United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
STARRETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
reasons provided below, the Court grants in part and
denies in part the Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Defendants Tanya Darlene Gray and Lukeith Ridgeway.
Specifically, the Court denies the motion with respect to
Plaintiff's claims of trespass, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Defendant Lukeith Ridgeway, but the Court
grants the motion in all other respects.
a wrongful foreclosure case. The Court discussed its factual
background in a previous opinion. See Green v. Lakeview
Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-156-KS-MTP, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17565, at *1-*2 (S.D.Miss. Feb. 12, 2016).
Plaintiff asserted claims of trespass, conversion, and
intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress
against the individual Defendants, Tanya Darlene Gray and
Lukeith Ridgeway. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment , which the Court now addresses.
Standard of Review
provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Sierra
Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d
134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). “An issue is material if its
resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”
Sierra Club, Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. “An issue
is ‘genuine' if the evidence is sufficient for a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010).
Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d
156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009). When deciding whether a genuine
fact issue exists, “the court must view the facts and
the inference to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sierra Club,
Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. However, “[c]onclusional
allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences,
unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do
not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial.” Oliver v. Scott, 276
F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no evidence to support
her claim that they committed a trespass by entering the
subject real property and removing her personal property.
“[A] civil trespass cause of action in Mississippi
includes three elements: 1) an intrusion upon the land of
another without license or other right for one's own
purpose; 2) damage to the plaintiff as a result of physical
invasion of the land; 3) credible evidence that the party
charged is the party responsible for the tort.”
McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., No.
1:01-CV-22-LG-JMR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105837, at *12
(S.D.Miss. Oct. 4, 2010) (citing Monsanto Co. v.
Scruggs, 342 F.Supp.2d 602, 606 (N.D. Miss. 2004)).
presented a Notice of Right to Reclaim Abandoned Property,
which she claims was posted on the property. See
Exhibit D to Response, Green v. Lakeview Loan Servicing,
LLC, No. 2:15-CV-156-KS-MTP (S.D.Miss. May 1, 2017), ECF
No. 73-4; Exhibit B to Response at 2, Green v. Lakeview
Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-156-KS-MTP (S.D.Miss.
May 1, 2017), ECF No. 73-2. The Notice provided that the
“premises has been rekeyed, ” and it directed
Plaintiff to contact Defendant Ridgeway to gain access to the
property. Exhibit D [73-4]. Defendant Ridgeway signed the
Notice. Id. The parties have not directed the Court
to any other evidence regarding who had the house rekeyed.
Defendants argue that “the property had been rekeyed in
accordance with the foreclosure process by someone other
than these Defendants.” Reply at 5-6, Green v.
Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-156-KS-MTP
(S.D.Miss. May 10, 2017), ECF No. 76 (emphasis original). But
Defendant Ridgeway's affidavit, cited in support of this
argument, says nothing about who rekeyed the property.
Exhibit H to Memorandum, Green v. Lakeview Loan
Servicing, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-156-KS-MTP (S.D.Miss. Apr.
17, 2017), ECF No. 69-8. Plaintiff apparently assumes, based
on the Notice of Right to Reclaim Abandoned Property, that
Ridgeway changed the locks on the house. Indeed, she stated
as much in her affidavit. Exhibit C to Response at 2,
Green v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, No.
2:15-CV-156-KS-MTP (S.D.Miss. May 1, 2017), ECF No. 71-3.
Court's opinion, a reasonable jury could infer from the
Notice of Right to Reclaim Abandoned Property that Defendant
Ridgeway rekeyed the property. Of course, Ridgeway could not
have changed the locks without entering the property, and he
has not presented any argument regarding his right or license
to do so. The record contains evidence that Plaintiff
suffered damages as a result of the locks being changed.
Specifically, she stated in her affidavit that she was unable
to retrieve her personal property. Exhibit B [73-2], at 2.
Therefore, the Court finds that the record contains
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material
fact as to Plaintiff's trespass claim against Defendant
Ridgeway, and it denies Defendants' motion in that
Plaintiff presented no evidence whatsoever that Defendant
Tanya Gray trespassed on her property. In fact, Plaintiff did
not even address the trespass claim as applied to Defendant
Gray. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion as
to Plaintiff's trespass claim against Defendant Gray.