OF JUDGMENT: 02/06/2016
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. HENRY L. LACKEY JUDGE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LATRAI SPRAGGINS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY:
ABBIE EASON KOONCE
IRVING, P.J., ISHEE, FAIR, AND WILSON, JJ.
Latrai Spraggins pleaded guilty to statutory rape in the Clay
County Circuit Court. Spraggins then filed a motion for
postconviction relief (PCR). In that motion, Spraggins waged
a collateral attack on his conviction and the sentence he
received. The circuit court denied the motion. Spraggins now
appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2009, Spraggins was indicted for the statutory rape
of C.H.,  which was stated to have taken place in or
around mid-January 2009. At the time of the rape, C.H. was a
child over the age of fourteen, but under the age of sixteen,
and thirty-six or more months younger than Spraggins, and not
his spouse. After many continuances, the assignment of new
counsel, and the necessary appointment of a new judge due to
recusal, Spraggins pleaded guilty on August 6, 2012. He was
sentenced to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC), with ten years suspended,
and five years of postrelease supervision.
On December 22, 2015-more than three years after his plea of
guilty was entered-Spraggins filed a PCR motion. In that
motion, Spraggins alleged a violation of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial, that his conviction should not stand
due to mental incompetency, and that he was not made aware of
his right to appeal his guilty plea or sentence. On February
6, 2016, the circuit court summarily denied his motion for
relief. This appeal followed. We affirm.
"A circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief
will not be reversed absent a finding that the court's
decision was clearly erroneous." Wood v. State,
200 So.3d 491, 493 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
"[W]hen issues of law are raised, [however, ] the proper
standard of review is de novo." Id.
The sole issue raised on appeal by Spraggins is that his
counsel, and the circuit court, failed to properly advise him
regarding his constitutional right to a direct appeal.
Alternative issues raised in his original PCR motion, but
abandoned on appeal, will not be addressed by this Court.
See Clay v. Clay, 837 So.2d 215, 220 (¶27)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (holding issues not discussed in briefs
are considered abandoned and waived on appeal). In rebuttal,
the State argues that Spraggins's motion is time-barred,
and furthermore, that he is not entitled to a direct appeal
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-35-101
(Rev. 2015). We agree.
To begin, Spraggins pleaded guilty on August 6, 2012; he
filed his PCR motion on December 22, 2015. Therefore, his PCR
motion is time-barred under Mississippi Code Annotated
section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015), as he filed it more than
three years after the entry of his judgment of conviction.
Owens v. State, 17 So.3d 628, 634 (¶17) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2009). In addition, we find that none of the
statutorily enumerated exceptions within section 99-39-5(2)
apply to Spraggins's claims. See Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-39-5. ...