United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division
CARLTON W. REEVES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Docket No. 15. The motion has been fully briefed and is ready
Factual and Procedural History
Marshall was an employee of M-Tek, Inc. for approximately 10
years before she was fired on February 21, 2013. She was
discharged after discovering that a male coworker was being
paid substantially more for the same work. In this suit,
Marshall alleges that M-Tek discriminated and retaliated
against her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act.
bringing this action, she filed two charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. In the first charge,
Marshall complained that she had been discriminated against
because of her sex and suspended in retaliation for
complaining about her unequal pay. Docket No. 15-2 at Exhibit
2. Her second charge of discrimination also was based on
retaliation-this time when she was discharged from her
employment. Id. at Exhibit 3. In letters dated April
30, 2014, the EEOC dismissed the charges and issued notices
of her right to sue. Docket No. 15-3. The disputed facts
regarding when Marshall received those letters will be
discussed below. Marshall did not file this suit until
December 29, 2015.
judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party seeking to avoid summary judgment
must identify admissible evidence in the record showing a
fact dispute. Id. at 56(c)(1). “Once a summary
judgment motion is made and properly supported, the nonmovant
must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in
the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions
will satisfy the nonmovant's burden.” Wallace
v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
Court views the evidence and draws reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Maddox v.
Townsend & Sons, Inc., 639 F.3d 214, 216 (5th Cir.
2011). But the Court will not, “in the absence of any
proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove
the necessary facts.” McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v.
Wash. Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir.),
as revised on denial of reh'g, 70 F.3d 26 (5th
asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because
Marshall's Title VII and EPA claims are time-barred.
Docket No. 16.
Title VII Claims
Under Title VII, . . . a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies before pursuing employment
discrimination claims in federal court. For Title VII . . .
claims, exhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a timely
charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right
to sue. A plaintiff must file her civil suit within ninety
days of receipt of a right-to-sue-letter.
The requirement that a party file a lawsuit within this
ninety-day limitations period under Title VII . . . is
strictly construed. Commencement of the ninety-day period
begins to run on the day that notice is received at the
address supplied to the EEOC by the claimant . . . . This
court routinely dismisses untimely claims involving delays
after receipt of the right-to-sue letter in the absence of a
recognized equitable consideration.
Garcia v. Penske Logistics, L.L.C., 631 F. App'x
204, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks, citations, and
brackets omitted) (emphasis in original); see Stokes v.
Dolgencorp, Inc., 367 F. ...