:
ABBIE EASON KOONCE.
GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND FAIR, JJ.
In 2008, Anthony Green pled guilty to two counts of murder
and one count of grand larceny. He did so as part of a plea
agreement where, in exchange for Green's guilty pleas,
the State agreed not to pursue capital murder charges and to
recommend concurrent life sentences on the murder charges and
a consecutive sentence on the grand larceny charge that was
below the maximum term of incarceration for that offense. In
2016, Green filed a motion for post-conviction relief
attacking his murder convictions, contending that his
indictment was defective and that his guilty plea was
involuntary. The circuit court dismissed the motion as
time-barred. We affirm.
The circuit court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion without
an evidentiary hearing "[i]f it plainly appears from the
face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior
proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to
any relief." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev.
2015). To succeed on appeal, the movant must: (1) make a
substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right
and (2) show that the claim is procedurally alive. Young
v. State, 731 So.2d 1120, 1122 (¶9) (Miss. 1999).
Our review of the summary dismissal of a PCR motion, a
question of law, is de novo. Id.
Green acknowledges that his motion was filed more than three
years from the entry of the judgment of his conviction, so it
was time-barred pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated
section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015). Ordinarily, claims made
outside of the three-year statute of limitations must raise
one of the exceptions found in Mississippi Code Annotated
section 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b). "The movant bears the burden
of showing he has met a statutory exception." Bell
v. State, 95 So.3d 760, 763 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
2012) (reversed in part on other grounds) (citation omitted).
Green does not argue that he meets any of the statutory
exceptions; instead, he relies on the Mississippi Supreme
Court's oft-cited holding that "errors affecting
fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the
procedural bars of the [Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral
Relief Act]." See Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d
503, 507 (¶12) (Miss. 2010). Since the applicability of
the fundamental rights exception depends on the particular
claim, we will address each of Green's contentions in
Sufficiency of the Indictment
Green argues that his indictment failed to allege an
essential element on the capital murder counts because it
failed to identify the victim of the underlying felonies -
robbery in one and robbery and arson in the other. First of
all, this issue is irrelevant because Green pled guilty to
"simple" murder, which does not require an
underlying offense. Green's indictments ...