United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFEND ANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STAY
Presently
before the Court are the following: (1) a motion for summary
judgment [46] filed by Defendants the City of Fulton, Chief
Reginald Reggie Johnson in his official capacity, and Agent
Joel Hill in his individual and official capacity; and (2) a
motion to stay [54] filed by Plaintiff Christopher Little.
These matters are now ripe for review. Upon due consideration
of the motions, responses, replies, corresponding briefing,
attachments, and exhibits, and for the reasons stated below,
the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment must be
granted and the motion to stay must be denied as moot.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On
March 17, 2016, Plaintiff Christopher Little
("Plaintiff) filed a complaint [1] against Defendants
the City of Fulton, Mississippi ("City of Fulton");
Joel Hill ("Defendant Hill"); Chief Reginald
"Reggie" Johnson ("Defendant Johnson");
and John Does 1-2 ("Defendant John Does")
(collectively, "Defendants").[1] On April 18,
2016, Defendants filed an answer [11] to the
complaint.[2]
Plaintiff
asserts the following claims: (1) injunction prohibiting
future conduct of a similar character, kind, or nature; (2)
negligence, gross negligence, and failure to hire, monitor,
train, and supervise; (3) intentional and/or negligent
infliction of emotional distress; (4) civil assault and
battery; and (5) "[violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Civil Rights Violation and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 Civil Rights
Violation, " which apparently refers to Fourteenth
Amendment due process and equal protection violations and a
Fourth Amendment excessive force violation.[3]
The
parties engaged in discovery. On March 29, 2017, Defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment [46] to which Plaintiff
filed a response and Defendants filed a reply. On June 21,
2017, Plaintiff filed a supplemental response in opposition
[57] to the motion for summary judgment [46]. Subsequently,
on June 29, 2017, Defendants filed a reply [59] to Plaintiffs
supplemental response. On April 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a
motion to stay [54] to which Defendants filed a response.
Defendant
Hill is a narcotics officer at the City of Fulton Police
Department.[4] Defendant Johnson is Chief of Police of
the City of Fulton, Mississippi.[5] On August 27, 2015,
Defendant Hill subjected Plaintiff to a traffic
stop[6]
that resulted in Plaintiffs arrest for the misdemeanor crimes
of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, no tag, seatbelt
violation, driving while license suspended, and no proof of
insurance.[7]
Plaintiff
alleges that on the way to his workplace, Plaintiff drove his
vehicle to a friend's automobile body shop to use the
telephone.[8] Plaintiff further alleges that while
Plaintiff was exiting his car, Defendant Hill drove into the
parking lot.[9] Plaintiff avers that Defendant Hill asked
Plaintiff for his driver's license, and that when
Plaintiff attempted to retrieve his driver's license from
the inside of his car, "[Defendant] Hill forcefully
grabbed [Plaintiffs] waist and pulled him out of the
car."[10] Plaintiff further avers that Defendant
Hill then "thought he saw [Plaintiff] stuff a white
substance down his mouth, so [Defendant] Hill grabbed
[Plaintiffs] jaw, trying to pry it open, " and
"threw [Plaintiff] to the ground and began choking
him."[11] Plaintiff further alleges that Plaintiff
lost consciousness twice.[12] Plaintiff maintains that
Defendant Hill searched Plaintiffs car and his person, but
found no narcotics or paraphernalia.[13] Plaintiff alleges that
Plaintiff was then handcuffed and transported to the Itawamba
County Jail.[14] Plaintiff further alleges that
paramedics from the North Mississippi Medical Center
Ambulance Services were called to the jail to evaluate
Plaintiff.[15] Plaintiff avers that he "sustained
lost wages and missed a work day on the day of the
incident"; Plaintiff further avers that "his
preexisting back issues were significantly
exacerbated."[16]
Defendants'
account of the aforestated events somewhat differs from
Plaintiffs account. Defendants argue that a confidential
informant provided Defendant Hill with a tip that Plaintiff
was planning to purchase Oxycodone pills in Alabama in order
to sell the pills in the parking lot of the Dixie Gas Station
in Fulton, Mississippi.[17] In response to this tip, Defendant
Hill parked across the street from the Dixie Gas Station in
Fulton to observe the parking lot of the gas
station.[18] Defendant Hill observed a small, black
vehicle parked at the gas station; two vehicles then drove up
to the car, parked beside it briefly, and left.[19] Defendants
further maintain that Defendant Hill believed that this
activity was consistent with drug activity.[20] Defendants
argue that Defendant Hill was able to identify Plaintiff
based on earlier encounters and Plaintiffs limp while
walking.[21] Defendants further argue that Plaintiff
returned to his vehicle and pulled out of the convenience
store; Defendant Hill followed and observed that Plaintiff
was "driving with an expired tag, was not wearing a
seatbelt, and was driving erratically."[22] Defendants
maintain that Defendant Hill activated his blue lights, but
Plaintiff drove on for approximately a half
mile.[23] At that point, Defendants maintain that
Plaintiff stopped his vehicle at an automobile repair shop,
"immediately jumped out of his vehicle[, ] and
questioned [Defendant] Hill as to why he was pulled
over."[24] Defendants further maintain that
Defendant Hill informed Plaintiff of his reasons for the stop
and "requested that the Plaintiff provide him with his
driver's license, " but that "[i]nstead of
complying, the Plaintiff 'dove' back into his
vehicle."[25] Defendants maintain that while Defendant
Hill was "trying to extricate the Plaintiff from the
vehicle, [Defendant] Hill witnessed the Plaintiff pushing a
small cellophane wrapper containing a white substance into
his mouth."[26] Defendants further maintain that
"[Defendant] Hill grabbed the Plaintiffs jaw in an
effort to prevent him from swallowing the substance" and
"told the Plaintiff to 'spit it out.'
"[27]However, Defendants maintain that
"Plaintiff did not comply[, ] [a] struggle ensued[, ]
and [Defendant] Hill took the Plaintiff to the
ground."[28] Defendants further argue that Plaintiff
then "swallowed what was in his mouth and relaxed his
jaws, " and "[Defendant] Hill got up off the ground
and told the Plaintiff to remain still."[29] Defendants
maintain that Defendant Hill then called for assistance, and
two officers arrived at the scene.[30] Defendants further
maintain that video of Plaintiff following the traffic stop
demonstrates Plaintiff did not suffer an injury from the
encounter with Defendant Hill.[31] Defendants maintain that
Defendant Hill was "[c]oncerned that the Plaintiff had
swallowed drugs" and "called for paramedics to come
to the jail to examine Plaintiff, " but "Plaintiff
objected to this, stating that he was
fine."[32] Defendants maintain that nonetheless
"[Defendant] Hill insisted that the paramedics come to
the jail, " and that once the paramedics arrived and
took Plaintiffs vital signs, "[Plaintiff] refused any
additional medical treatment."[33]
The
pertinent events following the detention at Itawamba County
Jail are not in dispute. Plaintiff was released on a
recognizance bond.[34] Plaintiff was criminally charged with
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, no tag, seatbelt
violation, driving while license suspended, and no proof of
insurance.[35] Plaintiff pled nolo contendere
to the charges in Fulton Municipal Court, was found guilty,
and was sentenced to 30 days in jail suspended pending appeal
in the Itawamba County Circuit Court on the charges of
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.[36] The Itawamba
County Grand Jury subsequently indicted Plaintiff in Cause
Number CRCR16-219 for felony destruction of
evidence.[37] Subsequently, "[Plaintiff] reached
a plea deal with prosecutors. He admitted guilt as to the
felony destruction of evidence charge. In exchange, the
Itawamba Circuit Court withheld acceptance of the plea and
placed [Plaintiff] on probation for a year, and the
misdemeanor charges were dropped."[38] On June 12,
2017, the Circuit Court of Itawamba County dismissed with
prejudice the misdemeanor charges against Plaintiff,
including charges of disorderly conduct and failure to
comply, and also entered an Order of Non-Adjudication on
Plaintiffs charge of felony destruction of evidence/tampering
with evidence.[39]
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
This
Court grants summary judgment "if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Weaver v. CCA Indus.,
Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). The rule
"mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct.
2548.
The
party moving for summary judgment bears the initial
responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its
motion and identifying those portions of the record it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. See Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Under
Rule 56(a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
"go beyond the pleadings and by .. . affidavits, or by
the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, ' designate 'specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' "
Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Littlefleld v.
Forney Indep. Sch. Dist, 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.
2001); Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61
F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). Where, as here, the parties
dispute the facts, the Court must view the facts and draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378,
127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (internal citations
omitted). "However, a nonmovant may not overcome the
summary judgment standard with conclusional allegations,
unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla
of evidence." McClure v. Boles, 490 F.App'x
666, 667 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hathaway v.
Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)).
IIL
Analysis and Discussion
Defendants
argue in their motion for summary judgment that the claims in
the case sub judice must be dismissed as a matter of
law. As stated above, Plaintiff asserts Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection violation claims, a Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim, a Section 1983 failure to
train/supervise claim, and state law claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, assault and battery, negligence, gross
negligence, and failure to hire/monitor/train/supervise.
Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the
following bases: (1) Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment excessive
force claim is barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d
383 (1994); (2) Defendants are immune from suit due to
qualified immunity and immunity under the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act (the "MTCA"); (3) and all claims fail
due to insufficient evidence. The Court addresses these
arguments as follows.
A.
Heck v. Humphrey
First,
Defendants argue in their motion for summary judgment that
Plaintiffs claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
because Plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest and
because allowing Plaintiff to pursue his excessive force
claim in light of the resisting arrest claim and conviction
in state court would imply the invalidity of Plaintiffs state
court conviction or sentence. Defendants argue that Plaintiff
could only pursue his excessive force claim in this Court if
he proved that his conviction or sentence had already been
invalidated.
Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition and a motion to stay,
conceding that Heck potentially barred his claims,
but requesting that this Court stay the case sub
judice until such time as his criminal convictions and
charges were fully adjudicated in state court.
While
these motions were still pending, Plaintiff filed a
supplemental response in this case stating that Heck
does not bar the claims, because on June 12, 2017, the
Circuit Court of Itawamba County dismissed with prejudice the
misdemeanor charges against Plaintiff, including charges of
disorderly conduct and failure to comply, and also entered an
Order of Non-Adjudication on Plaintiffs charge of felony
destruction of evidence/tampering with evidence. Pl'.s
Suppl. Resp. Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. [57]
¶ 2. Plaintiff further contends that his previously
filed motion to stay is now moot in light of these
developments. Plaintiff attaches the pertinent state-court
documentation to his supplemental response. See Cir.
Ct. of Itawamba Cty.'s Non-Adjudication Order on Charge
of Felony Destruction of Evidence/Tampering with
Evidence[57-1]; Agreed Order of Dismissal on Charge of
Driving While License Suspended [57-2] at 1; Agreed Order of
Dismissal on Charge of Tag Violation [57-2] at 2; Agreed
Order of Dismissal on Charge of Seatbelt Violation [57-2] at
3; Agreed Order of Dismissal on Charge of Resisting Arrest
[57-2] at 4; Agreed Order of Dismissal on Charge of Ins.
Violation [57-2] at 5; Agreed Order of Dismissal on Charge of
Failure to Obey Officer [57-2] at 6.
Defendants
subsequently filed a reply to Plaintiffs supplemental
response. In their reply, Defendants concede that Plaintiffs
state criminal convictions were dismissed on appeal to the
Circuit Court of Itawamba County, but argue that Plaintiffs
testimony under oath during his plea to the felony
destruction of evidence/tampering with evidence charge has
Heck implications, as well as other implications.
Specifically, Defendants point to Plaintiffs testimony in his
plea hearing that he swallowed drugs in his car to destroy of
the evidence of his crime. Defendants attach the plea
transcript to their reply. See Pl'.s State-Ct.
Plea Hr'g Tr. [59-1]. Defendants cite to a portion of the
plea transcript indicating that in exchange for Plaintiffs
guilty plea the District Attorney agreed to allow the
appealed misdemeanor charges for failure to obey and officer
and resisting arrest to be dropped. See Id. at 13.
"An
excessive force claim is Heck-barred if the
plaintiffs factual allegations supporting the claim are
necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the
conviction." Hall v. Abilene's Task Force,
No. 15-10836, 2017 WL 1040587, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 16, 2017)
(per curiam) (citing Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492,
497-98 & n.14 (5th Cir. 2008)); see DeLeon v. City of
Corpus Christi, Tex., 488 F.3d 649, 656-57 (5th Cir.
2007). "Under Heck, 'a plaintiff who has
been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for an
alleged violation of his constitutional rights if that
violation arose from the same facts attendant to the charge
for which he was convicted, unless he proves that his
conviction or sentence' has been in some way reversed or
invalidated." Ducksworth v. Rook, 647
F.App'x 383, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing
Bush, 513 F.3d at 497). If claims are barred by
Heck, the Court must dismiss those claims with
prejudice to their being asserted again until the
Heck conditions are met. See DeLeon, 488
F.3d at 657 (citing Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d
423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff may only bring
Heck-barred claims in the court if he later shows
that his " 'conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.' "
Palmer v. Sessions, No. 16-50102, __ F.App'x __,
2017 WL 2274293, at *1 (5th Cir. May 23, 2017) (quoting
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364). Based on
the foregoing, the Court finds that given the record in the
case sub judice, including the pertinent attached
documentation relating to the state-court criminal matters,
Plaintiffs claims are not clearly barred by Heck v.
Humphrey. However, as demonstrated below, his claims
must nonetheless be dismissed on other grounds.
B.
Immunity
Second,
Defendants argue that they are immune from suit on the
claims, both due to qualified immunity and immunity under the
MTCA.
1.
Fourth Amendment Excessive Force
Defendants
argue that Defendant Hill is entitled to qualified immunity
on Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims against him.
"Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any
person who deprives an individual of federally guaranteed
rights 'under color' of state law." Filarsky
v. Delia, __ U.S. __, __, 132 S.Ct. 1657, 1661, 182
L.Ed.2d 662 (Apr. 12, 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
"Anyone whose conduct is 'fairly attributable to the
state' can be sued as a state actor under §
1983." See id., 132 S.Ct. at 1661; see also
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937,
102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). State actors enjoy
various protections from liability derived from the common
law, such as absolute or qualified immunity. See Filar
sky, 132 S.Ct. at 1660, 1662 (it is well settled that
"common law protections well grounded in history and
reason had not been abrogated by covert inclusion in the
general language of [Section] 1983") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). "An official sued under
[Section] 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is
shown that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was 'clearly established'
at the time of the challenged conduct." Plumhoffv.
Rickard, __ U.S. __, __, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.
2D 1056 (May 27, 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp, 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th
Cir. 2005)). "When a defendant invokes qualified
immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the
inapplicability of the defense." Atteberry, 430
F.3d at 253 (citation omitted).
"In
resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary
judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first
asks whether the facts, '[t]aken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the
officer's conduct violated a [federal] right[.]'
" Tolan v. Cotton, __ U.S. __, ___, 134 S.Ct.
1861, 1863, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,
150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). "The second prong of the
qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in
question was 'clearly established' at the time of the
violation." Id., 134 Ct. at 1866 (citing
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508,
153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)). Courts have discretion to decide
which prong to consider first. Id. (citing
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct.
808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)). "But under either prong,
courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of
the party seeking summary judgment." Id.
In the
case sub judice, Defendants argue that Defendant
Hill is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim. Although Plaintiff argues
that genuine disputes of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff
posed a threat to Defendant Hill, Defendants maintain that
the force used by Defendant Hill was "entirely
appropriate, " because "[Defendant] Hill witnessed
the Plaintiff attempt to swallow what appeared to [Defendant]
Hill to be drugs after 'diving' back into his
vehicle" and because "[Plaintiff] refused to
'spit out' what was in his mouth, resisted
[Defendant] Hill's attempts to remove the drugs from
[Plaintiffs] mouth, and struggled with [Defendant] Hill while
he was attempting to take [Plaintiff] into custody."
Defs.' Mem. Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. [47] at 8. Defendants
maintain that Plaintiff suffered no physical injury from any
alleged events giving rise to this suit; Defendants cite the
videos taken immediately following the traffic stop, which
are exhibits to the motion for summary judgment, as evidence
supporting this argument.
"In
order to state a claim for the constitutional violation of
excessive force, [Plaintiff] must establish that an injury
occurred that resulted directly from the use of clearly
excessive force, and that the excessiveness was
unreasonable." See Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg,
Tex., 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009).
"fAIll claims that law enforcement officers
have used excessive force ... in the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen should
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness
standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395,
109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (emphasis in
original).
To
satisfy the first prong of an excessive force claim, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that he "suffered at least
some form of injury" from the defendant's actions
that is more than de minimis. Glenn v. City of Tyler,
Tex., 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks
omitted). The degree of injury necessary to meet this
requirement is related to the amount of force that was
constitutionally permissible under the facts of the case.
Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703-04 (5th Cir.),
decision clarified on reh'g, 186 F.3d 633 (5th
Cir. 1999). In this case, Plaintiff testified in his
deposition that he suffered cuts on his arm and neck and a
bruise on his neck from being thrown down on gravel and
pressure being applied by Defendant Hill. Pl'.s Dep.
[46-5] at 65-66. However, Plaintiff further testified that he
was not treated for any injuries at the jail or at any point
thereafter. See Id. at 14 ("When I had got to
the jail, [Defendant] Hill and the[y] had had some paramedics
come up there and check me out. And the paramedics said I was
fine, so I just went on to the house."); id. at
15 (testifying he has never seen a doctor for any injuries in
connection with this case); id. at 31 (testifying
that after he was informed that the paramedics would be
called to the jail, he told Defendant Hill, "I'm
fine"). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
first prong of his excessive force claim that he suffered an
actionable injury, and his excessive force claim fails on
this basis.
Plaintiffs
excessive force claim fails for the additional reason that he
fails to show that any use of force was objectively
unreasonable. Plaintiff argues that "viewed in the light
most favorable to [Plaintiff], Defendant Hill's use
offeree in this situation where there was absolutely no
threat that his safety was threatened and also engag[ing] in
a choke hold violated a clearly established constitutional
right." Pl'.s Mem. Br. Supp. Resp. Opp'n to
Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. [52] at 12. However, Plaintiff
presents no evidence supporting that Defendant Hill's use
of force was excessive or unreasonable, and the evidence in
the record supports the opposite inference. Although the
charges were later dismissed on appeal due to plea
negotiations in connection with the felony destruction of
evidence/tampering of evidence charge, Plaintiff pled
nolo contendere in state court on his criminal
charges of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, no tag, a
seatbelt violation, driving while license suspended, and no
proof of insurance. Defs.' Mem. Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
[47] at 4 (citing Charges [46-36]); Pl'.s Mot. Stay [54]
at 1. Further, as the documentation attached to
Defendants' reply to the supplemental response
demonstrates, Plaintiff admitted under oath in his plea
hearing in state court on the felony destruction of
evidence/tampering with evidence charge that drugs were found
on him or in his vehicle and that he swallowed drugs at the
time of the events giving rise to this suit. Pl'.s Plea
Hr'g Tr. [59-1] at 11-12, 15, 17-18. Given all of the
foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs excessive force
also fails because he has not demonstrated that any force was
objectively unreasonable.
In sum,
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the elements of his Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim. Therefore, there is no
underlying constitutional violation, and the Court need not
further address the qualified immunity issue. See Myers
v. Klevenhagen,97 F.3d 91, 96 (5th Cir. 1996)
(unnecessary for courts to reach qualified immunity issue if
no alleged constitutional violation). ...