United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING
GUIROLA, JR. CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for
consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff Henry Lee Craig, an
inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, brings
this pro se Complaint seeking monetary damages and
injunctive relief. Craig is proceeding in forma
pauperis. See Order . The named Defendants
are: Jerome Lorraine, FBI Agent; Louie Miller, FBI Agent; and
James B. Comey, FBI Director. The Court, having liberally
construed Craig's Complaint  and Amended Complaint 
in consideration with the applicable law, finds that this
case should be dismissed.
Facts and Procedural History
2011, Craig was convicted of murder in the Jackson County
Circuit Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. Craig
v. State, 110 So.3d 807, 808 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
Craig's conviction arises from a shooting that occurred
in May of 2009. Id. Agent Lorraine testified at
Craig's trial regarding statements Craig made to him
about the shooting and the victim. Id. at 809.
According to Craig, Agents Lorraine and Miller conspired to
conceal evidence of a crime from Director Comey. Compl. 
at 4. Craig also claims that Lorraine and Miller conspired
with the prosecutor's office “by concealing
evidence of a crime of intimidation by federal agents.”
Id. According to Craig, the “crime of
intimidation” occurred on June 4, 2009, June 11, 2009,
August 26, 2010, and May 10, 2011. Am. Compl.  at 3
brings this Complaint on forms available for prisoners
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also states
that he is filing his claims under
Bivens and §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986.
Compl.  at 1, 4. Craig seeks “compensatory relief,
punitive relief, ” attorney's fees,
“injunctive relief” and “whatever relief
this Court deems necessary and appropriate.”
Id. at 4; Am. Compl.  at 4 (CM/ECF
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (as
amended), applies to prisoner proceedings in forma
pauperis, and provides that “the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . .
. (B) the action or appeal -- (i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Since Craig is proceeding
in forma pauperis, his Complaint is subject to the
case-screening procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2). Having completed that screening, it is apparent that
Craig's claims are barred by absolute witness immunity,
the applicable statute of limitations, and by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
immunity is immunity from suit rather than simply a defense
against liability, and is a threshold question ‘to be
resolved as early in the proceedings as possible.'”
Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d 654, 356 (5th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir.
1994)). Witnesses in grand jury proceedings and criminal
trials are entitled to absolute immunity against § 1983
suits. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1506
(2012); see also Wafer v. Person, 70 F. App'x
194, 195 (5th Cir. 2003) (absolute immunity for witness
testimony extends to Bivens actions). Insofar as
Craig claims his rights were violated by Lorraine's
testimony during his criminal proceedings, Craig's claims
are barred by absolute immunity. Rehberg, 132 S.Ct.
at 1506-07; see also Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty., Tex.,
274 F.3d 269, 277-78 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding absolute
witness immunity bars claims for conspiracy to commit
Statute of Limitations
district court ‘may raise the defense of limitations
sua sponte . . . [and] [d]ismissal is appropriate if
it is clear from the face of the complaint that the claims
asserted are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.'” Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d
565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Hegmann,
198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999)). Claims brought under
§ 1983 or Bivens are controlled by the
applicable state statute of limitations. See Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) (§ 1983 claims);
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 590 (5th
Cir. 1999)(Bivens action); see also Mitchell v.
Crescent River Port Pilots Ass'n, 265 F. App'x
363, 367, 367 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)
(finding state's personal injury limitation period
applies to claims under § 1981 and § 1985, but
noting that § 1986 specifically includes a one-year
statute of limitations). The applicable Mississippi statute
of limitations period is three years. See Rankin v.
United States, 556 F. App'x 305, 310 (5th Cir. 2014)
(Bivens action); James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d
834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (§ 1983 claims); see
also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972), as
Mississippi law governs the applicable limitations period,
federal law governs when a claim accrues. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (§ 1983 claims);
Rankin v. United States, 556 F. App'x 305, 310
(5th Cir. 2014) (Bivens action). An action accrues
when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of
action.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. As noted by
the Fifth Circuit:
Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run the
moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an
injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
injured. A plaintiff's awareness encompasses two
elements: (1) the existence of the injury; and (2) causation,
that is, the connection between the injury and the
defendant's actions. A plaintiff need not know that she
has a legal cause of action; she need know only the facts
that would ultimately support a claim. Actual knowledge is
not required if the circumstances would lead a reasonable
person to investigate further.
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576
(5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414