United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division
SHARION AYCOCK U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner
complaint of Cameron Allen, who challenges the conditions of
his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the
plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. The
plaintiff has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which provides a federal cause of action against
“[e]very person” who under color of state
authority causes the “deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleges
that the defendants arrested and prosecuted him without
probable cause. He also alleges that he lost personal
property as a result of the arrest and prosecution and that a
defendant defamed him by releasing information to the
newspaper. The defendants have moved for summary judgment,
and the plaintiff has responded. The matter is ripe for
resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the motion by
the defendants for summary judgment will be granted, and
judgment will be entered for the defendants in all respects.
judgment is appropriate if the “materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (c)(1).
“The moving party must show that if the evidentiary
material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in
court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party
to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). After a
proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts
to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen
v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621
(5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.
1998). Substantive law determines what is material.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets
forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to
his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 327. “Where the record, taken as a whole,
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings
and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503
(5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v.
Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist., 177 F.3d
351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital
Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198
(5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when
there is “an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory
facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v.
Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th
Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not
“assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove
the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
very purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the
pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Advisory Committee Note
to the 1963 Amendments to Rule 56. Indeed, “[t]he
amendment is not intended to derogate from the solemnity of
the pleadings[;] [r]ather, it recognizes that despite the
best efforts of counsel to make his pleadings accurate, they
may be overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof available to
his adversary.” Id. The non-moving party (the
plaintiff in this case), must come forward with proof to
support each element of his claim. The plaintiff cannot meet
this burden with “some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct.
1348, 1356 (1986), “conclusory allegations, ”
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,
871-73, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3180 (1990), “unsubstantiated
assertions, ” Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92
(5th Cir. 1994), or by a mere
“scintilla” of evidence, Davis v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1994).
It would undermine the purposes of summary judgment if a
party could defeat such a motion simply by “replac[ing]
conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with
conclusory allegations of an affidavit.” Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110
S.Ct. 3177, 3188 (1990). In considering a motion for summary
judgment, a court must determine whether the non-moving
party's allegations are plausible.
Matsushita, supra. (emphasis added).
“[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to
draw on its experience and common sense.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009)
(discussing plausibility of claim as a requirement to survive
a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).
considering a motion for summary judgment, once the court
“has determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent
supportable by the record, [the ultimate decision
becomes] purely a question of law.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (emphasis in original).
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one
of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on the
motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380.
complete summary of the events which led to Cameron
Allen's arrest may be found in the Horn Lake Police
Department's Investigative Report, summarized below:
On or about December 20, 2014, Elvis Allen (a defendant in
this case) was the victim of an attempted assault and robbery
at R&E Hot Wings in Horn Lake. The Horn Lake Police
Department began to investigate the allegations, ultimately
identifying Plaintiff as a possible suspect.
Later, on December 31, 2014, Defendant Elvis Allen picked
Plaintiff out of a picture lineup, identifying plaintiff
Cameron Allen as the person who attempted to steal his
necklace and who also struck him with a rock at R&E Hot
Based upon this positive identification, Defendant Swan
prepared a warrant for robbery on plaintiff Cameron Allen.
Judge James Holland signed the warrant, setting a $100, 000
bond on the warrant.
Approximately two weeks later, on January 15, 2015, Defendant
Swan obtained information that Cameron Allen was in custody
with the Memphis Police Department for unrelated domestic
related charges as well as being a felon in possession of
Then, on January 26, 2015, the plaintiff's case was sent
for review by the Detective Division Commander before being
sent to the District Attorney's office for possible
On March 3, 2015, Plaintiff appeared before Judge Holland and
was bound over to the DeSoto County Grand Jury on the charge
of robbery under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-79. His bond
remained at $100, 000 (or $15, 000 with GPS monitoring).
On March 19, 2015, in Cause no. CR2015-0213, Plaintiff was
indicted by a DeSoto County Grand Jury for the charge.
italicized portion above would, at first blush, appear to be
in dispute, because the plaintiff, Cameron Allen, alleges
that the victim, Elvis Allen, actually did not pick him from
a lineup - and filled out the lineup sheet to that effect. He
states that defendant Swan then altered the form to show that
Elvis Allen did identify the plaintiff as his
attacker. The plaintiff also alleges that, in a recorded
telephone call placed by Bernard Jackson on August 15, 2014,
at approximately 3:03 p.m., victim Elvis Allen acknowledged
that he never picked plaintiff Cameron Allen out of a lineup,
never accused him of anything, and had never known or met
him. The court notes that the alleged telephone call took
place some four months before the lineup regarding
the robbery at issue in this case. The plaintiff's
criminal defense attorney set forth that date and time in a
subpoena, and the plaintiff repeated date and time in his
response  to the instant motion for summary judgment, as