United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Western Division
DAY DREAMS RESOURCES, LLC, and JERRY P. OGDEN Plaintiffs,
CHARLES D. HUTCHISON, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
DAVID BRAMLETTE, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant's, Charles D. Hutchison's, Motion to Dismiss [docket entry no. 11]. Having considered the motion and responses, applicable statutory and case law, and being otherwise fully informed in the premises, the Court finds as follows:
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Jerry P. Ogden is the sole member and manager of Plaintiff Day Dreams Resources, LLC ("Day Dreams"). Day Dreams entered into an oral contract with Defendant Charles D. Hutchison to acquire interests in the Tuscaloosa Marine Shale, that covers parts of southern Louisiana and southwestern Mississippi, on Hutchison's behalf. On Hutchison's instructions, "Day Dreams and Ogden, or their agent, " were to obtain commitments for lease agreements with the owners of the mineral rights in the land, contingent on receiving clear title. Compl. ¶ 8(c). Day Dreams contracted with Lone Wolf Properties, LLC ("Lone Wolf") to act as its "acquisition agent in providing lease acquisition and other landman services." Compl. ¶ 9. "Hutchison agreed to reimburse Day Dreams for expenditures made for his benefit during the course of acquiring the leases." Compl. ¶ 8(h). Hutchison also agreed to pay Ogden a finder's fee based on the net mineral acreage acquired.
"Day Dreams and/or Lone Wolf acquired for Hutchison's benefit twenty-one (21) oil, gas and mineral leases consisting of 3, 517.455 net mineral acres" from July 2013 to July 2014. Compl. ¶11. Between July and September 2014, Day Dreams identified nineteen more mineral tracts with potential for acquisition for the benefit of Hutchison. In the last week of October 2014, Hutchison instructed Day Dreams, through Ogden, to stop leasing additional acreage. By this time, Day Dreams and/or Lone Wolf had already "leased or committed to lease" ten of those nineteen tracts. Compl. ¶ 13. Day Dreams alleges that Hutchison has refused to pay for these leases, thus requiring Day Dreams and/or Lone Wolf "to fund the lease acquisitions in order to avoid defaulting." Compl. ¶ 15.
Hutchison has moved to dismiss Day Dreams' claims arguing that Day Dreams lacks standing to assert this claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Specifically, Hutchison argues that Day Dreams has not alleged an injury in fact.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). The plaintiff must plead sufficient facts so that the Court may reasonably infer the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. Id . "[A] plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions cannot unlock the doors of discovery." Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383, 393 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
"Constitutional standing is a jurisdictional question." Brown v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 663 F.3d 759, 769 (5th Cir. 2011). A motion to dismiss based on standing is therefore governed by the standard of Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 12(b)(6). Harold H. Huggin Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011). In a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), "a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2011). To establish standing, the plaintiff must meet the elements of (1) an injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). An injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id., at 560 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The cause of the injury must be "fairly traceable" to an action by the defendant "and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). And "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id., at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hutchison argues that Day Dreams has not plead an injury because (1) it is not apparent from the face of the complaint that Day Dreams suffered damage because it pled using the phrase "and/or"; (2) Day Dreams alleged only an insufficient threatened injury from its contract with Lone Wolf.
In its complaint, Day Dreams alleges that either it or its agent Lone Wolf acquired the leases or lease commitments on behalf of Hutchison. See Compl. ¶ 11 ("Day Dreams and/or Lone Wolf acquired...."). Hutchison argues that the use of "and/or" means that the complaint can be read to mean that only Lone Wolf suffered any injury from Hutchison's alleged failure to pay on the contract.
It is true that "even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the case or controversy' requirement, ... the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). But here, Day Dreams is asserting its rights under the contract with Hutchison. The contract, as alleged in the complaint, contemplated that Day Dreams would hire an ...