United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division
SHARION AYCOCK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Degaris filed her Complaint  on December 27, 2016 alleging
a single claim for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Monroe County, Mississippi, the Monroe
County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Cecil Cantrell in
his official capacity, and Deputy James Doyle
Adams. Now before the Court are two motions to
dismiss [20, 22] filed by the County Defendants. The
Plaintiff did not file any response and the allotted time for
doing so has expired, making these issues ripe for review.
See L.U.Civ.R. 7(b)(3-4). The Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendants violated her constitutional rights while she
was incarcerated in the Monroe County Detention Center. In
their Motion to Dismiss , the County Defendants argue
that the Plaintiff's claim is time-barred by the statute
of limitations, and request that the Court dismiss all claims
against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Court reviews a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings using the same standards applicable to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
See Phillips v. City of Dallas, 781 F.3d 772, 775-76
(5th Cir. 2015) (citing Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d
540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010)). The complaint therefore,
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d
868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291
(5th Cir. 2017) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
County Defendants argue that the Plaintiff failed to state a
plausible claim for relief because the statute of limitations
has run. “The length of the limitations period for a
§1983 claim ‘is determined by the general statute
of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum
state.'” Balle v. Nueces Cty., Texas, 690
F. App'x 847, 849 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Piotrowski
v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001)).
In Mississippi, §1983 claims are subject to a three-year
statute of limitations under §15-1-49 of the Mississippi
Code. Norwood v. City of Mendenhall, Miss., 630 F.
App'x 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Edmonds v.
Oktibbeha Cty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012); Miss.
Code Ann. § 15-1-49). Although state law controls the
statute of limitations in §1983 cases, “federal
law governs when a §1983 claim accrues.” Smith
v. Reg'l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir.
2016); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct.
1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). Under federal law, the
limitations period begins to run “the moment the
plaintiff becomes aware that she has suffered an injury or
has sufficient information to know that she has been
injured.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576; see
also Reg'l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d at 421.
Plaintiff filed her complaint on December 27, 2016. In her
complaint, the Plaintiff states that her injury occurred on
December 24, 2013. It is apparent on the face of the
Plaintiff's complaint that she filed outside of the
three-year statute of limitations applicable in this case.
See Norwood, 630 F. App'x at 249;
Edmonds, 675 F.3d at 916; see also Wallace,
549 U.S. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091; Reg'l Transit
Auth., 827 F.3d at 421. The Plaintiff did not raise any
evidence or argument for tolling the statute of limitations
or argue that the statute of limitations has not otherwise
run. Under the relevant statutes and precedent, the Court
finds that it appears on the face of the pleadings in this
case that the applicable statute of limitations has run, and
that the Plaintiff's claim is time-barred.
The County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss  is GRANTED,
and the all of the Plaintiff's claims against them are
DISMISSED with prejudice. With all claims against them
dismissed, the County Defendants' second pending Motion
to Dismiss  is DENIED as MOOT.
ORDERED on this.
 The official capacity suit against
Sheriff Cantrell is a suit against the County as the real
party in interest. See Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571
F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating “an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,
to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is
not a suit against the official personally, for the
real party in interest is the entity.”) (citing
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct.
3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citation omitted)). For
simplicity, the Court will refer the County, the
Sheriff's Department, and the Sheriff, as the County
 The County Defendants request relief
under Rule 12(b)(6) or alternatively under Rule 12(c).
Because the County Defendants filed their Answer  before
filing their motions to dismiss, and Rule 12 clearly states
that motions under 12(b)(6) “must be made before
pleading, ” the Court ...