United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SHARION AYCOCK U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Stanley
Cordell Thompson (“Thompson”), a federal inmate,
has filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that his attorney
made an unkept promise that he would receive a more lenient
sentence if he pleaded guilty. See Doc. #76. The
United States of America opposes the motion. See
Doc. 82. Having considered the pleadings and the record,
including the relevant parts of Thompson's underlying
criminal case, along with the relevant law, the Court finds
that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary[1], and that the
§ 2255 motion should be denied.
I
Background
Facts and Procedural History
On
January 20, 2016, Thompson pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and four counts of
distribution of cocaine after he entered a plea agreement
with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. As part of the plea agreement,
the government agreed to recommend that Thompson receive a
48-month sentence, but the parties made no agreement on the
sentence the Court would ultimately impose. See Doc.
#36. The plea supplement stated, “should the Court not
accept [the government's] recommendation, the defendant
will be bound by the plea agreement and will have no right to
withdraw the guilty plea.” Id. at ¶4. At
his change of plea hearing, Thompson acknowledged his
understanding of the plea agreement, including his
understanding that each of the five counts against him
carried a maximum 20-year term of imprisonment. Doc. #81 at
10.
Based
on Thompson's criminal history and the drug quantity, his
sentencing guidelines range was 87 to 108 months. Doc. #74 at
19. At sentencing, the Court rejected the 11(c)(1)(B)
recommendation. Doc. #74 at 19-23. The Court sentenced
Thompson to an 87-month term of imprisonment. Doc. #69.
Thompson
took no direct appeal. However, on or about July 27, 2017,
Thompson filed the instant motion, claiming that his guilty
plea was involuntarily given because of his attorney's
unkept promise that he would receive a 48-month sentence if
he pleaded guilty.
II
Legal
Standard
After a
defendant has been convicted and exhausted his appeal rights,
a court may presume that Ahe stands fairly and finally
convicted.@ United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
164 (1982). A motion brought pursuant to § 2255 is a
Ameans of collateral attack on a federal sentence.@ Cox
v. Warden, Federal Detention Ctr., 911 F.2d 1111, 1113
(5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). There are four separate
grounds upon which a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set
aside, or correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255: (1)
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States; (2) the court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds
the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is
otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a). Collateral attack limits a movant's allegations
to those of Aconstitutional or jurisdictional magnitude.@
United States v. Samuels, 59 F.3d 526, 528 (5th Cir.
1995) (citation omitted). Relief under § 2255 is
reserved, therefore, for violations of Aconstitutional rights
and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not
have been raised on direct appeal and, would, if condoned,
result in a complete miscarriage of justice.@ United
States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981).
III
Discussion
Thompson
alleges that his plea was involuntary given because his
attorney rendered ineffective assistance in promising him he
would not receive more than a 48-month sentence if he pleaded
guilty. Thompson's claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance is governed by the two-pronged test as
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984), which holds that a movant may not succeed on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless he
demonstrates that his attorney rendered deficient performance
that prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. In the
context of a guilty plea, a movant can show prejudice by
demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (quotation marks
omitted).
To be
valid, a guilty plea must be made voluntarily and
intelligently. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242-43 (1969); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 618 (1998) (holding plea is Aconstitutionally valid only
to the extent it is >voluntary= and
>intelligent=”). A plea that “is induced by
deception, an unfulfillable promise, or
misrepresentation” is not voluntary. United States
v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Brady v. UnitedStates, 397 U.S. 742, 755
(1970). However, there is a strong presumption of veracity
accorded to sworn declarations made in open court.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)
(quotation marks omitted). In order to successfully allege
that counsel's unkept promises entitle him to relief
despite the inconsistent representations he made in open
court when entering his guilty plea, Thompson must prove: the
exact terms of the alleged promise; the exact circumstances
of the promise; and the identity of an eyewitness to the
promise. See UnitedStates v. Cervantes,
132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). When
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