United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
R. ANDERSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Lawrence Dudley filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May 8,
2015. When Dudley filed his petition, he was a
federal prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Complex (“FCC”) in Yazoo City, Mississippi.
Having considered the submissions of the parties and the
applicable law, the undersigned is of the opinion that the
petition should be dismissed without prejudice.
was arrested by Alabama state authorities for violating his
parole on May 18, 2011. On June 7, 2011, his parole was
revoked and he was remanded to state custody to serve the
remainder of a 25-year sentence for robbery. On June 16,
2011, he was temporarily transferred to federal custody
pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum. On August 4, 2011, he entered a guilty
plea to Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute and
for Distribution of a Quantity of Oxycodone in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
He was sentenced on April 26, 2013, to a 60-month term, with
36 months of supervised release. The sentencing court ordered
that Dudley's federal sentence be served concurrently
with any undischarged state sentences, and recommended that
he “be given credit for the 22 months that he served
awaiting disposition of this case.” Dudley was then
returned to state custody where he remained until he was
paroled again on August 11, 2014, and transferred back to
federal custody to serve the remainder of his federal
sentence. The Bureau of Prisons calculated Dudley's
projected release to be September 2, 2017. In the instant
petition, Dudley claims that the Bureau of Prisons abused its
discretion in failing to credit his sentence for time spent
on loan pursuant to the federal writ, and for time served
between the date of his guilty plea and the commencement of
his federal sentence.
judicial notice of the Bureau of Prisons's website,
which reflects that Dudley received an early release on May
19, 2017, and noting that he has not provided this Court with
a current address, the undersigned recommends that the
instant petition, which sought an early release, be dismissed
for lack of a case or controversy. See, e.g.,
Fed.R.Evid. 201 (stating that a judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute and capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); Denius v.
Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2003) (permitting
judicial notice of government records readily available in
the public domain, such as the internet, because the fact of
recordkeeping is not subject to reasonable dispute and the
accuracy could not reasonably be questioned).
Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may
adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or
controversies.” Lewis v. Continental Bank
Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citation omitted). The
“case or controversy” requirement subsists
throughout the case during all stages, and a case becomes
moot if it no longer presents a case or controversy.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citing
Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Generally, any set of
circumstances eliminating the controversy after the lawsuit
is filed renders the case moot. Center for Individual
Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 661 (5th
Cir. 2006). “A case becomes moot ‘when the issues
presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.'” Valentine
v. Pearson, No. 5:10cv160 DCB-JMR, 2011 WL 2680716, at
*2 (S.D.Miss. May 11, 2011) (quoting United States v.
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396
the Spencer case, a petitioner presents an Article
III controversy when he demonstrates “some concrete and
continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or
parole C some ‘collateral consequence' of the
conviction.” 523 U.S. at 7. For the courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a petitioner no longer in custody, that
petitioner must demonstrate both that he was in custody when
he filed the petition, and that his subsequent release has
not rendered the petition moot. Zalawadia v.
Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2004).
has not contacted the Court after his release or provided a
current address. He has not demonstrated to the Court that he
has a continuing injury after his release, and he may have
lost interest in pursuing his claims for early release due to
the claims being moot.
his petition is subject to dismissal without prejudice for
want of prosecution and failure to comply with the Local
Rules. See McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126,
1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that, pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district
court possesses inherent authority to dismiss an action for
failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with a court
order) (citing Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630-31 (1962)). Whether or not a plaintiff is pro
se, or incarcerated, he still has an obligation to
inform the Court of any address changes. “Every
attorney and every litigant proceeding without legal counsel
has a continuing obligation to notify the clerk of court of
address changes.” See Local Rule 11(a);
Wade v. Farmers Ins. Group, 45 F. App'x 323
(5th Cir. 2002) (on appeal from district
court's denial of a motion for reconsideration of
dismissal for failure to prosecute -- even incarcerated
litigants must inform the court of address changes).
light of the mootness of Petitioner's claims, as well as
his failure to maintain a current address with the clerk of
the court, the undersigned recommends that his Petition be
dismissed without prejudice. Alternatively, if Dudley files a
timely objection to this Report and Recommendation, providing
a current address and showing why his claims are not moot, he
should be allowed to proceed on the merits of his claims.
OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
to Rule 72(a)(3) of the Local Uniform Civil Rules of the
United States District Courts for the Northern District of
Mississippi and the Southern District of Mississippi,
any party within 14 days after being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation, may serve and file written
objections. Within 7 days of the service of the objection,
the opposing party must either serve and file a response or
notify the District Judge that he or she does not intend to
respond to the objection.
parties are hereby notified that failure to file timely
written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations contained within this report and
recommendation, shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)
(as amended, effective December 1, 2009); Douglas v.
United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415,
1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996).