United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING
GUIROLA, JR. CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for
consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff Henry Lee Craig, an
inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, brings
this pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Craig is proceeding in forma pauperis.
See Order . The named Defendant is Calvin
Taylor, Attorney-at-law. The Court, having liberally
construed Craig's Complaint  and Amended Complaint 
in consideration with the applicable law, finds that this
case should be dismissed.
Facts and Procedural History
2011, Craig was convicted of murder in the Jackson County
Circuit Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. Craig
v. State, 110 So.3d 807, 808 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
Taylor represented Craig at his murder trial. Compl.  at 5
(CM/ECF pagination). Craig complains that Taylor violated his
constitutional rights and civil rights. Specifically, Craig
claims that Taylor conspired with state officials to conceal
“the crime of intimidation by federal agents”
during Craig's trial. Id.; Am. Compl.  at 3.
brings this Complaint on forms available for prisoners suing
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also states that he if filing
his claims under §§1981, 1985, and 1986. Compl. 
at 6 (CM/ECF pagination). Craig seeks “compensatory
relief, punitive relief, injunctive relief, ”
attorney's fees and “whatever this Court deems
necessary to grant Plaintiff relief.” Id. at
4; Am. Compl.  at 5 (CM/ECF pagination).
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (as
amended), applies to prisoner proceedings in forma
pauperis, and provides that “the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . .
. (B) the action or appeal -- (i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Since Craig is proceeding
in forma pauperis, his Complaint is subject to the
case-screening procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2). Having completed that screening, it is apparent that
Craig's claims are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations and by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
Statute of Limitations
district court ‘may raise the defense of limitations
sua sponte . . . [and] [d]ismissal is appropriate if
it is clear from the face of the complaint that the claims
asserted are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.'” Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d
565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Hegmann,
198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999)). Since there is no federal
statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal court must
borrow the forum state's general personal injury
limitations period. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S.
235, 240 (1989); see also Mitchell v. Crescent River Port
Pilots Ass'n, 265 F. App'x 363, 367, 367 n.3
(5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (holding state's
personal injury limitation period applies to claims under
§§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, but noting that §
1986 specifically includes a one-year statute of
limitations). The applicable Mississippi statute of
limitations period is three years. See James v.
Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
Mississippi's three-year general personal injury
limitations period applicable to § 1983 cases); see
also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972), as amended.
Mississippi law governs the applicable limitations period,
“the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a
question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to
state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388
(2007). As such, an action accrues when a plaintiff has
“a complete and present cause of action.”
Id. As noted by the Fifth Circuit:
Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run the
moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an
injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
injured. A plaintiff's awareness encompasses two
elements: (1) the existence of the injury; and (2) causation,
that is, the connection between the injury and the
defendant's actions. A plaintiff need not know that she
has a legal cause of action; she need know only the facts
that would ultimately support a claim. Actual knowledge is
not required if the circumstances would lead a reasonable
person to investigate further.
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576
(5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414
(5th Cir. 2008) (citing Piotrowski).
filed this lawsuit in October 2016. His claims are premised
on the inadequacies of his criminal conviction, including
Taylor's actions as his defense counsel at his 2011
trial. Craig specifically represents the date of May 11,
2011, for Taylor's purported conduct causing his injury.
Compl.  at 5 (CM/ECF pagination); Am. Compl.  at 3
(same). Craig's claims accrued more than three years
prior to Craig filing the present action in October 2016, and
are therefore time-barred.