United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
P. JORDAN III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
pro se action is before the Court on Defendant Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC's Motion to Dismiss . Because
Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim, the motion is
Facts and Procedural History
16, 2006, Plaintiffs Leroy and Brenda Purnell obtained a
mortgage loan. Sub. Tr.'s Deed [10-1] at 1. The note was
secured by a Deed of Trust covering Plaintiffs' property
at Rural Route 1 Box 38 in Coila, Mississippi. Id.
The Deed of Trust listed Mitchell L. Heffernan as trustee for
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee
for Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc., beneficiary.
Id. The Deed of Trust was ultimately assigned to
U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”), as
Trustee, for Residential Asset Securities Corporation, Home
Equity Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certifications,
Series 2006-EMX7. Id.
point thereafter, Plaintiffs defaulted on their loan
payments, and on December 15, 2014, U.S. Bank appointed Emily
Kaye Courteau, an attorney with Morris & Associates, as
the Substitute Trustee on the Deed of Trust. Id. On
May 14, 2015, Courteau conducted a foreclosure sale at which
U.S. Bank purchased Plaintiffs' property. A Demand for
Possession of Property was mailed to Plaintiffs on June 24,
2015, and Ocwen Loan Servicing (“Ocwen”), as a
servicer for U.S. Bank, filed a Complaint for Possession in
the Justice Court of Carroll County two months later. The
court entered judgment against Plaintiffs on November 12,
2015, and issued a Writ of Possession on December 17, 2015.
by the foreclosure and eviction, Plaintiffs filed this
lawsuit on April 1, 2016, against Ocwen as servicer for U.S.
Bank, the eviction attorneys, and the judge who presided over
the eviction. Ocwen filed the instant Motion to Dismiss 
on October 26, 2016. Following the issuance of a Show Cause
Order , Plaintiffs filed a one-sentence response. Ocwen
did not reply. The Court has personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.
considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the “court
accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'”
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid
Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.
1999)). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as
true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555
(citations and footnote omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should look
only to the face of the complaint to assess whether the
plaintiff states a claim. However, the Court may consider
documents outside the complaint that are “(1) attached
to the motion; (2) referenced in the complaint; and (3)
central to the plaintiff's claims.” Maloney
Gaming Mgmt., L.L.C. v. St. Tammany Par., 456 F.
App'x 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2011). Here, much of the factual
background was gleaned from documents submitted by Ocwen in
support of its motion. These documents are central to
Plaintiffs' claims and are therefore properly before the
Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se. “It is
well-established that ‘pro se complaints are held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.'” Taylor v. Books A Million,
Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir.
1981)). “However, regardless of whether the plaintiff
is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel,
‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to
prevent a motion to dismiss.'” Id. (citing
S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of
the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)
(additional citation omitted)).
characterizes the Complaint as possibly asserting one or both
of the following two claims: (1) violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and (2)
violation of section four of the Clayton Act. The Court's
review of the Complaint does not suggest any additional
claims, and Plaintiffs do not clarify their claims ...