United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Western Division
H. KENNETH LEFOLDT, JR. PLAINTIFF
v.
DONALD RENTFRO, et al. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Keith
Starrett UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
For
the reasons below, the Court denies Defendant Horne,
LLP's Motion to Transfer [97] this case to another
division.
Defendant
Horne, LLP argues that the Court should transfer this case to
the Eastern Division or Northern Division of this District
pursuant to Rule 1404(a). This Court has previously applied
Section 1404(a) to determine the propriety of an
intra-district transfer. See, e.g. Green v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:11-CV-226-KS-MTP, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 193744, at *4 (S.D.Miss. Mar. 29, 2012); Parsons v.
Pearl River County, No. 2:09-CV-72-KS-MTP, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51128, at *5 (S.D.Miss. June 9, 2009). District
courts “have broad discretion in deciding whether to
order a transfer” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
In re Volkswagen of Am., 545 F.3d 304, 311 (5th Cir.
2008). The statute provides: “For the convenience of
the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought or to
any district or division to which all parties have
consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The
first question under Section 1404(a) is whether the case
“might have been brought in the destination
venue.” In re Volkswagen of Am., 545 F.3d at
312. It appears to be undisputed that this case “might
have been brought” in either the Northern or Eastern
Division.
Next,
the party seeking a transfer must show “good
cause.” Id. at 315. Good cause has been
defined as follows:
When viewed in the context of § 1404(a), to show good
cause means that a moving party, in order to support its
claim for a transfer, must satisfy the statutory requirements
and clearly demonstrate that a transfer is for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice. Thus, when the transferee venue is not clearly more
convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff's choice should be respected. When the movant
demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more
convenient, however, it has shown good cause and the district
court should therefore grant the transfer.
Id. To determine whether the transferee venue is
clearly more convenient than the plaintiff's chosen
venue, the Court considers various factors impacting the
private and public interests at play in the case.
Id.
The private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of
access to the sources of proof; (2) the availability of
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3)
the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. The public interest factors are
(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized
interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum
with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance
of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the
application of foreign law.
Id. While these factors “are appropriate for
most transfer cases, they are not necessarily exhaustive or
exclusive, ” and none of them carry “dispositive
weight.” Id.
A.
Prejudicial Communications & Publicity
Defendant
focuses virtually all of its argument on the fourth private
interest factor - practical problems that make the trial of a
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Defendant contends
that “[m]any residents of the Western Division have
been exposed to prejudicial communications that will affect
their ability to deliver a verdict based solely on the
evidence at trial.” First, Defendant cites the number
of persons employed by the Natchez Regional Medical Center,
representing that it was “likely the largest or one of
the largest single non-education employer in Adams
County.” Next, Defendant speculates that NRMC's
Board of Trustees, the Trustees' families, the Adams
County Board of Supervisors, and the Supervisors' friends
and families have commented to others about the litigation.
Defendant also argues that the NRMC had numerous creditors in
Natchez, Mississippi, including Adams County.
Additionally,
Defendant contends that newspaper publicity about issues
related to this case has prejudiced the Western Division jury
pool. Defendant attached copies of over seventy newspaper
articles that it claims support this argument. It represents
that some of the articles contain inaccurate information,
specifically noting articles from July 2015 in which
Plaintiff, NRMC's Trustee, is quoted as considering
potential litigation against its Recovery Audit Contractor
(“RAC”) for failing to appeal certain
Medicare/Medicaid payment determinations. In one opinion
piece, the local newspaper opined that the Trustee should
“pull[] out all the stops in trying to get everyone who
was harmed by the hospital bankruptcy paid.” Defendant
argues that Plaintiff facilitated these reports by
“inject[ing] this specific issue into the public
discussion.” Defendant also noted at least one article
with a quotation from Plaintiff that purportedly contains an
inaccurate description of his duties. Likewise, Defendant
complains of an opinion piece criticizing
“professionals” who allegedly received payments
just before the hospital filed its bankruptcy petition, as
well as a news article that specifically discusses this
lawsuit and describes the allegations against
Defendant.[1]
Defendant
contends that all of the pretrial publicity discussed above
can not be easily addressed in voir dire, asserting
that potential jurors will have to be questioned in
camera, to prevent tainting the remainder of the
venire, and that hypothetical prejudice caused by
pretrial publicity can not be cured by potential jurors'
assurances that they can be impartial in spite of reading or
hearing such publicity. In summary, Defendant argues that
“almost everybody in and around Adams County and the
neighboring counties” has been and will continue to be
incurably prejudiced by news publicity, social media posts,
connections to and communications with persons who have an
interest in this case, community gossip, and/or their own
connection to the hospital or its bankruptcy.
This
Court gives certain jury instructions in every civil trial.
Among these are an instruction for the jury to base its
verdict upon only the evidence presented during the course of
trial, and numerous instructions to avoid all news, social
media, discussions with friends and family, and/or any other
potential source of information about the trial. The Court
presumes that jurors follow the Court's instructions,
see United States v. Anderson, 755 F.3d 782, 798
(5th Cir. 2014), and the Court is inclined to believe that
thorough, careful voir dire and firm instructions
are sufficient to avoid empaneling jurors whose attitudes and
opinions have been substantially prejudiced by the publicity
discussed above, and to cure whatever prejudice may
...