United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division
SHARION AYCOCK U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner
complaint of Wilton Wade Corley, III, who challenges the
conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
For the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed
this suit. The plaintiff has brought the instant case under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of
action against “[e]very person” who under color
of state authority causes the “deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleges
that during his stay at the Leflore County Detention Center,
the County Defendants denied him adequate medical care and
tampered with his mail. In addition, he has alleged that
Mississippi Department of Corrections defendant Nanette
Trotter denied him adequate medical care. The County
Defendants have moved  for summary judgment, and the
State Defendant has joined ,  in that motion. In
addition, the State Defendant has filed a separate motion
 for summary judgment based upon Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The plaintiff has not responded to the motions, and
the deadline to do so has expired. For the reasons set forth
below, the motions , ,  by the defendants for
summary judgment will be granted, and judgment will be
entered for the defendants in all respects.
judgment is appropriate if the “materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (c)(1).
“The moving party must show that if the evidentiary
material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in
court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party
to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). After a
proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts
to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen
v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621
(5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.
1998). Substantive law determines what is material.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted.” Id., at 248. If the
non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of
allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is
presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. “Where
the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968
F.2d 500, 503 (5thCir. 1992). The facts are
reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA
Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management
Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir. 1999);
Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d
1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995). However, this is so
only when there is “an actual controversy, that is,
when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory
facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v.
Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th
Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not
“assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove
the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
plaintiff cannot meet this burden with “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986),
“conclusory allegations, ” Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 871-73, 110 S.Ct.
3177, 3180 (1990), “unsubstantiated assertions, ”
Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5th Cir.
1994), or by a mere “scintilla” of evidence,
Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082
(5th Cir. 1994). It would undermine the purposes
of summary judgment if a party could defeat such a motion
simply by “replac[ing] conclusory allegations of the
complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an
affidavit.” Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188
(1990). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court
must also determine whether the non-moving party's
allegations are plausible. Matsushita,
supra. (emphasis added). “[D]etermining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific,
requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and
common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (discussing plausibility of claim
as a requirement to survive a motion to dismiss under
considering a motion for summary judgment, once the court
“has determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent
supportable by the record, [the ultimate decision
becomes] purely a question of law.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (emphasis in original).
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one
of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on the
motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380.
plaintiff's remaining claims are:
1. that Sheriff Ricky Banks, Tyrone Banks, Nurse Holmes,
Sergeant Gayden, Sergeant Alphonso Williams, Parole Officer
Nanette Trotter, Dorothy Dozier, and the Mississippi
Department of Corrections denied him adequate medical care;
2. that Chief of Security Chip Gravlee tampered with the
Leflore County Adult Detention Center (“LCADC”)
is a small jail located in and operated by Leflore County.
Administrator Banks Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. “A.” At
the time Corley was incarcerated, approximately 91 inmates
were incarcerated in the LCADC, with 62 inmates in Pod C with
the plaintiff. Id. Wilton Wade Corley, III has been
incarcerated many times with the LCADC and is known in the
facility as “Chill Will.” Id. ¶ 3.
He is well-known there because he, on at least on one
occasion, tried to break into the jail. Id.
did not use the grievance procedure to seek relief regarding
the conditions of his confinement for dates October 13, 2015,
through November 14, 2015, . Id. ¶ 6; Sheriff
Banks Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. “B”; Gravlee Aff. ¶
5, Ex. “C”; Hood Aff. ¶ 4, Ex.
“D”; Gayden Aff. ¶ 3, Ex. “E.”
Indeed, Corley filed no grievances at all during that stay at
the LCADC. Id. Though Corley has alleged that he
filed three grievances, he has provided no documentary proof
to substantiate the allegation. In addition, Corley filed no
grievances with the Mississippi Department of Corrections
regarding his allegations against defendant Nanette Trotter.