DAVARRIUS BROWN A/K/A DEVARRIUS DEONTAY GARRETT A/K/A DEVARRIUS GARRETT A/K/A DEVARRIUS GARRETT BROWN A/K/A DEVARIOUS DEONTAY BROWN A/K/A DEVARIOUS GARRETT BROWN A/K/A DEVARIOUS DONTAY BROWN A/K/A DEVARRIOUS GARRETT A/K/A DEVARRIUS D. GARRETT A/K/A DEVARRIUS DEONTAY GARRETT BROWN A/K/A DEVARIUS GARRETT BROWN A/K/A DEVARIUS DEONTAY BROWN APPELLANT
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
of Judgment: 12/04/2015
FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON.
WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN III TRIAL JUDGE.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DAVARRIUS BROWN (PRO SE).
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY:
DARRELL CLAYTON BAUGHN JASON L. DAVIS ANTHONY LOUIS SCHMIDT
Davarrius Brown appeals pro se to this Court arguing that the
Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) incorrectly
computed the date of his parole eligibility following
sentencing for his fifth and sixth felony convictions.
Finding no error, we affirm.
AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In 2012, Brown pleaded guilty to one count of felony
shoplifting, and had a previous nonadjudication for one count
of felony shoplifting set aside. In 2013, Brown pleaded
guilty to yet another count of felony shoplifting. For each
of these three convictions, Brown was sentenced to ten years,
with five years to serve followed by five years of
post-release supervision. All together, the time to serve
amounted to three consecutive five-year terms.Brown was enrolled
in the Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) and began serving
these sentences under "house arrest."
In May 2014, while still under the ISP and wearing an ankle
monitor, Brown was arrested for felony shoplifting from a
department store. Later that day, while still being processed
in booking, Brown escaped police custody due to a faulty
jail-cell door. The authorities promptly tracked him through
his ankle monitor, and he was apprehended. Brown pleaded
guilty to felony shoplifting and escape, and was sentenced in
March 2015 to a total of fifteen years (ten for shoplifting
and five for escape, with the sentences to run consecutively
to each other). The 2015 sentencing order is silent as to how
the new sentences should run in relation to the 2012 and 2013
Brown was not sentenced as a habitual offender. MDOC gave him
a parole-eligibility date of January 21, 2020. This was
calculated by first measuring twenty-five percent of his 2012
and 2013 consecutive sentences (3.75 years) followed
consecutively by twenty-five percent of his 2015 sentences
(an additional 3.75 years). Brown filed a motion in the
Circuit Court of Madison County, arguing that the 2012 and
2015 sentences should be treated as concurrent for purposes
of calculating parole eligibility. Treating Brown's
motion as a motion for post-conviction relief, the circuit
court summarily dismissed it. Brown appeals.
An inmate may contest the computation of a parole-eligibility
date as an original action in circuit court without first
exhausting administrative remedies. Keys v. State,
67 So.3d 758, 760 (¶9) (Miss. 2011); Ducksworth v.
State, 103 So.3d 762, 765-66 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App.
2012); Lattimore v. Sparkman, 858 So.2d 936, 938
(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). The State failed to identify
or distinguish this line of controlling cases in its brief,
pointing instead to the requirement in Mississippi Code
Annotated section 47-5-803 (Rev. 2015) that "no state
court shall entertain an offender's grievance or
complaint which falls under the purview of the administrative
review procedure unless and until such offender shall have
exhausted the remedies as provided in such procedure."
But as this Court discussed in detail in Lattimore,
parole eligibility does not clearly fall under the purview of
the administrative-review procedure. Lattimore, 858
So.2d at 938 (¶7). Therefore we follow the rule that
inmates may-but are not required to-use the
administrative-review procedure as a way of challenging
parole eligibility. Id.
Brown's argument that he has a liberty interest in parole
is without merit. Mississippi law is settled that criminal
offenders have "no constitutionally recognized liberty
interest in parole." Vice v. State, 679 So.2d
205, 208 (Miss. 1996). By statute, the Mississippi Parole
Board has the exclusive responsibility and discretion ...