United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division
MICHAEL P. MILLS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner
complaint of Charleston Hudson, who challenges the conditions
of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the
purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes
that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit.
The plaintiff has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides a federal cause of action against
“[e]very person” who under color of state
authority causes the “deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleges
that the defendants improperly revoked his post-release
supervision on a cyberstalking charge. The defendants have
moved  for summary judgment, and Hudson has responded.
The matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion by the defendants for summary judgment will
be granted, and judgment will be entered for the defendants.
judgment is appropriate if the “materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (c)(1).
“The moving party must show that if the evidentiary
material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in
court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party
to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)).
proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts
to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen
v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621
(5th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.
1998). Substantive law determines what is material.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary
will not be counted.” Id., at 248. If the
non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of
allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is
presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. “Where
the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968
F.2d 500, 503 (5thCir. 1992).
facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621;
PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water
Management Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5th Cir.
1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper,
67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995). However, this
is so only when there is “an actual controversy, that
is, when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994);
see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432
(5th Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the
court does not “assume that the nonmoving party could
or would prove the necessary facts.” Little,
37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
very purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the
pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Advisory Committee Note
to the 1963 Amendments to Rule 56. Indeed, “[t]he
amendment is not intended to derogate from the solemnity of
the pleadings. Rather, it recognizes that despite the best
efforts of counsel to make his pleadings accurate, they may
be overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof available to his
adversary.” Id. The non-moving party (the
plaintiff in this case), must come forward with proof to
support each element of his claim. The plaintiff cannot meet
this burden with “some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586,
106 S.Ct. at 1356, “conclusory allegations, ”
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,
871-73, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3180 (1990), “unsubstantiated
assertions, ” Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92
(5th Cir. 1994), or by a mere
“scintilla” of evidence, Davis v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1994).
It would undermine the purposes of summary judgment if a
party could defeat such a motion simply by “replac[ing]
conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with
conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”
Hudson is in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) serving sentences for two
counts of sexual battery. He is currently housed at the
Central Mississippi Correctional Facility. On November 22,
2010, in a single proceeding before the Circuit Court of
Tippah County, Mississippi, Hudson pled guilty in Cause No.
TK-2010-032 to Cyberstalking (Miss. Code Ann. §
97-45-15) and, in Cause No. TK-2010-100 to Jail Escape (Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-9-49). In that same proceeding, the trial
court sentenced Hudson to five years' imprisonment with
none suspended on the cyberstalking charge, and five
years' imprisonment with five years suspended on the jail
escape charge. Docs. 7-3, 7-4. The court also sentenced
Hudson to five years of supervised release on both charges
(though, as discussed below, it was error to apply a period
of post-release supervision to the cyberstalking sentence).
Id. The net effect of the sentence was that Hudson
would be incarcerated solely on the five-year cyberstalking
charge - then, upon release, have five years'
post-release supervision on the escape charge.
was released from imprisonment for the cyberstalking
conviction on February 25, 2013. His Mississippi Department
of Corrections Discharge Certificate states that, as to the
charges of cyberstalking and jail escape:
MDOC Number K9018 Name Hudson, Charleston has completed
sentence service of 5 Year(s) in the Mississippi Department
of Corrections and is hereby DISCHARGED ON February 25, 2013
due to Expiration of Sentence.
Doc. 1 at 49 (emphasis in original).
September 24, 2013, the trial court issued an order holding
that Hudson had violated the terms of his post-release
supervision in Cause No. CR2010-32 (cyberstalking). Eight
days later, on October 2, 2013, the state court also revoked
Hudson's probation on an escape charge in Cause No.
2010-100. The revocation order in Cause No. CR2010-32
(cyberstalking) was vacated on July 14, 2015. In that order,
the trial court acknowledged that “the petitioner was
erroneously revoked on CR2010-32 [cyberstalking].” Doc.
1 at 12.
Mississippi's post-release supervision statute:
[T]he total number of years of incarceration plus the total
number of years of post-release supervision shall not exceed
the maximum sentence authorized to be imposed by law for the
Miss. Code. Ann. § 47-7-34(1). The maximum sentence for
cyberstalking under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-45-15 is five
years, and in 2010 the court sentenced Hudson to five
years' incarceration on that charge. However, as the sum
of the terms of incarceration and supervised release on the
single cyberstalking charge cannot exceed the maximum
sentence (five years in this case), the court could not
properly impose both a sentence of imprisonment of five years
- and a period of supervised release on that same charge.
Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34(1). Thus, when Hudson was
released from incarceration on the cyberstalking charge, he
had served that entire sentence.
Discharge Certificate also states that:
Hudson, Charleston is hereby remanded to the supervision of
the Mississippi Probation and Parole Board to complete the
suspended portion of his sentence under the jurisdiction of
Doc. 1 at 49. Though less than clear, this part of the
Discharge Certificate is also correct. Under the court's
sentencing order, Hudson was under supervision (on the jail
escape charge) from the moment he was released on the
cyberstalking charge on February 25, 2013. The sentencing
court had imposed a five-year period of supervised release on
the jail escape charge, to be served after
completion of the cyberstalking sentence:
The recommendation is on the cyberstalking charge that he be
sentenced to serve a term of 5 years, and on the jail escape
he be sentenced to serve a term of 5 years; that they run
consecutive to each other for a total to 10 years, but the
jail escape charge be suspended and he be placed on 5
years' post-release supervision. The net effect of it
would be he's got a 10-year sentence, 5 years suspended
with 5 years to serve and that 5 years to serve will be on
the cyberstalking charge . . . .
Doc. 1 at 47-48.
is, ultimately, what occurred. Hudson's MDOC time sheet
reflects that he has received credit for each day he spent in
jail after the first revocation on September 24, 2013. Eight
days passed between the erroneous revocation (September 24,
2013) and the proper one (October 2, 2013). According to
Hudson's MDOC time sheet, he has been credited for those
days, as the begin date on his current period of
incarceration is September 24, 2013, rather than October 2,
2013. Finally, as of May 13, 2016, the trial court held that
plaintiff has completed serving his sentence on the escape
The Court hereby modifies the Order entered on October 2,
2013, that correctly revoked the probation of the Defendant
in this case and suspends the balance of the time imposed in
TK 10-100, that sentence now being suspended down to time
served, it being the intention of the Court that the
Defendant may now begin serving his consecutive ...