Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Reddix

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division

October 25, 2017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARL REDDIX

          ORDER

          DANIEL P. JORDAN III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         The Government in this criminal case seeks a preliminary order of forfeiture in the form of a money judgment against Defendant Carl Reddix. Reddix opposes the Government's motion, arguing that a personal money judgment is not authorized by statute and the amount sought by the Government constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.

         Neither party requested a hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1)(B). So the Court may determine the issue “based on evidence already in the record, including any written plea agreement, and on any additional evidence or information submitted by the parties and accepted by the court as relevant and reliable.” Id. Here, the record would includes the Plea Agreement, Plea Supplement, and Pre-Sentence Investigative Report (“PSR”).[1]

         Based on the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that a personal money judgment may be entered and the amount sought is not grossly disproportional to Reddix's wrongdoing. The Government's Motion for Determination of Money Judgment [55] is therefore granted.

         I. Discussion

         On May 3, 2017, Reddix pleaded guilty to one count of bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), related to kickbacks he paid to then Mississippi Department of Corrections Commissioner Christopher Epps for contracts awarded to Reddix's company, Health Assurance, LLC. Under the Plea Agreement, Reddix stated that he understood “that an order of forfeiture will be entered by the Court as a part of Defendant's sentence and that such order is mandatory.” Plea Agreement [51] ¶ 2. The Plea Supplement Reddix signed went further:

Defendant understands that any forfeiture order entered by the court is mandatory and is a part of his sentence.
. . . Defendant agrees that the assets and property being forfeited, include, but are not limited to, the following:
A money judgment in an amount to be determined by the court.

Plea Supplement [52] ¶ 10.

         According to the PSR prepared by the United States Probation Officer, the net benefit received by Reddix and Health Assurance, LLC, of which Reddix is a 50% owner, was $2, 532, 876.00. PSR ¶ 45. Relying on this figure, the Government asks the Court to order forfeiture in the form of a money judgment in the amount of $1, 266, 438.00-half of the net benefit received as a result of the illegal kickbacks.

         Reddix makes four arguments in response to the Government's motion. First, he argues that forfeiture is not permitted under the statute because the Government has not identified “(1) any real property traceable to the subject violation; (2) any personal property traceable to the subject violation; or (3) any proceeds traceable to the subject violation.” Def.'s Resp. [59] at 2. Second, he says “there is no basis in the statute for this Court to enter a judgment of forfeiture in the form of a money judgment based on an amount of money that is in actuality nothing more than an economic fiction.” Id. Third, he contends that the money judgment the Government requested violates the excessive-fines clause of the Eight Amendment. Id. at 3. Finally, he says that, “if th[e] Court does impose the requested . . . money judgment . . ., the Court should consider the same when weighing the § 3553(a) factors and determining what sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary[, ] to accomplish th[e] goals” of that statute. Id. at 5. The Court will address each argument in turn.

         To begin, Reddix's traceability argument falls short because the Government has identified traceable proceeds. Title 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) requires forfeiture of “[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to . . . any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity' (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.” Section 1956(c)(7)(D), in turn, defines “specified unlawful activity” to include “an offense under . . . section 666”-the statute of Reddix's conviction. So, under § 981, property derived from proceeds traceable to Reddix's bribery scheme are forfeitable.

         The Government contends-and Reddix does not dispute-that the applicable definition of “proceeds” is found ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.